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The Oriental Policy 
of the United States 



By 
HENRY CHUNG, A. M. 

Compiler of Korean Treaties, Korean Envoy 
to the Paris Conference 



With Introductory Note by 

JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph. D., LL.D. 

Director of Far Eastern Bureau 
Research Professor of Government and Public Admin- 
istration ; New York University 




New York Chicago 

Fleming H. Revell Company 

London and Edinburgh 



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Copyright, 1919, 
FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY 






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New York : 1 58 Fifth Avenue 
Chicago: 17 North Wabash Ave. 
London : 2 1 Paternoster Square 
Edinburgh : 75 Princes Street 



C)C!.A 58 541)9 ^ 



1^0 

The Chinese Students in America 

whose mission it is to emancipate their country 
from the iron-bound traditions of the past and 
to instil the spirit of Western civilization into 
their ancient culture^ so that China henceforth 
will be not a passive and self-contained nation 
but a progressive and dynamic power taking 
its place, along with the United States, in the 
family of the worWs democracies 



Introductory Note 

By 
JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph.D., LL. D. 

THE publication of a book on the Oriental 
policy of the United States is peculiarly 
timely. 

In connection with the discussion and ap- 
proval of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, 
and in connection with the much discussed 
League of Nations, it is essential that the gov- 
ernment of the United States now determine its 
Oriental policy. It seems probable that the 
former policy of the territorial integrity of China 
and the Open Door, with fair dealing and jus- 
tice, should be stated anew with a more vigorous 
determination to give it positive effect. If the 
policy is to be modified, the change should be 
made promptly and the world should know it. 

It is fortunate that this book is written by a 
citizen of the Far East, a Korean. The people 
of the United States need to see clearly the 
view-point of the Orientals. There is little dif- 
ficulty in getting the view-point of the Japanese. 
In fact, it is impossible for any reader of the 
public press to avoid getting the Japanese Gov- 
ernment's view-point. It is much more difficult 
to know what the Chinese are thinking because 
of the great variety of opinions published in the 

7 



8 INTEODUCTOEY NOTE 

press. Even the policy of the government of 
China is varying and undetermined, although 
the sentiments of the Chinese people now seem 
to be crystallizing. On the other hand, it has 
been almost impossible, owing to the Japanese 
censorship, to get an authoritative judgment or 
statement regarding Korean opinion. 

This book is admirably written, and although 
I should not find it possible to agree in all par- 
ticulars with the policies advocated and the 
views expressed, I believe it of very great im- 
portance to the American people that this view 
be known and understood in America. 

The book, aside from expressions of opinions, 
contains very valuable information. Public men 
in the United States will find the documents 
published in the appendices of decided interest. 
They have not been heretofore readily acces- 
sible, but they are important. 

It is especially desirable at this moment to 
be informed as fully as possible regarding the 
relations of Korea and Japan at the time when 
the Japanese Government is asking to have its 
influence over scores of millions of the people 
in China extended and strengthened. The 
whole civilization of the Orient, as well as the 
relations commercial, political and social, be- 
tween the Orient and the West are swinging in 
the balance. 

The public opinion of America and of Europe 
are determining factors. Everything that can 
throw real light upon the situation is valuable. 

This book contains much of importance. It 
should be widely read. 

J.W.J. 



Preface 

THE world's greatest war has come to an 
end, and, in so far as we are able to 
judge, autocracy and militarism have 
been driven from Europe once for all. 

Now the all-important question is : " Is this 
the last war, or has the Peace Conference failed 
to solve the problem, thereby sowing seeds for 
another world war — perhaps more horrible than 
the one just concluded? " 

Political cynics all over the world are already 
beginning to criticize the work of the Peace 
Conference as being no better than that of the 
Congress of Vienna; they assert that all the 
statesmen of the leading Powers went to the 
Peace Conference with the intention of getting 
out of it as much of material gain for their re- 
spective countries as they could, and that they 
have obtained as much as they had expected al- 
though not as much as they wanted; that the 
" Fourteen Points " were made a political re- 
volving door to admit whatever the Powers 
wanted to have included, and to exclude nearly 
everything that did not serve their purposes of 
nationalistic gain ; and that " self-determina- 
tion " of weaker nations turned out to be selfish 

9 



10 PEEFACB 

determination of stronger Powers. These are 
extreme views, unpleasant to be reminded of, 
but, perhaps, they are not without foundation. 
The League of Nations is as yet nothing more 
than a mere experiment, basing its strength 
upon the moral support of humanity. Will it be 
a new Holy AUiance, or will it serve as the 
framework for a world organization that will 
bind humanity into a mosaic of lasting peace 
and mutual good-will? The Peace Conference 
has virtually recognized the validity of secret 
treaties made prior to and during the war. Will 
the Powers, under the guidance of the League 
of Nations, abandon secret diplomacy and dis- 
continue their economic exploitation of less civ- 
ilized lands, thereby surrendering the particular 
purpose of individual states to the common will 
of mankind? Since the League of Nations is a 
league of free nations, will it not, even if it be- 
comes a complete success, be but another nail 
driven into the coffin of the already crushed 
nations, whose claims to the right of resurrec- 
tion were denied them at the Peace Table? It 
must be remembered that a right to revolt 
against foreign oppression is an inalienable 
right — a right upon the foundations of which 
the Fathers of the American Revolution built 
their nation. Peace at any price — especially, at 
the price of the political aspirations of nations 
whose people are crying for justice and free- 



PEEFACE 11 

dom — is the worst kind of tyranny. It is, how- 
ever, quite possible in this pregnant century, 
that a new international standard of moral rec- 
titude will be born of mankind, which will bring 
pressure to bear upon the League so that this 
new world organization will slowly succeed in 
disentangling itself from the many things that 
have bound us in the past, and be guided in its 
actions by a sense of justice that plays no 
favourites. 

These are more or less academic speculations 
that occupy the minds of political students at 
the present as the aftermath of the war and the 
peace settlements. But the most vital question 
that is bound to engage the attention of the 
statesmen of the world is the Far Eastern ques- 
tion. 

The open door in the Far East cannot be 
maintained permanently by a balance of rival 
powers under the guidance of intrigue. China 
must not be left to herself, staggering under the 
strain of " spheres of influence," as she has been 
during the last twenty years. The present 
Eastern question is far more menacing to the 
future peace of the world than was the Balkan 
problem ten years ago. And if the Powers of 
the world do not solve it now by peaceful 
methods, then they must be prepared to solve it 
ten years hence on the field of battle. It must 
be remembered that China has one-fourth of 



12 PEEFACE 

the world's population and an unlimited supply 
of natural resources — especially in coal and iron 
— to be exploited for peace or war. If this res- 
ervoir of power is permitted to be dominated by 
one nation — especially by such an ambitious 
empire as Japan — then it is obvious that the 
world cannot be made "safe for democracy"; 
there will be a drawn dagger at the heart of the 
United States and of the British possessions 
in the Far East. Consolidation of Asia under 
Japanese domination is the vision of the Japa- 
nese statesmen; and toward the attainment of 
this national goal there is unity of purpose 
among Japanese leaders. With this in view, 
Korea was annexed, Manchuria was absorbed, 
Inner Mongolia and Fukien province are being 
overwhelmed, and last but not least, Japan has 
obtained from the Powers at the Peace Confer- 
ence the official recognition of her paramount 
interests in Shantung. At the present rate of 
Japanese aggression, China cannot last very 
long. Shall she be left to her own fate, or will 
the Powers of the West take an active interest 
in the Far Eastern aflFairs and save her national 
entity? The United States is not interested in 
any particular European or Asiatic problem, in- 
dividual in character. But the United States is 
interested in a problem that has far-reaching 
effects on the world's peace and the welfare of 
mankind. What are her obligations, by treaty. 



PEEFAOE 13 

by policy, by moral rights, to her sister Republic 
in the East? These are some of the questions 
the author has in mind in presenting the follow- 
ing chapters. 

The author is not unaware of the possible 
criticism on the part of the reader that Parts I 
and II lack coordination. But the opinion of 
the writers on the Far Eastern questions are so 
often conflicting, even diametrically opposed to 
each other at times between those who regard 
the Japanese as a " model people " and those 
who regard them as "treacherous savages" mas- 
querading in the garb of civilization, that it is 
almost impossible for the average American 
reader to have a clear-cut conception as to what 
the Oriental policy of the United States ought to 
be unless he knows the subtle undercurrent that 
directs, in a large measure, the course of public 
opinion in the West with regard to Japan's for- 
eign policy. In this respect the author feels 
justified in considering the two parts as sup- 
plementary to each other. 

In preparing this volume, the author had at 
his disposal abundant Oriental sources. But he 
took pains to use as much as possible only those 
facts that had been corroborated by Western 
historians and publicists of unquestioned integ- 
rity, in order that the reader may have available 
references for the fuller support of the present 
author's statements. 



14 PREFACE 

In conclusion, the author wishes to express 
his sincere appreciation of the kind encourage- 
ment and constructive criticism given him by 
Professor Hartley Burr Alexander, who has 
aided him to a deeper insight into and higher 
appreciation of Western culture. 

New York, Henry Chung. 



Contents 

PART I 

The Development of the Policy 
Introduction 21 

I. The Opening of the East ... 25 

1. Japan. 

-|f- 2. Korea. 

3. China. 

II. China in the Twentieth Century . 49 

1. "Spheres of Influence" versus *' Open 

Door." 

2. The Boxer Uprising. 

3. The Russo-Japanese Struggle. 

III. Aaierican Rivalry with Japan . . 62 

1. TKe American Fleet in the Far East. 

2. American and British Policies. 

3. " Dollar Diplomacy." 

4. The Twenty-one Demands. 

5. China and the European War. 

IV. The Lansing-I§hii Agreement . , 83 

1. The Diplomatic Procedure. 

2. Reception of the Agreement. 

3. Effect on Japanese Attitude. 

V. Present Policies and Opportunities . icx) 

1. Japanese Plans and Ambitions. 

2. American Duties and Opportunities. 

15 



16 CONTENTS 

PART II 

An Undercurrent Shaping the Policy: 
Japan's Control of Publicity 
Introduction 113 

I. The Official Espionage . , .116 

1. The Philosophy of the System. 

2. Spies in Other Lands. 

3. Espionage in Japan and Korea. 

II. *rHE Government Censorship . .129 

1. Press Censorship. 

2. Censorship of Postal and Telegraphic Com- 

munications. 

III. Publicity Propaganda . . . .144 

1. Official Publications. 

2. Government Agencies in Foreign Lands. 

3. Manipulation of Foreign Visitors in Japan. 

Conclusion 167 

Comparison of Russian and Japanese Diplomacy. 

\ PART III 

Documents in the Case 

A. Treaty Between the United States and Japan . 177 

B. The Emigration Treaty Between China and the 

United States 192 

C. Protocol Between China and the Treaty Powers 

Respecting the Settlement of the Boxer War . 198 

D. The Hay Doctrine of the " Open Door " in China 21 1 

E. The Anglo-Japanese Alliances . . . .216 



CONTENTS 



17 



'^ F. Senate Resolution Requesting the President to 
Transmit to the Senate the Official Correspond- 
ence Between the United States and Korea . 227 

^' G. The President's Reply 228 

^ H. The Kflrean-AmericanJTreaty .... 229 

I. Petition from the Koreans of Hawaii to President 

Roosevelt ..... . . . 241 

American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium 245 

Korea Under Japan .... . — - • 258 

The Root-Takahira Agreement Concerning China 266 
M. Count Okuma's Message to the American People 

Concerning China ..... *70 ■ 

The Twenty-One Demands . . . . 271 ' 

A Resume of Japan's Procedure in Connection 

with the Twenty-One Demands . . . 276 

The Revised Demands Presented by Japan to China 278 
China's Concession to the Demands . . .285 
R. American Note to China and Japan Concerning the 

Agreement . . . . . . .286 

S. The Peking Petition 287 

^T. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement . . . ,289 

U. The New Sino-Japanese Military Agreement . 292 

Selected Bibliography 296 



J. 

K. 

L. 



N. 
O. 

P. 



Maps 



Possessions of the Great Powers in the Pacific . Frontispiece 
"Spheres of Influence" in China — 1898 and 191 8 . 49 
Rail w^ays in China, 191 5 . . . . . 63 

Trade Routes of the Pacific . . . . .83 
China in 1919, Showing Railways and Spheres of In- 
fluence ......>• loi 



PART I 
The Development of the Policy 



Introduction 

SOME years ago Ex-Premier Kang Yu- 
Wei in an address before a group of 
Chinese in California made a statement 
that if China had been a strong and aggressive 
empire, California would be to-day a part of 
Chinese territory/ If we reflect for a moment 
that at the time of the American occupation of 
the Pacific coast, China was nearer to it than 
any other great empire excepting Japan, and 
that travel between China and California was 
less difficult, before the time of railroads, than 
that across the continent, we shall see that this 
utterance from the wise Chinese is not an empty 
remark. As early as 1860 there were 34,933 
Chinese in the United States." And it would 
have been a comparatively easy matter for 

* Kang was premier under the late Emperor Kwang-Hsu, and was 
the leader of the reform movement of 1898. He has been the head 
of Pao Huang Hwei (empire reform association), and is known 
among the Chinese as the " Modern Sage." He made a trip around 
the world in 1905-06 at which time the writer heard him in Cali- 
fornia. 

2 "Thirteenth Census of U. S., Abstract " (1910), p. 79. 
31 



22 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

China, had she been a powerful nation, to send 
colonies to the Pacific coast before that part of 
the continent became a part of the United 
States/ 

It is also easy to believe that had the Ameri- 
can Government, impelled by imperial tenden- 
cies, encouraged its merchants and seamen by 
subsidy and ample protection, the American 
" sphere of influence " would be to-day larger 
than that of any other nation in China, and 
American merchants would be enjoying the 
lion's share of the Oriental trade. The enterpris- 
ing Yankees who sailed to all parts of the globe 
as merchants and fishermen were not at all slow 
in getting their share of the Oriental trade. Thus 
the first American merchant vessel appeared in 
Chinese waters in 1784;* and the commerce of 
the United States in the palmy days of its Ori- 
ental trade was second in volume among that of 
the Western nations. But American statesmen 
of the early period believed that there was 
" room enough for our descendants to the thou- 
sandth and thousandth generation " on this 

8 In 1850 California had a population of 92,597 (most of whom 
went out there after gold was discovered in 1848) ; Oregon had only 
13,294; and the territory of Washington was not yet setoff from 
Oregon, which act came on March 2, 1853. 

* For a full account, see Callahan, " American Relations in the 
Pacific and the Far East," Johns Hopkins University Studies, XIX : 
13 ff. ; also, Coolidge, " The United States as a World Power," 
313 ff- 



INTEODUOTION 23 

continent/ and the American Government was 
too busily occupied with internal problems to 
safeguard the commercial interests of its citi- 
zens in the Far East. The intercourse, there- 
fore, between North America and the Orient, 
built up at the close of the eighteenth century, 
was practically abandoned in later years, and so 
remained until the new efforts of the middle of 
the nineteenth century. 

The industrial revolution of the nineteenth 
century inaugurated indeed a new political 
regime in Europe and in America. By utiliza- 
tion of steam, electricity, and labour-saving ma- 
chinery, an industrial nation can produce manu- 
factured articles far beyond its own needs. Two 
things are essential to commercial expansion of 
a nation — to find raw material either at home or 
abroad, and to find a market for manufactured 
goods. Commerce has become the greatest of 
all political interests. Territories are sought to 
enlarge commerce, and great armies and navies 
are maintained to enforce commercial rights in 
foreign lands. The United States, which had 
remained hitherto a self-contained nation, could 
no longer hold its isolated position. With the 
acquisition of the Philippine Islands, and the 
coming of the " spheres of influence " in China, 
the United States was forced to become an 

8 Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, Richardson, " Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents," i : 321-24. 



24 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

active participant in Oriental politics. From 
now on, American diplomacy was what the Jef- 
fersonian Republicans might have called ag- 
gressive imperialsm. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 

I. Japan 

WHEN Commodore Perry reached 
Japan in 1853, he presented to the 
Emperor of Japan President Fill- 
more's letter asking for the friendship and com- 
mercial intercourse of the two nations. The 
American Government had long since wanted to 
open Japan to American trade. In 1815 Secre- 
tary Monroe had planned to send Commodore 
Porter to open Japan to trade. In 1837 the 
American ship Morrison had arrived in Yedo 
Bay, Japan, in hope of opening up trade, but had 
been driven away by bombardment. The mo- 
tive of the American Government in its attempt 
to open Japan in 1853 was, as stated in Presi- 
dent Fillmore's letter to the Japanese Emperor, 
" friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and 
provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked 
people." The American whale industry in the 
Pacific Ocean about this time was estimated at 
about $17,000,000. In several instances Ameri- 
can whalers had been wrecked on the Japanese 
coasts and the crews had been maltreated by the 
Japanese officials, as in the case of the Lawrence 

25 



26 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

in 1846, and the Ladoga in 1848. Then, too, it 
was quite necessary for ocean liners plying be- 
tween California and China to stop over in Jap- 
anese ports to provision themselves. In addi- 
tion to all these material reasons, there was 
some sense of moral duty on the part of Chris- 
tian America to open up heathen Japan to the 
penetrating rays of Christian civilization. In- 
deed, as early as 1816, John Quincy Adams 
urged the opening of Japan as a duty of Chris- 
tian nations. 

Between 1854, when the first American-Jap- 
anese treaty was signed at Yokohama, and 1899, 
when the Western nations recognized the full 
sovereignty of Dai Nippon, many significant 
historical events happened in the Sunrise King- 
dom. It was during the early part of this 
period that the Japanese embassies returned 
from Europe and America with the astonishing 
discovery that " it is not the foreigners, but we 
ourselves who are barbarous." Japanese stu- 
dents were sent abroad to learn Western arts 
and sciences; foreign teachers were employed 
to reorganize the school system; the army was 
organized after the Western model, and the navy 
changed from fishermen's junks to iron-clad 
men-of-war; and feudal barons were forced to 
give up their powers to the central government. 
In short, Japan emerged from a state of mediae- 
val feudalism into that of a modern constitu- 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 27 

tional monarchy, strongly centralized and highly 
efficient in its working order. In the Boxer up- 
rising, 1900, she joined hands with the Western 
nations, and in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-6, 
she completely surprised the world with the 
efficiency of her mihtary organization. It was 
the first time since the Turk had pounded the 
gates of Vienna that a heathen nation of the 
East had shown itself able successfully to meet 
a Christian power of the West on the military 
field. With good reason did President Roose- 
velt pay high tribute in his message to Con- 
gress, 1906, to the spirit and methods of Japan 
in her acceptance and promotion of modern 
civilization; and it was largely through the in- 
strumentality of President Roosevelt that the 
peace negotiations at Portsmouth were brought 
to a successful issue. When in 1908 Japan sent 
her first envoy, Viscount Shuzo Aoki, to the 
United States with the rank of Ambassador, it 
was the culmination of the long friendship be- 
tween the two countries. 

American relations with Japan in interna- 
tional questions have always been fair, and Jap- 
anese statesmen have looked up to the United 
States for moral support in their struggle for 
recognition by the Western Powers.' They 

* The United States was the first of Western nations to with- 
draw the right of extra-territoriality from Japan by a treaty signed 
Nov. 22, 1894. See Part III. 



28 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

knew the American lack of sinister designs 
in foreign lands, and had the utmost faith 
in the American sense of fair play, until the 
question of Japanese immigration and citizen- 
ship in America came up. This embarrassing 
question was complicated by discriminatory 
laws passed by some of the western states of 
the American Union — especially California — 
against aliens not qualified for citizenship. The 
labour element on the Pacific coast carried on a 
crusade against the Japanese on the grounds 
that the market for labour was cheapened by the 
presence of the Orientals. Politicians found a 
popular issue in vehement denunciations of the 
Japanese. For a time the Japanese question in 
California, serving as a football in local politics, 
furnished a source of grave complications be- 
tween America and Japan. 

It is not the purpose of this study to trace the 
historical relations between the United States 
and Japan, nor to deal with the Japanese prob- 
lem within the United States. Many excellent 
volumes have been written on these topics.' 

* On the historical relations between Japan and the United States, 
P. J. Treat, " Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States 
and Japan ; " John W. Foster, " American Diplomacy in the 
Orient ; " W, E. Griffis, " America in the East ; " J. M. Callahan, 
" American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East," are among 
the best accounts. For full treatment of the Japanese question in 
the United States, see : Sidney L. Gulick, " The American Japanese 
Problem ; " K. K. Kawakami, " American Japanese Relations, 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 29 

SufHce it to say here that the present friendship 
between the United States and Japan is largely 
traditional/ although the recent Imperial Com- 
mission headed by Viscount Ishii painted over 
the ugly spots of local friction with a fresh var- 
nish of alliance against the " Common Enemy,"* 
and the Japanese question in the United States 
is still an unsettled issue. No unbiased student 
of international relations will deny that a sover- 
eign nation has a right to close its doors to 
undesirable immigrants, or that citizenship is a 
privilege to be granted and not a universal right 
to be claimed by every alien that comes to its 
shores. But in the interest of fairness, the ques- 
tion presents itself, should the United States, 
the champion of world democracy, continue to 
deny its citizenship, which is open to all other 
races, including the blacks from the jungles of 
Africa, to Asiatics permanently settled in this 
country, who have educational and financial 
qualifications for all the duties and obligations 
of American citizenship? The future affairs of 
the world must be settled by both the white and 

Asia at the Door; " Harry Alvin Mills, "The Japanese Problem in 
the United States ; " Lindsay Russell, " America to Japan ; " Monta- 
ville Flowers, " Japanese Conquest of American Opinion; " J. F. 
Steiner, " The Japanese Invasion," 

' Cf. K. K. Kawakami, " Japan and the United States," Atlantic 
119:671-81, May, 1917. 

*See Viscount Ishii's speeches during his visit in America, 1917, 
together with editorial comments on them by the American press. 



30 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

the yellow races. Let it be known to the states- 
men of the world — especially to the American 
statesmen — that the ultimate welfare of the hu- 
man race depends largely upon the wise ad- 
justment of the relations between these two 
dominant races, that the peace of the world 
cannot be "planted upon the tested founda- 
tions of political liberty," unless this compli- 
cated problem is correctly solved. Surely the 
American public should not, through indiffer- 
ence, leave this problem to the hands of agita- 
tors and propagandists, when a lasting solution 
can be made only in the light of its best reason 
and highest wisdom. 

(2. Korea 

Before passing to the Chinese question, it 
might be worth our while to take a glance at the 
closing chapter of the least known nation — once 
a nation — in Asia. 

The United States was the first Western 
power to enter the gates of Korea." The first 
article of the Korean-American treaty signed at 
Wonsan, Korea, May 22, 1882 (ratifications ex- 
changed at Seoul, Korea, May 19, 1883), reads 
as follows: 

" There shall be perpetual peace and friend- 
ship between the President of the United States 

■ For early diplomatic intercourse between America and 
Korea, see Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," 
chap. IX. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 31 

and the King of Chosen and citizens and sub- 
jects of their respective governments. If other 
powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either 
government, the other will exert their good 
ofjfices, on being informed of the case, to bring 
about an amicable arrangement, thus showing 
their friendly feelings." ' 

Interpreting this diplomatic phraseology into 
every-day language, it meant that America 
would stand sponsor for the political independ- 
ence and territorial integrity of Korea. And- 
the simple-minded Korean Government from 
the Emperor down literally believed in it. In 
fact, they had no reason to doubt the sincerity 
of the United States. They saw the splendid 
work of American philanthropy through mis- 
sionary channels ; the integrity of the American 
Government was exemplified by the integrity of 
American citizens there. They thought that 
there was at least one great nation that was un- 
selfish and honest and upon which they could 
rely for support, as it was provided in the 
Korean-American treaty, whenever their na- 
tional life was in jeopardy. American citizens 
were accorded greater privilege than any other 
foreigners in Korea. The first Korean rail- 
way — Seoul-Chemulpo line — was built and 
owned by an American concern; the first elec- 

' Complete text of the treaty reprinted in Senate Docu- 
ment, No. 342, 64th Congress, 1st Session. 



32 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

trie plant in Korea was installed by the Edison 
Company in 1895. The first and largest elec- 
tric road and water works in Korea were built 
and owned by Americans/ The richest gold 
mine in Korea was given to an American firm. 
Dr. Horace N. Allen, former American minister 
to Korea, thus describes the gaining of the con- 
cession : "As the result of a long train of circum- 
stances, it had become known to me exactly 
which district was considered the richest by the 
natives, and it was this district, twenty-five by 
thirty miles in extent, that I named in the con- 
cession.*'^ It must be remembered that America 
did not get all these concessions from Korea by 
force as European nations got theirs in China. 
They were given to American concerns by the 
Korean Government in return for the good will 
and friendship of the United States. 

Numerous other American industries in Korea 
might be mentioned, but it is enough to say that 
while Korea was an independent nation, the 
American business man had the best of the ad- 
vantages open to foreigners in Korea. After 
mapping out her imperial program, and through 
the clever use of her publicity propaganda' 
Japan convinced the American public — espe- 

'See Horace N. Allen, "Things Korean," chap. XIV; 
Thomas F. Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," chap. XII, 
" The Open Door in Korea." 

* Allen, "Things Korean," pp. 232-233. 

» See Part II. 



THE OPENING OP THE EAST 33 

daily official Washington — that she must have 
Korea in order to preserve peace in the Far 
East. "Japan began and carried through this 
whole matter," said Homer B. Hulbert, an 
American educator and for some time political 
adviser to the Korean Emperor, " by clever use 
of misinformation and broken promises, which 
successfully hoodwinked the American pub- 
lic."" 

The first obvious step taken by the United 
States in handing Korea over to Japan was at 
the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, when 
Japan violated Korean neutrality and exacted 
certain concessions from the Korean Govern- 
ment under " military necessity." The Secre- 
tary of State, John Hay, instructed the American 
minister at Seoul, Horace N. Allen, to observe 
strict neutrality and not cable the text of any 
agreement that Korea and Japan might come 
to." This was undoubtedly done to avoid recog- 
nition of Korea's appeal against Japanese ag- 
gressions. 

The next move the United States made to aid 
Japan in this game of Oriental politics was the 
recall of Dr. Allen from Korea. Dr. Allen had 
stayed in Korea over twenty years and was 
highly esteemed by both the natives and for- 

" Homer B. Hulbert, " The Passing of Korea," p. 462. 

"Cablegram sent from Washington, Feb. 23, 1904; re- 
corded in Senate Document, No. 342 p. 11, 64th Congress, 
1st Session. 



h 






34 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

eigners. When the Japanese began to tighten 
their grip in the peninsula, he told his govern- 
ment a few unpalatable truths about what the 
Japanese were doing in Korea. Immediately 
subtle influences were put in operation at Wash- 
ington intimating that Minister Allen was a 
persona non grata to the Japanese. As a result 
Dr. Allen, despite his unquestioned integrity 
and long years of loyal service to his govern- 
ment, was summarily recalled, to the great sur- 
prise and indignation of American communities 
in Korea. 

When hostilities began between Russia and 
Japan, America was officially neutral, but her 
sympathies were with Japan. There were three 
possible reasons for this: (1) Japan through her 
publicity propaganda created a favourable opin- 
ion of herself in America;" (2) Japan bor- 
rowed vast sums of money from America for 
war purposes, and Japanese success was natu- 
rally wished for by American capitalists; (3) at 
the beginning of the war Japan was thought of 
by the outside world as an " under-dog " trying 
to get loose from the brutal clutch of the Rus- 
sian Bear. An incident which happened at 
Chemulpo Harbour immediately preceding the 
naval encounter of the two belligerents fur- 

"For various methods of controlling American public 
opinion by Japan in regard to Japanese affairs, see Part II, 
"Japan's Control of Publicity." See also Flowers, "Japanese 
Conquest of American Opinion." 



THE OPENING OP THE EAST 35 

nishes an illuminating illustration of American 
attitude toward the three nations directly con- 
cerned in the war, — ^Japan, Russia, and Korea. 

On February 9, 1904, Admiral Uriu, the com- 
mander of the Japanese fleet, sent an ultimatum 
to the captain of the Variag, the Russian war- 
ship lying in the harbour of Chemulpo, that he 
would give the Russian ships until twelve 
o'clock to leave the harbour, and if they had not 
moved by four o'clock that afternoon, the 
Japanese fleet would come in and sink them at 
their anchorage — in a neutral port of a neutral 
country. 

There were at that time in the harbour four 
other foreign war-ships : the Talbot (British), the 
Blba (ItaHan), the Pascal (French), and the 
Vickshurg (American). The commander of the 
British war-ship, notwithstanding the fact that 
Great Britain was an ally of Japan, was indig- 
nant at the insolence of the Japanese Admiral, 
and invited the commanders of the other for- 
eign ships to a conference on board the Talbot 
to decide what action should be taken. " The 
British, French, and Italian commanders at once 
decided that Admiral Uriu was proposing to 
commit a gross breach of international law, and 
they unanimously resolved to give the Russian 
ships whatever protection they could. A mes- 
sage was sent to the commander of the Variag 
informing him of this determination, and ad- 



36 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICT 

vising him to refuse to leave the harbour.** 
But the captain of the Vicksburg explained to 
the other commanders that he had received ex- 
plicit instructions from his government to re- 
main strictly neutral in the coming event. And 
the American war-ship Vicksburg, with its proud 
name, skulked into the inner harbour of safety. 
The Russian naval ofHcers keenly resented this 
action of the Vicksburg, and the Russian press 
made bitter references to this incident as well 
as to the generally pro-Japanese tendency in 
America at that time as a breach of the historic 
friendship between America and Russia." 

At the time of the Portsmouth Conference 
between Russia and Japan, July, 1905, the 
Koreans in Hawaii sent their two delegates, 
Syngman Rhee and P. K. Yoon, to present a 
petition to President Roosevelt, asking that he 
" see to it that Korea may preserve her autono- 
mous government."" The delegates were re- 
ceived unofficially, and their petition was given 
a sympathetic consideration. But this did not 

"For full discussion o£ this incident, see Millard, "The 
New Far East " chap. V. 

" Ever since the birth of the American nation, there has 
been no serious friction of any kind between the United 
States and Russia. During the Civil War the Russian fleet 
anchored outside the New York Harbour. It was generally 
understood, although not officially stated, that in case Eng- 
land and France took sides with the South, Russia would 
intervene on behalf of the North. Thus the Russian fleet 
gave no small moral support to the cause of the Union. 

" See full text of the petition, Part III, I. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 37 

change the President's settled policy toward 
Korea. When the Emperor of Korea sent 
Homer B. Hulbert to present his letter to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt asking for aid against Japan's 
aggression, Mr. Hulbert was refused an inter- 
view by both the President and Secretary of 
State Root on one excuse after another until it 
was too late." " So far from pleading the case 
of Korea with Japan, America was the first to 
fall in with and give its open assent to the 
destruction of the old administration. On the 
first intimation from Japan it agreed, without 
inquiry and with almost indecent haste, to with- 
draw its minister from Seoul." " 

When the United States declared neutrality 
at the beginning of the recent European war, 
the very men who ignored treaty obligations 
and handed over, as far as America was con- 
cerned, the " Belgium of the East " to Japan, 
Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, were the 
loudest in denouncing the Wilson Administra- 
tion for not going to war against Germany in 
defense of Belgian neutrality. There was no 
treaty binding upon the United States to defend 
Belgium against the unrighteous aggressor as in 
the case of Korea. The Democratic President 
and Congress retaliated by publishing the ac- 

"For a full description of Hulbert's mission, see Part 
III, J, "American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Bel- 
gium." 

" F. A. McKenzie, " Tragedy of Korea," p. 131. 



38 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

counts of the Roosevelt and Root Administra- 
tion ignoring Korea's appeal in the last days 
of her struggle against Japan." For the first 
time the part played, or not played, by the 
United States in that tragedy in the Far East 
came to light. When newspaper reporters in- 
terviewed Root on the subject, he refused to 
comment on it. Alvey A. Adee, who was the 
Second Assistant Secretary of State under Root, 
and who is the star witness of the Korean case 
at Washington, also refused to comment on the 
matter, but said, " It is ancient history, any- 
how." " 

Korea was the bone of contention of the East 
for a number of years. It was only through a 
favourable combination of circumstances that 
Japan was enabled to occupy it. Russia gave 
her consent to Japanese occupation as her war 
indemnity ; England welcomed the expansion of 
her ally's influence on the mainland of Asia to 
checkmate^^the Russian advance and to protect 
the British interests in the East, so that she 
might concentrate her navy in the North Sea to 
counteract Germany. But the United States, 
instead of gaining something by the " deal," 
lost all the advantages she had held before. Be- 
fore the Russo-Japanese War, American busi- 
ness men enjoyed the largest share of foreign 



^^ Senate Document, No. 342, 64th Congress, ist Session. 
^ " Ne-iv York Times, March 6, 1916. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 39 

trade in Korea and Manchuria/" But now their 
place is taken by Japanese. The American policy 
then, as now, was not motivated by material 
gains. The statesmen at Washington were con- 
vinced that Korea was utterly " incapable of in- 
dependence " — the same kind of conviction that 
Metternich had toward Italy, George III to- 
ward American colonies, and the statesmen of 
the Central Powers toward Serbia, Belgium, 
and all the constituent states of Austria-Hun- 
gary. The principle of " no people must be 
forced under sovereignty under which it does 
not wish to live " " was as yet too far off an 
ideal to be a common expression of American 
statesmen. 

The Korean people learned too late that there 
is no such a thing as international honesty, and 
that treaty obligations backed by no force are 
not worth the paper upon which they are 
written. The United States was the first of 
Western nations to enter Korea, the first to 
enjoy the preferential treatment and commer- 
cial advantages in that land, and the first to 
desert her in the time of her dire need of Amer- 
ican friendship. Dr. Allen well sums up the 
case of Korean- American treaty obligations in 
the following words: 

'" See Alleu, " Things Korean," pp. 215, if. 
"From President Wilson's Message to Russia, May 26. 
1917. 






40 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

" Korea has taken that treaty to mean just 
what the words say, while we seem to have 
utterly disregarded the solemn promise we 
therein voluntarily made, that we would lend 
her our good offices should she be oppressed by 
a third power; thus breaking faith with a people 
who trusted us implicitly, and who consented to 
the opening of her doors on this guarantee of 
friendly aid." *' 

Thus the United States of America " sneered 
at freedom and lent arms to the tyrant " in the 
demolition of a civilization that began long be- 
fore David became the king of Israel.'* ^ 

3. China 

A prominent Western historian and scientist 
won distinction for a time by his advocacy of 
a novel idea that a nation, like an individual, has 
its infancy, maturity, senility, and final extinc- 
tion.^ This idea was supported by a few super- 
ficial observers of Oriental politics who main- 
tained that the Eastern nations had long since 
reached the summit of their evolution, and that 
no further progress in the future was to be ex- 

» Allen, "Things Korean," p. 214. 

*'For antiquity of Korean civilization, see W. E. GriflSs, 
;• Corea— The Hermit Nation " ; H. B. Hulbert, " The Pass- 
ing of Korea." 

" See John William Draper, " History of the Intellectual 
Development of Europe." 



THE OPENING OP THE BAST 41 

pected," Interesting though these theories may- 
be, they have little historical foundation. A na- 
tion may have ebbs and flows of civilization in 
the cycle of its life, but there is no reason for 
its predestined maturity and decay except 
through its adoption of wrong institutions. 
Egypt in Africa, Italy in Europe, and China in 
Asia furnish ample evidences to upset the 
theory of an analogy between the life of a 
nation and that of an individual. 

When China opened her gates to the treaty 
powers of the West, her civilization was at its 
ebb. The China that Marco Polo found in the 
thirteenth century was undoubtedly in a higher 
stage of civilization than the China of the nine- 
teenth century. The " foreign-devil " notion 
and the spirit of exclusiveness were not the atti- 
tude of China toward foreigners in the Middle 
Ages. On the contrary, the alien then enjoyed 
in China rights and privileges such as he could 
enjoy in few, if any, countries of modern times. 
" The imperial government placed the aliens 
practically on the same footing as its own sub- 
jects: it opened to them public employments 
and extended to them the fullest protection. 
Olopun, one of the Nestorians who entered 
China in the Tang Dynasty, was raised to the 

" See Henry Sumner Maine's "Ancient Law" and his the- 
ory of progressive and non-progressive races together with 
the theories advanced by his followers along the same line. 



42 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

rank of high priest and national protector by 
Emperor Kautsung. Marco Polo, though a 
Venetian by birth, was appointed to the office 
of prefect of Yangchow, which he held for three 

St 3S 

years. 

When the Portuguese first entered the Can- 
ton River in 1517, they were received in a 
kindly spirit. But their greedy and high-handed 
methods in their relations with the natives 
turned the feeling of amity into one of hatred, 
and caused the Ming Emperor in 1545 to issue 
an edict to attack the foreigners. The Span- 
iards made their appearance in 1575, but they 
were as cruel and greedy as the Portuguese, and 
failed to restore the prestige of Westerners in 
the eyes of the Chinese. The successive events 
of European expansion in the East, — the con- 
quest of the East Indies, and the forcible occu- 
pation of parts of India and the Malay Penin- 
sula by Portuguese adventurers, — awakened the 
suspicions of the Chinese as to the ulterior 
motives of the foreigners rapidly flocking to 
their shores. At this early period of European 
intercourse, China unfortunately received a bad 
impression that all Europeans were barbarians 
and adventurers. 

Commercial relations between England and 

China began in 1635, when Captain John Wed- 

dell was sent to China with a small fleet of 

" V. K. W. Koo, " The Status of Aliens in China," p. 19. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 43 

vessels. Later two missions — one under the 
Earl of Macartney in 1793, and the other under 
Lord Amherst in 1816 — were sent to China 
from England for the purpose of arriving at a 
better understanding in regard to the trade 
relations between the two countries. Lord 
Napier was appointed as Commercial Superin- 
tendent of the British Government in China in 
1833, when the control of the British trade at 
Canton passed out of the hands of the East 
India Company. All the British had accom- 
plished during the two hundred years of com- 
mercial intercourse with China was the estab- 
lishment of a trading post in Canton. Their 
attempt to enter into a cordial relationship with 
China on the basis of international comity and 
mutual understanding had been a complete fail- 
ure. The Chinese continued to suspect the 
motive of the foreigner and treated him as a 
barbarian. This suspicion and hatred was in- 
tensified when opium was forced upon China 
through the muzzles of the British men-of-war, 
and the Chinese Government was compelled to 
submit to the demands of the British." 
The treaty of Nanking, signed at the close of 

*' The treaty was signed in 1842 at the close of the " Opium 
War." By this treaty, the island of Hongkong was ceded to 
Great Britain, an indemnity was paid for the opium des- 
troyed, official correspondence was to be carried on on equal 
terms, and Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai 
were opened to foreign trade as treaty ports, where for- 
eigners could reside. 



44 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

the first Anglo-Chinese War, did not settle all 
the pending issues between the Chinese and the 
British. The constant friction between the 
Chinese and the British officials in regard to 
their respective rights, and the continuance of 
opium smuggling by the British merchants at 
Canton and Hongkong, furnished causes for an- 
other war. This time the French, actuated 
partly by the desire to seek reparation for the 
massacre of a missionary in West Kwangsi, and 
partly by the spirit of imperial aggrandizement, 
joined with the English in war against China. 
The allied forces took Canton, and then carried 
war to the north. The Chinese were forced to 
sue for peace, and the war was brought to a 
close by the treaty of Tientsin, signed June 26, 
1859. The treaty provided among other things 
the right of residence by foreign ministers in 
Peking, the opening of five additional treaty 
ports, and the toleration of the Christian re- 
ligion.'* The Chinese, later on, tried to evade 
the carrying out of these provisions. This 
caused the allied armies to make an expedition 
to Peking, where they burned the Summer 
Palace as a punitive measure, and compelled the 
Chinese Government to sign another treaty on 
October 22, 1860. In addition to the terms of 



"At this time the United States and Russia also made 
treaties with China, although they took no part in the con- 
flict. 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 45 

the treaty of Tientsin, Kowloon was ceded to 
the British and Tientsin was opened as a treaty- 
port. Foreign ministers for the first time took 
up their residence in Peking, Anson Burlingame 
representing the United States.** 

Repeated defeats and humihations caused the 
Chinese Government to make feeble attempts 
at reform. In 1867 the first Chinese embassy 
was sent to foreign countries for the purpose of 
winning for China more favourable treatment 
from Western nations. The embassy was headed 
by Anson Burlingame, who had completed his 
term as the first American minister to China. 
This was the beginning of American prestige in 
the Far East. Minister Burlingame, through 
his personal integrity and diplomatic foresight, 
won the respect and confidence of the Chinese. 
He convinced the Chinese Government that his 
country of all Western nations had no ulterior 
motives in Chinese territory.*" The most notable 
achievement of the embassy was the conclusion 
of the treaty of 1868 with the United States. 
" It stipulated the territorial integrity of China 
by disavowing any right to interfere with its 
eminent domain or sovereign jurisdiction over 



"For Burlingame's career as the American minister to 
China, see U. S. "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1862-68, 
China ; Martin's " Cathay," pt. II, chap. II. 

*° See U. S. " Diplomatic Correspondence," 1S68, pt. I, pp. 
493, 502, 601; 1870, pp. 317, 332; 1871, p. 166; Martin's 
"Cathay," p. 374; Speer's "China," p. 429. 



46 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

its subjects and property; it recognized the 
right of China to regulate its internal trade not 
affected by treaty; provided for the appoint- 
ment of consuls ; secured exemption from perse- 
cution or disability on account of reHgion; 
recognized the right of voluntary emigration; 
pledged the privilege of residence and travel in 
either country on the basis of most favoured 
nation; granted the privilege of schools and 
colleges; disavowed the intention to interfere 
in the domestic administration of China in re- 
spect to public improvements, but expressed 
the willingness of the United States to aid in 
such enterprise when requested by China." " 

All these outward signs of change and reform 
did not affect the core of China. The depths of 
Chinese conservatism were like those of a vast 
ocean undisturbed by the surface ripples of wars 
and treaties. The literati of China were as firm 
as ever in their beHef that China was the center 
of the world's culture — hence the name, "Middle 
Kingdom " — and that all the foreign nations 
were barbarians. When the first imperial 
audience for foreign ambassadors was held in 

"Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient" pp. 365- 
366. The vohmtary emigration clause of this treaty was 
revised later, and exclusion laws were passed against Chinese 
labourers. For voluminous findings of investigating com- 
mittees, debates in Congress, editorial comments pro and con 
on the subject, see " Select List of References on Chinese 
Immigration," compiled by A. P. C. GrifBn, Library of Con- 
gress, Washington, 1904, 



THE OPENING OF THE EAST 47 

Peking in 1873, it took place in the " Pavilion 
of Purple Light," a hall used for receiving 
tributary nations. Something decidedly violent 
was needed to stir the complacency of the 
Chinese and upset their naive attitude of 
superiority. Now Japan was ready to play her 
role in Eastern politics. 

For centuries China considered Korea as a 
vassal nation ^ and Japan as an archipelago of 
barbarous tribes. Japan patiently forebore the 
insolence of China during the early period of 
Meiji Era with the anticipation of coming back 
at her later. After the internal troubles were 
settled and the country was thoroughly organ- 
ized on a modern basis, the Japanese statesmen 
launched the program of imperial expansion, 
and hastened military and naval preparations 
with astonishing rapidity for what they deemed 
to be the inevitable conflict with China. When 
they thought they were sufficiently prepared, 
they struck the blow in 1894, and China was 
completely prostrated.'* 

** Korea had her autonomy in all its essentials. Dynasties 
changed, wars and treaties were made with foreign countries 
without regard to China. See Bishop, " Korea and Her 
Neighbours " ; Griffis, " Corea — The Hermit Nation " ; Long- 
ford, " The Story of Korea " ; McKenzie, " The Tragedy of 
Korea"; Hulbert, "The History of Korea." 

''For the causes of the war, see Sengman Rhee, "The 
Spirit of Korean Independence," pp. 164-173 (Korean) ; 
"U. S. Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 5-23; 
Williams, "History of China," pp. 437-444; Griffis, "Corea," 
pp. 460-462 ; Henry Norman, " The People and Politics of 



48 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

The United States performed an important 
mission during and at the close of the war. 
When the war was declared, both belligerent 
countries intrusted the archives and property of 
their legations and consulates and the interests 
of their subjects in the enemy country to the 
care of the United States ministers and consuls 
in the respective countries. At the close of the 
conflict, peace overtures were made through 
American ministers both at Peking and Tokyo." 
Thus the United States proved herself a dis- 
interested friend to both China and Japan, and 
established the foundation for further diplo- 
matic achievements in the East. The Emperor 
of Japan, soon after the close of the war, sent a 
letter to the President of the United States ex- 
pressing his cordial thanks for the good offices 
of the United States during the war. A similar 
sentiment was expressed by China through Li 
Hung Chang on his visit to the United States 
in 1896." 

the Far East," pp. 259-266; Curzon, "Far East," pp. 196- 
208. 

For the events of the war, see " Foreign Relations," 1894, 
Appendix I, pp. 44-104 ; Williams, " China," pp. 444-459 ; 
" Vladimir," " The China-Japan War," London, 1896, pts. II 
and III, Appendix D, F-H. For results of the war, see J. H, 
Wilson, U. S. A., " China, Travels in the Middle Kingdom," 
chap. XX. 

** For peace negotiations, see " Foreign Relations," 1894, 
Appendix I, pp. 29-106 ; 1895, p. 969 ; " History of Peace 
Negotiations Between China and Japan," officially revised, 
Tientsin, 1895 ; Williams, " China," p. 459. 

*^ See " Memoirs of Li Hung Chang," edited by W. F. 
Mannix, Shanghai, 1912. 



II 

CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 

I. " Spheres of Influence " vs. " Open Door " 

THE position of China at the opening of 
the twentieth century was pecuHar. 
The China-Japanese War, 1894-95, re- 
vealed the utter helplessness of China. When 
the three European powers — Germany, France, 
and Russia — sent a notice to Japan to withdraw 
from the mainland of Asia and to return to 
China the conquered territory of the Liaotung 
Peninsula, they did not do so with the altruistic 
motive of helping China preserve her territorial 
integrity. Their action was motivated, as was 
proved by subsequent events, by a desire to curb 
the expansion of Japanese influence on the 
Asiatic mainland, and to appropriate for them- 
selves, in time, what Japan wanted as a prize of 
her victory. The downfall of China was pre- 
dicted, and the partition of that vast empire 
among civilized nations was freely discussed. 
Then arose the " sphere of influence " doctrine. 
This peculiar modern doctrine, paraphrased, 

49 



50 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

means that each nation that has some interest 
in China shall map out a certain district as its 
own sphere in which it will have a paramount 
influence, and out of which other nations must 
stay. In case of final partition, each district 
thus mapped out will become a territory of its 
respective owner. Even in far-off China, as in 
Europe proper, the spirit of European rivalry 
was based on the theory and practice of bal- 
ance of power. And every incident was utilized 
as a pretext to press upon the Chinese Govern- 
ment claims for leases, concessions, and privi- 
leges of one kind or another. 

Germany fired the opening gun in this Euro- 
pean lease scramble in China. In 189T two Ger- 
man missionaries were killed by a Chinese mob. 
The German Government lost no time in seiz- 
ing this opportunity. German men-of-war ap- 
peared promptly in Kiaochow Bay, occupied 
the city, demanded, as an indemnity, the lease of 
Kiaochow for ninety-nine years, and the recog- 
nition of a German sphere of influence in the 
greater part of Shantung Peninsula. These de- 
mands were complied with by the Chinese Gov- 
ernment in the treaty signed March 8, 1898. 

This move of Germany turned loose the 
pent-up ambition of European nations to ex- 
ploit China. Russia, who had already held rail- 
road franchises in northern Manchuria, now ap- 
proached China with cajolery, intimidation, and 



CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 61 

promises of aid in case of further aggression by 
other European nations/ and succeeded in leas- 
ing Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent 
waters as naval bases. The Manchurian Rail- 
way Company under Russian control was given 
the right to construct a branch line to Port 
Arthur. England forced China to sign a lease 
of Weihaiwei together with the adjacent 
waters, July 1, 1898. In like manner France 
occupied Kwangchow Bay under a ninety-nine 
year lease; and Italy obtained the right to de- 
velop the port of Sanmun. In April, 1898, 
England and Russia made an agreement that 
Russia should have her sphere of influence to 
the north of the Great Wall of China, and Eng- 
land to have hers to the south. 

The movement for the partition of China was 
thus well under way. Unless some counteract- 
ing influence was introduced, China no longer 
could maintain her national entity. The United 
States with her newly acquired insular posses- 
sions in the East could not afford to be in- 
different to the partition of China. There were 
two courses open to her: She had either to 
deviate entirely from her traditional foreign 
policy and seize her share of land and commer- 
cial advantages in China, regardless of justice 
and fairness to the Chinese, or to exercise her 

* For Russian intrigues in China, see Rhee, " The Spirit of 
Korean Independence," pp.. 173, ff. 



52 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

good offices to preserve the integrity of the 
Chinese Empire. She chose the nobler way. 

'^On September 6, 1899, the Secretary of State, 
John Hay, addressed notes to England, Ger- 
many, and Russia, and later to France, Italy, 
and Japan, declaring the " open door " doctrine 
in China.* This formal protest of the United 
States in behalf of China requested the Powers 
to give their official assurances to the effect: 
(1) that they would not interfere with any 
treaty port or vested interest in their respective 
spheres of influence; (2) that the Chinese tariff 
should continue to be collected by Chinese of- 
ficials; (3) that they would not discriminate 
against other foreigners in the matter of port 
dues or railroad rates.' England expressed her 
willingness to sign such a declaration, and other 
powers, while carefully avoiding to commit 
themselves, showed their accord with the prin- 
ciples set forth by Mr. Hay. These principles, 
together with the principle of the territorial and 

' For full discussion of diplomatic intercourse between the 
United States and other powers and the part played by John 
Hay, consult W. R. Thayer, "Life and Letters of John 
Hay," 2 vols., 1915. 

• This doctrine is being violated by Japanese in Manchuria 
now. Japanese merchants through government subsidies, 
special railway rebates, preferential customs treatment, and 
exemption from internal taxation, have monopolized the 
Manchurian market. Consult Millard, " The Far Eastern 
Question," chaps. XV-XX; Hollington K. Tong, "American 
Money and Japanese Brains in China," Review of Reviews, 
53 : 452-455, April, 1916 ; " Japan, China, and American 
Money," Harper's Weekly, 62 : 298-299, March 25, 1916. 



CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH OENTUEY 53 

administrative integrity of China, were empha- 
sized by the American Government in the settle- 
ment of the Boxer trouble in China, and since 
then the principle of the " open door *' in China 
has become an American doctrine, recognized as 
such by the Powers just as the time-honoured 
Monroe Doctrine is recognized. ? 

2. The Boxer Uprising 
The rapid foreign exploitation of Chinese 
territory, the introduction of Christianity into 
China, the constant bullying of the natives by 
foreigners, aroused the Chinese to concerted 
action. To the fogyish Chinese mind, every- 
thing foreign was repulsive. They could not 
distinguish the work of an American missionary 
from the opium traffic of a British merchant. 
The only way, they thought, that they could 
enjoy again the undisturbed peace of the old 
times was to drive all the " foreign devils " out 
of the country. Prince Tuan, an influential 
reactionary, formed an organization known as 
the Society of Boxers to expel all foreigners 
from China. This movement was secretly en- 
couraged by the Empress Dowager, who was 
holding the supreme power in China after the 
coup d'etat in 1898, and by all the reactionary 
officials under her. The movement spread like 
wild-fare, and the army of Boxers joined by im- 
perial forces occupied Peking. Foreign repre- 



54 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

sentatives fled to the British Legation. Many 
tragic incidents occurred to both the Chinese 
and the foreigners in China during the struggle.* 
Promptly an expeditionary force composed of 
English, French, German," Russian, Japanese, 
and American soldiers marched to Peking and 
lifted the siege. The imperial court fled west- 
ward, and later appointed Li Hung Chang as its 
representative to negotiate with the Powers. 

This was the most critical period of Chinese 
history in recent times. China had incurred 
** well-nigh universal indignation," as Minister 
Wu expressed it, when he was presenting a 
cablegram from his emperor to President Mc- 
Kinley, asking for American aid in settling her 
difficulties with the Powers. The Powers, with 
good reason, looked upon the Chinese Govern- 
ment as hostile, and many of them — especially 
Russia — were willing to consent to the partition 
of China. But the United States insisted on re- 
garding the outrages as the work of insurrec- 
tionists, and remained on friendly terms with 
the constituted authorities, thus firmly uphold- 
ing the territorial and administrative integrity 

*For full account of the Boxer War, consult Paul Henry 
Clemants, " The Boxer Rebellion," Columbia University 
Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 66, 
1915 ; Rhee, " Spirit of Korean Independence," pp. 175, ff. ; 
" Foreign Relations," 1900, pp. ^J, ff. 

* The German troops remained at Kiaochow and took no 
part in the expedition, although the allied forces were led by 
Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee chosen as Generalissimo 
to satisfy the Kaiser. 



CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 55 

of China. Then, too, many a wise statesman in 
the world saw a condition of general anarchy 
and the possibility of world war over the spoils, 
in case China were partitioned. It was much 
better for a nation like England, which enjoyed 
the largest foreign trade in China, to restore 
the status quo, and enjoy the commercial privi- 
leges, than to take the chance of losing them by 
partition. Thus the Powers finally followed the 
lead of the United States in preserving China 
as a nation and maintaining there the principle 
of the " open door." 

The final protocol settling the difficulties con- 
sequential to the Boxer Uprising was signed on 
September 7, 1901. China agreed: (1) to pun- 
ish those who were responsible for and who 
took part in foreign massacres; (2) to adopt 
adequate measures to prevent recurrence of 
such disorders; (3) to indemnify the losses sus- 
tained by foreign nations and individuals ; (4) to 
improve trade relation with foreign nations. 
^During the lengthy negotiation prior to the 
signing of this protocol the United States threw 
the weight of its influence on the side of modera- 
tion, urging the powers not to make the burden 
too heavy for China. The total indemnity 
($333,000,000 approximately) imposed upon 
China was far in excess of the actual losses sus- 
tained by the powers. The share that was as- 
signed to the United States was a little over 



56 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

$24,000,000, whereas the actual loss sustained 
by the American Government and its citizens 
was only about $11,000,000. Once more the 
American Government deviated from the grab- 
it-all spirit of modern diplomacy, and in 1907 
returned the amount in excess of actual losses. 
The Chinese Government, in return, sent Tang 
Shao Yi as its special envoy to thank the United 
States, and decided to use the money thus re- 
turned by the American Government to educate 
Chinese students in American colleges and uni- 
versities.' This step taken by the American 
Government was an act of simple justice, and it 
remains to be seen whether the European 
Powers who took advantage of China's prostra- 
tion to demand far heavier indemnities than 
their claims justified will yet take similar action.' y 

3. The Russo-Japanese Struggle 

After the protocol was signed, other nations 
withdrew their forces from China, but Russia 
retained her forces in Manchuria and gradually 
strengthened her position in eastern China. 
She not only retained all vantages gained prior 
to and during the Boxer Uprising, but was 

• There were 679 Chinese students (male alone) in Ameri- 
can colleges and universities in 1916, accordinp^ to the 
Directory of Foreign Students, published by the Committee 
on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, Interna- 
tional Y. M. C. A., New York City. 

' Washington Post, June 19,1907; opinion of Judge Charles 
Sumner Lobinger of the American Court in Shanghai, China, 
Nebraska State Journal, October 11, 191 7. 



CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 57 

secretly pressing upon the Chinese Government 
for further conceSvSions. This serious situation 
led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to 
put a check upon Russian influence. The 
United States entered a formal protest at 
Petrograd and succeeded in getting a definite 
promise from the Russian Government not to 
oppose the opening of two Manchurian cities, 
Mukden and Antung, to foreign commerce by 
China. This did not, however, check the out- 
stretching clutch of the Northern Bear, and 
Russian influence in Manchuria kept on increas- 
ing. 

Japan was now ready to make an active re- 
sistance. Her attempts to negotiate with 
Russia the question of neutrality and the " open 
door " in Manchuria and China were fruitless.' 
Feeling that she was strong enough to combat 
her rival, and that the Anglo-Japanese AlHance 
safeguarded her from the attack of a third 
power in alliance with Russia, she struck the 
first blow on February 10, 1904. Secretary Hay 
promptly sent identical notes to Russia and to 
Japan, expressing the wish of the United States 
that the neutrality and administrative entity of 
China should be respected by the belligerents. 
In reply both Russia and Japan agreed to re- 

■ For the complete ^ diplomatic correspondence between 
Russia and Japan prior to the opening of hostility, see 
"Russo-Japanese War," published by Collier & Son, New 
York. 



58 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

spect Chinese neutrality outside of Manchuria. 
On January 10, 1905, Hay addressed circular 
notes to the powers to the effect that it was the 
wish of the United States that the war would 
not result in any concession of Chinese terri- 
tory. This note met with the hearty approval 
of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy, 
^he greatest single stroke of diplomacy that 
established American dignity and prestige in 
the Pacific basin since the declaration of the 
" open door " doctrine, was the mediation of 
President Roosevelt on behalf of the two bel- 
ligerent nations. Russia was completely pros- 
trated, and Japan, though victorious, was at the 
end of her financial resources. On June 8, 1905, 
President Roosevelt made a formal appeal in 
the interest of the civilized world to the em- 
perors of Japan and Russia to cease hostilities 
and open direct negotiations. Both nations 
complied with the request and sent their envoys 
to the United States to open a peace conference. 
The conference began its regular sessions at 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 8th, 
and the treaty was signed September 5th. 
More than once during the negotiations, the en- 
voys came to points of controversy and were 
unable to reach an agreement. The Russian 
commission was headed by the astute diplomat, 
Count Witte, who made a most favourable im- 



CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 59 

pression and drew to himself the sympathetic 
interest of the public. In presenting the cause 
of his country, he capitaHzed the situation 
created by his striking personality. He con- 
ceded every demand made by Japan, but refused 
to pay a single ruble of indemnity. President 
Roosevelt unofficially advised, restrained, and 
urged the envoys to compromise their differ- 
ences. Russia finally agreed to recognize 
Japan's paramount interest in Korea; to trans- 
fer, with the consent of China, her lease of Port 
Arthur, Talienwan, and adjacent territories to 
Japan ; and to evacuate Manchuria and leave its 
doors wide open to the trade of the worlj. 

By the result of this conference Japan, per- 
haps, got as much as she had expected, although 
not as much as she wanted. The Japanese 
envoys went home somewhat disgruntled — at 
least outwardly so — and when they reached 
home they had to have police protection from 
howling mobs. Japanese dailies made bitter 
comments to the effect that Japan won all the 
battles in the war, and lost all the spoils on the 
green table. Later, when the anti-American 
feeling was high as an echo of the anti- Japanese 
sentiment in California, more than one period- 
ical in Japan referred to the diplomatic " loss '* 
sustained by Japan at the Portsmouth confer- 
ence as the result of American intervention. 

The close of the Russo-Japanese War marks 



60 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

the beginning of new political relations between 
the East and the West Up to this time the 
Western nations — especially the United States — 
looked upon the East with sympathetic regard. 
But now, one of the nations of the effete East 
had proved herself equal to a Western Power in 
the field of military operations, and able to give 
as well as take blows. From now on the West 
must necessarily change its attitude toward the 
East from that of patronage to one of recog- 
nition on the basis of honour and equality. 
The United States has the proud distinction of 
having opened Japan and Korea to modern 
civilization, and of having saved China from 
disintegration after the Boxer rebellion. Japan 
knew the honourable intentions of the United 
States in the Orient, and looked up to her for 
moral support in her struggle for recognition 
from the Western Powers. And the United 
States regarded Japan as one of her brightest 
proteges and took pride in having played such 
an important part in bringing a secluded 
mediaeval nation up to the first rank among the 
modern civilized nations. All this era of good 
feeling and mutual trust ended with the Ports- 
mouth conference. Henceforth Japan was to 
be a rival of the United States in the theater 
of Eastern commerce and politics. Japan, a new 
recruit in the field of commercial and political 
expansion of the world, must necessarily in- 



CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 61 

fringe upon the rights of the pioneer nations 
of the West, including the United States, in 
order to realize her dream of greatness. And 
the United States, for the safeguarding of its 
interests, was compelled to lay certain restric- 
tions upon Japan, such as restriction of Japa- 
nese immigration into the United States and its 
insular possessions, and vindication of the prin- 
ciples of the " open door " and the political in- 
tegrity of China. Japan in turn resented these 
restrictions as an obstruction of her imperial 
progress. But she is at present in no position 
to make a vigorous protest to the United States. 
Economically, the United States is her second 
best customer, China being the first ; and from a 
military standpoint, the United States is far 
superior both in man-power and in resources, 
Japan feels that she must " eat worms " for the 
time being. She prefers to have all negotia- 
tions not satisfactory to her postponed indefi- 
nitely until such time when she will be in a 
position to make demands as well as to make 
" appeals." She must be content to cover her 
wounds with diplomatic grace. In 1914, when 
Secretary Bryan handed the American reply to 
the Japanese note concerning the pending 
California Alien Law question, Ambassador 
Chinda said, "Will this be final?" Secretary 
Bryan replied, " There is nothing final between 
friends." 



Ill 

AMERICAN RIVALRY WITH JAPAN 

I. The American Fleet in the Far East 

SUBSEQUENT American policies in the 
Far East have been along the path laid 
down by John Hay. The Root-Takahira 
agreement exchanged at Washington, Novem- 
ber 30, 1908, outlined the mutual position of the 
United States and Japan regarding China as 
follows: (1) to encourage the free and peaceful 
development of their commerce on the Pacific; 
(2) to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, and 
to preserve the principle of equal commercial 
opportunity in China; (3) to reciprocally "re- 
spect the territorial possessions belonging to 
each other in said region " ; (4) to preserve and 
maintain the independence and integrity of 
China; (5) the two governments will communi- 
cate with each other in case the status quo or the 
principle of equal opportunity is threatened as 
above defined. 

It was not a formal treaty but merely an 
agreement — a " gentlemen's agreement " — rely- 

62 



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Courtesy Asia Magazine of 
American Asiatic Association. 



AMEEIOAN EIVALEY WITH JAPAN 63 

ing upon the mutual trust and honour of the 
contracting parties for the observance of its pro- 
visions. Japan was anxious to convince the 
United States that she had no sinister designs 
on the mainland of Asia, and the United States 
was desirous of assuring Japan that the result 
of the Russo-Japanese War did not change the 
" open door " status in China. American policy 
toward both China and Japan has always been 
non-aggressive. In trying to befriend both, the 
United States has, unintentionally, in minor 
matters, played into the hands of the more 
clever and aggressive of the two nations. The 
visit of the American fleet to Asiatic waters in 
1908 may be cited as illustration of this. 

In 1907 when President Roosevelt decided to 
send the American fleet around the world, the 
Chinese were anxious to have the fleet pay a 
visit to China. They had looked up to the 
United States for moral support, if not active 
assistance, in their struggle for national stability. 
Their attitude was not without foundation. 
During the Boxer settlement, the United States 
was China's one friend among the nations of 
the West, and it was through American effort 
that a degree of moderation in the demands 
made was secured. In October, 1907, Secretary 
of War William Howard Taft said in his speech 
at Shanghai that " the United States and others 
who sincerely favour the * open door ' policy 



64 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

will, if they are wise, not only welcome, but 
encourage this great Chinese Empire to take 
long steps in administrative and governmental 
reforms, in the development of her natural re- 
sources and the improvement of the welfare of 
her people."* This statement, though unof- 
ficially made, assumed somewhat of an official 
nature, as it was from a great American states- 
man who was to be the next president of his 
country and as it was made before a large 
gathering of both foreigners and Chinese in 
that great metropolis of the East. The Chinese 
wished to reciprocate the good will of America 
in refunding the balance of Boxer indemnity, by 
welcoming the American fleet to their shores. 

As soon as this move in China was known at 
Tokyo, action was taken with the characteristic 
Japanese celerity to checkmate the Chinese at- 
tempt to gain American favour and recognition. 
The Japanese Government immediately dis- 
patched an invitation which reached Washing- 
ton one day ahead of that of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment. Subtle influences were exerted to 
defeat Chinese expectations. The Japanese had 
apparently three reasons for their attempt to 
frustrate the plans of the Chinese Government 
in inviting the American fleet to Chinese waters : 

* Secretary Taft was welcomed at Shanghai, China, Octo- 
ber 8, 1907, " The World's Almanac and Encyclopedia," 1908, 
P- 314- 



AMERICAN EIVALRY WITH JAPAN 66 

(1) After the war with Russia the Japanese had 
created among the Oriental nations an impres- 
sion that their fighting force was equal, if not 
superior, to that of any Western nation, and 
they did not want a first-class foreign fleet to 
anchor off Chinese waters and destroy that im- 
pression. (2) They wanted to make the Ori- 
ental peoples feel that Japan was the only 
Asiatic nation recognized on the basis of equal- 
ity by Western Powers; and if the American 
fleet visited both Japan and China it would 
elevate China to the same plane with Japan. 
(3) The Japanese wanted to keep the relation 
between China and the United States as distant 
and non-intimate as possible, so that they could 
allude to China as a backward nation that must 
need the tutelage of Japan, while to China they 
could intimate that her aspirations for recogni- 
tion and equal treatment by Western Powers 
were useless except through Japan, and that, 
indeed, China's solution of her national prob- 
lems must be in following Japanese leadership. 

European residents in China, who were 
none too eager to have American prestige in 
China and the cordial relation between China 
and the United States enhanced, heartily en- 
cored Japanese sentiment. Through W. W. 
Rockhill, the American minister to China, who 
was then in Japan on his way back from Amer- 
ica, official Washington was informed of the in- 



66 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

advisability of sending a fleet to China. The 
original plan was revised and a part of the 
American fleet visited Amoy instead of Shang- 
hai — the original city designated by both the 
Chinese and American residents in China for 
the welcome of the fleet. This was a great dis- 
appointment to both the Chinese and the 
Americans in China, who had planned an elab- 
orate welcome to the fleet in the greatest center 
of communication and commerce in the East. 
The " number two fleet and number two ad- 
miral are coming to China, while the number 
one fleet and number one admiral are going 
to Japan," said the Chinese papers. All their 
enthusiasm was dampened, and the reception 
was perfunctory. The news of the Chinese re- 
ception of the American fleet was scattered 
abroad through the channels of Japanese pub- 
licity as being cold and unappreciative, and as 
showing the backward condition of China. 

2, American and British Policies 
With the incoming of the Taft and Knox 
administration, the American policy in the 
Orient assumed a more active form. Both 
President Taft and Secretary of State Knox had 
some knowledge of what was taking place in the 
East subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War. 
After singeing the outstretching paws of the 
Northern Bear, Japan occupied her place in the 



AMERICAN EIVALEY WITH JAPAN 67 

sun with other first-class Powers of the world, 
and was ready to play the role of mistress of 
Asia. England's fear and suspicion of Russian 
domination in the East, which had been the 
nightmare of EngHsh statesmen for the past 
half a century, now faded away. In place of the 
Russian phantom stalked the ever-threatening 
figure of the German Superman with Kiiltur in 
one hand and Weltpolitik in the other. German 
industries were monopolizing the markets of 
the world by both business efficiency and 
" dumping," and the German navy was growing 
by leaps and bounds." 

In the Anglo-Russian rivalry it had been 
merely a question of protecting British posses- 
sions and commercial interests in the East; but 
now the very existence of the British Empire 
was threatened by the Weltpolitik, English 
statesmen realized the vital need of readjust- 
ment of their policy to meet changed conditions. 
They buried the hatchet with Russia by allow- 
ing her a free hand in Mongolia in return for 
the safeguarding of British interests in China. 

' Many excellent books have been written on Kuliur, Welt- 
politik, growth of the German navy, "dumping," Anglo- 
German rivalry, etc., leading up to the war. The following 
are a few typical references: Reventlow, " Deutschland's 
auswartige Politik"; Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," 
von Bulow, " Imperial Germany " ; Bernhardi, " Germany 
and the Next War " ; Rohrbach, " Der Deutsche Gedanke in 
der Welt " ; Dawson, " Evolution of Modern Germany " ; 
Price, " Diplomatic History of the War of 1914 " ; publica- 
tions of various governments engaged in the war. 



68 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

In European politics, Russia and Great Britain 
regarded each other as allies ; and in matters of 
Asiatic policy they cooperated, as illustrated in 
the division of Persia into spheres of influence 
assumed by their respective governments/ The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, defensive in 
character, was renewed in 1905 and again in 
1911. Japan promised to protect British posses- 
sions in Asia, and Great Britain in turn con- 
sented to the free hand of the Japanese in Man- 
churia, and to support Japan, — or at least, not 
to oppose her, — in whatever measures she 
deemed necessary in firmly establishing her 
sphere on the mainland of Asia. England also 
settled all differences with France on an ami- 
cable basis, supported her against Germany in 
the Moroccan question in 1907, and formed an 
entente to offset the Triple Alliance.* The pro- 
tection of British interests in the Mediterranean 
was left to the French just as the possessions in 
the East were left to the care of the Japanese. 
Thus the British fleet was able to concentrate 
in the North Sea to meet any exigency that 
might occur, and to bottle up the German fleet 

'The Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907, re- 
garding Persia has never been made public. See Review of 
Reviews, 45 : 49-53, January, 1912, " Persia, Russia, and 
Shuster." 

* For England's part in Moroccan question, see J. Holland 
Rose, "The Origins of the War," chap. IV, "Morocco"; 
Perseus, "Morocco and Europe: The Task of Sir Edward 
Grey," Fortnightly_ Review, 85 : 605^-624, April, 1906. 



AMEEICAN EIVALRY WITH JAPAN 69 

in case of hostility, as was so effectively done at 
the opening of the great war. 

This realignment of British policy produced 
two outstanding conditions in world politics: 
the isolation of Germany, and the supremacy of 
Japan in the East. Germany was not in favour 
of having Japan dominate Manchuria and 
Korea and occupy the premier commercial posi- 
tion on the Asiatic mainland, but she was too 
busily engaged to oppose the Entente Powers in 
Europe to make any effective resistance against 
Japan's encroachment in China. The only na- 
tion that was in a position to assist China to 
preserve her autonomy against foreign aggres- 
sion was the United States. The United States 
has political reasons and commercial interests 
as well as a sense of moral obligation which 
should lead her to help China preserve her na- 
tional integrity. The Hay " open door " doc- 
trine, promoted by the American Government 
and agreed to by other nations, provided equal- 
ity of commercial privileges in, and the preser- 
vation of the political independence and terri- 
torial integrity of China. By virtue of its origin 
and of the leadership of John Hay, the United 
States was made an unofficial sponsor for this 
doctrine, which is still in existence. Politically, 
domination of China by one power means the 
lessening of American Influence and prestige in 
the Far East, and a direct menace to the Ameri- 



70 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

can insular possessions. Commercially, the 
monopoly of the Chinese market, or of the mar- 
ket of one province, as in the case of Manchuria, 
signifies the driving out of American trade in 
the monopolized territory. There were ample 
reasons for the United States to propose to 
neutralize the Manchurian railways. But the 
immediate occasion that enabled Secretary 
Knox to make the neutralization proposal was 
a concession to build the Chinchow-Aigun rail- 
way given by the Chinese Government to an 
American concern. Thus by neutralizing all 
railways in Manchuria, America had its share of 
monopoly to give up. 

The proposal provided " to take the railroads 
of Manchuria out of Eastern poHtics and place 
them under an economic and impartial adminis- 
tration by vesting in China the ownership of its 
railroads; the funds for that purpose to be fur- 
nished by the nationals of such interested 
powers as might be willing to participate and 
who are pledged to the policy of the open door 
and equal opportunity, the powers participating 
to operate the railway system during the period 
of the loan and enjoy the usual preference in 
supplying materials. . . . The advantages of 
such a plan are obvious. It would insure un- 
impaired Chinese sovereignty, the commercial 
and industrial development of the Manchurian 
provinces, and furnish a substantial reason for 



AMERICAN EIVALRY WITH JAPAN 71 

the solution of the problems of fiscal and mone- 
tary reforms which are now receiving such ear- 
nest attention of the Chinese Government. It 
would afford an opportunity for both Russia 
and Japan to shift their onerous duties, respon- 
sibilities and expenses in connection with these 
railways to the shoulders of the combined 
powers, including themselves. Such a policy, 
moreover, would effect a complete commercial 
neutralization of Manchuria, and in so doing 
make a large contribution to the peace of the 
world by converting provinces of Manchuria 
into an immense commercial neutral zone." " 

On November 6, 1909, Secretary Knox sent a 
formal note to the British Government, asking 
British cooperation in the American proposal. 
On November 25th, Sir Edward Grey sent his 
reply, expressing the approval of his govern- 
ment of the principle involved in the plan, with- 
out, however, committing itself to any definite 
agreement. Secretary Knox presented his pro- 
posal simultaneously to Russia and Japan on 
December 18, 1909. There was a general cry of 
" confiscation *' in both countries, despite the 
fact that the plan provided a legitimate compen- 
sation for their Manchurian railroads properly 
and impartially appraised. Their charge of 
*■ confiscation " is ironically amusing when we 

"From a statement given to the press by the State De- 
partment, Washington, January 6, 1916. 



72 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

recall that their titles to the Manchurian rail- 
roads were based on nothing short of their own 
confiscation of Chinese property. 

Russia rejected the plan on January 22, 1910, 
and Japan on February 24, 1910. Great Britain 
and France stood by the decision of their re- 
spective allies — Japan and Russia. The Ameri- 
can public, instead of supporting its statesman 
in his attempt to give a legitimate protection to 
American interests abroad, condemned the 
Knox policy in China and also in Central 
America as " dollar diplomacy." ' 

3. " Dollar Diplomacy '' 
This " dollar diplomacy " was soon changed 
with the coming in of the Democratic adminis- 
tration in 1913, and the American Far Eastern 
policy was correspondingly weakened. The new 
government of the Chinese Republic, after the 
revolution of 1911-12, was in dire need of funds, 
and decided to borrow money from the bankers 
of the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Japan, and Russia. The terms of this 
loan — commonly known as the " six-power 
loan " — were none too agreeable to the Chinese. 
They provided how the money thus borrowed 
should be spent, and what measures the creditor 
nations should take to collect the money in case 

'See Fish, "American Diplomacy," p, 459; F. C. Howe, 
" Dollar Diplomacy," Annals of American Political and 
Social Science, 68 : 312-320, November, 1916. 



AMEEICAIT EIVALEY WITH JAPAN 73 

China failed to meet her part of the agreement 
as provided in the terms. The Chinese were 
afraid that such an arrangement might Egyp- 
tianize their country; yet they had no alterna- 
tive. Money they must have to pay the soldiers 
and to meet foreign and domestic obligations 
incidental to the revolution. The loan nations 
were withholding recognition of the Republic of 
China to press their terms on the newly born 
republic. 

President Wilson promptly reversed the pol- 
icy of the previous administration, and led the 
way, on March 18, 1913, to the recognition of 
the new Republic of China. He withdrew gov- 
ernment support of the " six-power loan," de- 
claring that " the conditions of the loan seem to 
us to touch very nearly the administrative inde- 
pendence of China itself, and this administration 
does not feel that it ought, even by implication, 
to be a party to those conditions." As a result, 
the American bankers withdrew from the syndi- 
cate. It must be remembered that doing busi- 
ness in an unstable country like China is not like 
carrying on a commercial transaction in the 
United States. Foreign capital is insecure in a 
country where bandit raids and political revolu- 
tions are of common occurrence, unless it be 
backed by its government.' Here is where the 

*See Tyler Dennett, "The Road to Peace, via China," 
Outlook, 117 '• 168-169, October 3, 1917. 



74 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

principle of " trade follows the flag " comes in. 
Commercial exploitation is usually the pioneer 
of political exploitation. There is no question 
that this act of President Wilson is just and 
statesman-like, and in line with the American 
traditional foreign policy. It invoked, as it 
should have done, universal approval both at 
home and abroad.* But from the Chinese point 
of view, the withdrawal of American bankers 
from the " six-power loan " was a disappoint- 
ment. 

The United States has always stood for jus- 
tice and fair play to China, and has more than 
once thrown its weight toward the preservation 
of the administrative and territorial integrity of 
that tottering nation. Had the American bank- 
ers stayed in the group, and been supported by 
the American Government, it would have made 
the United States a participant in foreign inter- 
ests in China; and the State Department at 
Washington would have an opportunity to wield 
a moral lever in urging moderation on the part 
of other creditor nations, as was done by John 
Hay in the Boxer settlement. But, as it was, 
the United States became a disinterested power 
— an outsider with respect to the international 
struggle for zones of influence in China — leav- 

* See " Recognition at Last," Independent, 74 : 1009-1010, 
May 8, 1913; "U. S. Recognizes China," Outlook, 104:41. 
May 10, 1913. 



AMEEICAN RIVALRY WITH JAPAN 75 

ing the infant republic to its own fate amid a 
pack of wolfish nations. The Sherman anti- 
trust law would be an asset in the development 
of world trade, should it be made an interna- 
tional commercial code. But it is a fatal mis- 
take to apply this restriction to American for- 
eign trade alone, while other foreign capital is 
not only protected but supported and subsidized 
by interested governments, and foreign invest- 
ors are even sometimes encouraged to resort to 
illegitimate business methods for the capture of 
foreign markets.* The failure of American 
statesmen to appreciate this fact has caused 
American trade and investment in China to de- 
cline, whereas its powerful competitor, Japanese 
trade, has increased by leaps and bounds, and 
is still so increasing. 

In 1914 China decided to build a naval base 
on the coast of Fukien. British, American, and 
Japanese firms were bidding against one an- 
other to supply the material. Finally the Beth- 
lehem Steel Corporation succeeded in getting 
the contract for the work. Japan immediately 
made representations to the State Department 
through Ambassador Chinda that the entrench- 
ment of American interest in Fukien Province, 
which is in the Japanese "sphere," and the 

' For Japanese trade methods in China, see Tong, " Amer- 
ican Money and Japanese Brains in China," Review of Re- 
views, S3 : 452-455, April, 1916 ; idem in Harper's Weekly, 
62:298-299, March, 1916. 



76 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

building of a naval base with American money 
on Chinese coast right opposite to Formosa 
would be an " unfriendly act." Secretary Bryan 
promptly sent a cablegram to Minister Reinsch 
at Peking to inform the Chinese Government 
that the United States would not support the 
American interest. Thus American capital, in- 
stead of receiving subsidies and protection from 
its home government, as does Japanese capital, 
was hampered by American political leaders. 



4. The Twenty-one Demands 
The greatest diplomatic struggle that China 
has had since the Boxer settlement in 1900-01 
was with Japan in 1915 over what was known as 
the Twenty-one Demands, made upon China by 
Japan." These demands embody serious en- 
croachments of Chinese rights, such as that the 
Chinese Government must employ influential 
Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and 
military affairs; that the policing of important 
places in China must be jointly administered by 
Japanese and Chinese; that China must pur- 
chase from Japan fifty per cent, or more of its 
munitions of war, and that Japanese experts 
must be employed in the arsenals. There is no 

" Concerning Japan's control o£ public opinion in con- 
nection with the Twenty-one Demands, see Part II, Chapter 
III, § III. 



AMERICAN EIVALRY WITH JAPAN 77 

question but that had China conceded to these 
demands in toto, the Eastern Repubhc would be 
a dependency of Japan to-day. 

The demands were first presented to the 
Chinese Government on January 18, 1915, when 
representatives of several important news serv- 
ices and papers were absent from Peking in 
Japan. Japan had intended to intimidate China 
into concession of these demands in secret. 
When the news began to leak out, Japan, 
through her diplomatic representatives abroad, 
denied the demands; when denial was no longer 
possible, she gave out a false series of demands 
for publication abroad." When, however, the 
real demands began to come to light from the 
Chinese official source, not only the Chinese 
themselves, but the foreigners in China were 
alarmed and indignant. The British commer- 
cial interests in China made vigorous represen- 
tations to their home government for protest 
against Japan's demands. American mission- 
aries in China sent a memorial to President 
Wilson asking for American mediation in the 
crisis." 

There was a general uproar of indignation in 
the House of Commons when the news of the 
demands reached London. But the British Gov- 

" Eleven articles published in the London Times, as com- 
ing from the Japanese Embassy at London, quoted by Mil- 
lard, "Our Eastern Question," pp. 146-147. 

" See the text of the memorial, Part III, S. 



78 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

ernment was in no position to oppose Japan. 
There was only one nation that was in a posi- 
tion to make an effective resistance to the Jap- 
anese aggression in China, and that nation was 
the United States. But all the American Gov- 
ernment did was to make an inquiry of Japan as 
to what she was doing in China, basing the 
right of inquiry on the American-Japanese 
agreement of 1908 regarding China: "Should 
any event occur threatening the stafits quo . . . 
or the principle of equal opportunity ... it 
remains for the two governments to communi- 
cate with each other in order to arrive at an un- 
derstanding as to what measures they may con- 
sider it useful to take." ^* 

Publicity compelled Japan to modify some- 
what the original demands. On April 26, 1915, 
the Japanese minister at Peking presented re- 
vised demands in twenty-four articles. On May 
7th Japan delivered to the Chinese Government 
an ultimatum providing that unless a satisfac- 
tory reply be given to the demands by six 
o'clock on the ninth day of May, " the Imperial 
Japanese Government will take such steps as 
they may deem necessary." The Chinese Gov- 
ernment waited as long as it could, hoping for 
foreign aid to relieve the pressure. But none 
came. After the agreements had been made 
and the demands granted, the American Gov- 
" See full text of the agreement, Part III, I,. 



ABIERICAN BIVALRY WITH JAPAN 79 

ernment notified the Chinese Government, on 
May 16, 1915, to the effect that " it cannot rec- 
ognize any agreement or undertaking which has 
been entered into, or which may be entered into 
between the governments of China and Japan 
impairing the treaty rights of the United States 
and its citizens in China, the poHtical or terri- 
torial integrity of the Repubhc of China, or the 
international policy, commonly known as the 
open door policy." " An identical note was sent 
to the Japanese Government. 

5. China and the European War 
After the United States severed its diplomatic 
relations with Germany, February 3, 1917, 
President Wilson sent a note to China advising 
her to follow the American example. It was 
largely through the influence of Dr. Paul S. 
Reinsch, the American minister at Peking, in 
combination with the Chinese liberals, that 
China was persuaded to follow the American 
lead and was brought into the ranks of the 
Allies.^' 

During the short period of the attempted res- 
toration of the monarchy by Chang Hsun and 

" See Part III, R. 

^'For a full account o£ China's entering the war and the 
reasons for it, see Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Tricks That are 
Vain — in Chinese Politics," Review of Reviews, 56: 172-175, 
August, 1917; "China's Part in the War," the Illustrated 
London News, 151 : 249, September, 1917. 



80 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

Kang Yu Wei," in the summer of 1917, when 
China was on the verge of shipwreck, Secretary- 
Lansing sent a sympathetic note to the Chinese 
Government through Minister Reinsch, ex- 
pressing regret for the dissensions in China, and 
the hope that stable government would be es- 
tablished, and extending America's sincere good 
wishes. This note was severely criticized by the 
Japanese press as an infringement of Japan's 
paramount interest in China. Japan does not 
give any direct advices to Mexico, the Nippon- 
ese press argued, and why should the United 
States attempt to exercise any influence over 
China, the country over which Japan has as 
much tutelage as the United States has over 
Mexico? Any advice to be given China by the 
United States, the Japanese suggested, ought to 
have been given through Japan." This haughty 
attitude of Japan brought forth some sharp re- 
torts on the part of the American press. Said 
the New York Morning Telegraph: " Why should 
the United States of America, the most power- 
full democracy in the world, consult the Japa- 
nese monarchy, recently delivered, in part, from 

"See "China Foils a Royalist Coup," New York Times, 
Current History, 6, pt. 2:259-260, August, 1917; Carl Crow, 
" Chang, the Unchanging," Sunset Magazine, 39 : 12-13, Au- 
gust, 1917. 

" The comparison of the Japanese position in China with 
the American position in Mexico is a hobby of the Jap- 
anese publicists : see statement by K. K. Kawakami, quoted 
by Millard in " Our Eastern Question," p. 297. 



AMERICAN EIVALRY WITH JAPAN 81 

paganism before admonishing the Chinese peo- 
ple ? . . . To have advised with Japan would 
have been officially acknowledging the para- 
mountcy of Japan in that section of the world. 
This we will never do." 

It will be of particular interest to the Amer- 
ican reader to know that Japan did her best to 
keep China out of the war, feeling that Japanese 
interests would be better served if China were 
not a belligerent. Japan preferred to deal with 
China herself; she did not care to have China 
given a voice at the Peace table. Late in 1915, 
on the advice of the European Allies, China 
practically completed plans for entering the 
war. On that occasion. Viscount Ishii, then 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to the 
European Ambassadors at Tokyo: "Japan could 
not view without apprehension the moral awak- 
ening of 400,000,000 Chinese which would re- 
sult from their entering the war." Japan's op- 
position was so definite and so potent that the 
Chinese plan of entering the war was blocked. 
Not until March, 1917, after obtaining secret 
promises from the European Allies that they 
would support Japan's claims at the Peace table 
and that Japan would not be interfered with in 
carrying out her program in China, and when it 
became clear that Japan was not able to check- 
mate the combined efforts of the European 
Allies and the United States to bring China into 



82 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

the war on the side of the Allies, Japan with- 
drew her objection." The Chinese Govern- 
ment, after formally declaring war upon Ger- 
many, offered to send 100,000 troops to Europe 
to help the Allies; but Japan, unwilling to have 
China take so active a part, vetoed the plan. 

^ See official dispatch from M. Krtipensky, former Russian 
Ambassador at Tokyo, to Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Petrograd, February 8, 1917, cited in The Secret Treaties 
and Understandings, published by the Russian Revolutionary 
Government. 



IV 

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT 

I. The Diplomatic Procedure 

A LATE development of the American 
Oriental policy is the Lansing-Ishii 
agreement of November 2, 1917, based 
on notes exchanged between Secretary of 
State Lansing and Ambassador Ishii, the head 
of the Japanese War Mission which visited 
the United States. The obvious purpose of this 
mission, as was announced by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, was to follow the example of the Eng- 
lish, French, and Italian War Missions to 
America in furthering the better understanding 
between America and Japan, and the closer co- 
operation in the war against the " Common 
Enemy."' But a closer investigation of the 
accomplishments of this mission in America 
reveals something deeper than these obvious 
reasons. The Japanese War Mission, like all 

* See addresses of Ambassador Kikujiro Ishii at various 
places in America, New York Times, Current History. 
VI: 429-430, September, 1917; ibid., VII: 50-52, October, 
1917- 

83 



84 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

other Japanese undertakings, had an ulterior 
motive. 

There are three outstanding issues between 
the United States and Japan that must be settled 
sooner or later. They are the " open door " 
question in China, the question of immigration, 
and the question of Japanese citizenship in 
America. The first of these hinders commercial 
development and political expansion of Japan, 
and the other two are an open insult to the 
honour and integrity of Japan, — at least, the 
Japanese think so. The purpose of this mission 
was to reach a satisfactory agreement concern- 
ing the first of these three issues, — blindly satis- 
factory to America and selfishly gratifying to 
Japan. A brief review of what the mission has 
accomplished unmistakably points to this con- 
clusion, 

Japan could not have selected a better man to 
head this mission than Viscount Ishii, whose 
knowledge of international etiquette, and whose 
rhetorical perfection in the English language 
are equal to that of the best in the West" In 
his speech before the United States Senate, the 
Japanese ambassador inspired thunderous ap- 
plause by declaring, " We of Japan took up arms 
against Germany because a solemn treaty was 
not to us a scrap of paper. We did not enter 

* See " Japanese Mission," Review of Reviews, 56 : 361, 
October, 1917. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 85 

into this war because we had any selfish interest 
to promote or any ill-conceived ambition to 
gratify." ' These statements are ironically 
amusing when we remember what Japan has 
done in Korea despite all her solemn treaty obli- 
gations to the Hermit Kingdom;* and more 
recently in China, ignoring not only her treaty 
obligations with China and other treaty powers, 
but breaking faith with her ally — England." 
When Japan declared war upon Germany, 
August 15, 1914, Count Okuma, then Premier 
of Japan, telegraphed to an American magazine 
assuring " the people of America and of the 
world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no 
desire to secure more territory, no thought of 
depriving China or other peoples of anything 
which they now possess." ' The sincerity of 
this statement was tested when, in less than 
a year, Japan made the well-known Twenty- 
one Demands upon China. Japanese statesmen 
stated more than once that Japan was to take 
Tsingtau with the intention of returning it to 

'Congressional Record, vol. 55, No. 124, p. 7040, August 
30, 191 7. 

* For Japan's perfidy with Korea, consult F. A. McKenzie, 
" The Tragedy of Korea," chapter on " Treaty-Making and 
Treaty-Breaking." 

'For Japan's aggressions on China despite her treaty 
obligations to the contrary, consult Millard, "Our Eastern 
Question," chapters on "Japan's Aggressions on China." 

'Cablegram sent to the Independent (New York), Au- 
gust 24, 1914, published in the Independent, August 31, 1914, 
vol. 79, p. 291. See Part III, M. 



86 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

China.' All the treaties, promises, and declara- 
tions made by the Japanese statesmen concern- 
ing their policy on the Asiatic mainland have 
so far been mere scraps of paper. Yet this 
ambassador extraordinary from Japan blandly 
told the most august body of American law- 
makers that Japan respected treaty obHgations 
and had entered the war unselfishly. 

At the public dinner given in honour of the 
Japanese Mission by Mayor Mitchel, in New 
York City, September 29, 1917, Viscount Ishii 
outlined the Japanese policy in China as follows : 

" Circumstances for which we were in no 
sense responsible gave us certain rights in 
Chinese territory, but at no time in the past and 
at no time in the future do we or will we seek 
to take territory from China or to despoil China 
of her rights. We wish to be and always con- 
tinue to be the sincere friend and helper of our 
neighbour, for we are more interested than any 
one else, except China, in good government 
there. Only we must at all times for self-pro- 
tection prevent other nations from doing what 
we have no right to do. We not only will not 
seek to assail the integrity or the sovereignty 
of China, but will eventually be prepared to de- 

*This promise has never been fulfilled. See Millard, 
"Our Eastern Question," chapter on "Japan's Seizure of 
Kiaochow," and Part III, S; also. World's Work, 
35 : 125-126, December, 1917 ; Independent, 79 : 293, August 
31, 1914- 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 87 

fend and maintain the integrity and independ- 
ence of China against any aggressor. . . . 
The door is always open. It always has been 
open ; it always must remain open to representa- 
tives of these vast commercial interests repre- 
sented so well in this great gathering of kings 
of commerce. We went to China where the 
door was open to us as to you, and we always 
have realized that there nature gave us an ad- 
vantage. There was no need, there is no need 
to close that door on you, because we welcome 
your fair and honest competition." ^ 

Then he described what the American public 
had heard concerning Japanese activities in 
China as false rumours manufactured by the 
German propagandists in China and America to 
estrange the friendship between the United 
States and Japan. These public declarations of 
the Japanese ambassador were cheered by more 
than a thousand public men; they were flashed 
all over the country, and were hailed every- 
where by the press as the keynote of the Jap- 
anese Monroe Doctrine based on "broad and 
altruistic principles." " " The statement should 
relieve the hyper-sensitive alarm over the pur- 
pose of Japan in the East,'* said Ex-President 

• See " Japan's New Pledge Regarding China," New York 
Times, Current History, VII : 356-357, November, 1917. 

• See " The Japanese Mission," Independent, 92 : 79, Octo- 
ber 13, 1917; "Japan, America, and the East," Outlook, 
117:200, October 10, 1917. 



88 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

Taft in his telegram to the United Press on 
October 1st, commenting on the Ishii declara- 
tion. " It manifested a spirit of friendship to 
the United States and a pledge to maintain and 
preserve China from spoliation which was most 
reassuring." " 

On November 2, 191Y, formal notes were ex- 
changed between Secretary Lansing and Am- 
bassador Ishii. The agreement in main pro- 
vides: (1) that the United States recognizes 
Japan's special interests in China based on terri- 
torial propinquity; (2) that both the United 
States and Japan recognize the principle of 
" open door " and integrity of China." Besides 
these formal agreements contained in the note, 
"A complete and satisfactory understanding 
upon the matter of naval cooperation in the 
Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common 
object against Germany and her allies has been 
reached between the representatives of the im- 
perial Japanese navy who are attached to the 
special mission of Japan and the representatives 
of the United States navy." ^ 

2. Reception of the Agreement 
With the exception of a few pubHcists who 

"Press dispatches from New York, October I, 1917. 
" See Part III, T. 

"From the official statement given to the press by the 
State Department, November 6, 1917. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 89 

know the Eastern politics and are familiar with 
the methods of Japanese diplomacy/' this new 
agreement between the United States and Japan 
received the most favourable comment in the 
press and from the public men in America/* 
Apparently it cleared away the threatening 
cloud on the Eastern horizon ; put an end to the 
yellow peril; and solved the perplexing Eastern 
question, together with its corollary — the ques- 
tion of the mastery of the Pacific. Even louder 
praises came from Japan. From the Japanese 
publicity channels and officially manipulated 
press, we heard that the news of the agreement 
was heralded throughout the Empire as a new 
bond of the time-honoured friendship between 
America and Japan; that in the Japanese mind 
this new agreement signalized the permanent 
peace in the Pacific basin, and expressed the 
cordial friendship of America and Japan to- 
ward China in a genuine spirit of helpfulness. 

Amid all these tumults of applause, both in 
America and Japan, the Associated Press re- 
ceived the following cablegram from its Peking 
agent, dated October 26th, which dispatch, 
owing to the supreme prestige of Japan at that 



"See "The Proper Interpretation of the Agreement," 
Nation, 105 : 563-565, November 22, 1917, by Herald Monk 
Vinacke. 

" See " Monroe and Ishii Doctrine," Independent, 92 : 309, 
November 17, 1917; for press editorials, see Literary Digest, 
November 17, 1917, vol. 55: pp. 15-16. 



90 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

moment, received practically no publicity in the 
American press : 

" The Japanese are exerting every effort, of- 
ficially and unofHcially, to close the Chinese arms 
monopoly contract, carrying control of the 
Nanking iron deposits and the employment of 
Japanese military advisers and a director of the 
ncMT arsenal at Nanking. It is asserted by the 
Japanese that they are extending credit, and 
not making a loan, and consequently that they 
are not violating the six Powers' exclusive 
rights to make political loans. 

" This view is not shared by the French and 
the English and a large section of the Chinese 
press, as well as diplomatic circles, which unite 
in denouncing the deal as a revival of the most 
objectionable feature in Japan's demands pre- 
sented to China in May, 1915, known as 
* Group Five.' The principal provisions of 
those demands, which were twenty-one in num- 
ber, concerned the appointment of Japanese 
military and political advisers for China and 
Japanese supervision over the manufacture or 
purchase by China of munitions of war. 

"Minister Reinsch has advised the Foreign 
Office that China has invariably taken the posi- 
tion that it would hold the remainder of the iron 
deposits for national use whenever Americans 
have sought development rights, and that con- 
sequently the United States now would insist 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGBEEMENT 91 

that American interests be given consideration 
in the Chinese iron industry. The ministers of 
several other countries have taken the same 
position. 

To the average American mind it is quite in- 
credible that Japan should assure the United 
States, through her special mission, of her inten- 
tion of preserving China's integrity and the 
principle of equal opportunities in the East, and 
at the same time secretly attempt to undermine 
these very principles." Still more incredible is 
the Chinese protest against the friendly and 
altruistic intentions of Japan that the Island 
Empire " not only will not seek to assail the 
integrity or the sovereignty of China, but will 
eventually be prepared to defend and maintain 
the integrity and independence of China against 
any aggressor." The Lansing-Ishii agreement 
is bitterly resented by the Chinese." It was 

^World's Work (New York), 35:125-126, December, 
1917. This attempt o£ Japan has resulted in the appoint- 
ment of Baron Yoshiro Sakatani as the Japanese Financial 
Adviser to the Chinese Government, and in the conclusion 
of the new Sino-Japanese Military Agreement (Part III, 
U) of March ig, 1918; see Hollington K. Tong, "What 
Japan Really Wants of China," Millard's Review (Shang- 
hai), IV: 264-267, April 20, 1918; "Japan Completing Finan- 
cial Control of China," ibid., IV : 457-459. May 25, 1918. 

" See Frederick Moore, " The Japanese Menace to 
China," World's Work, 35 : 196-207, December, 1917. 

"At a mass meeting of Chinese students in Tokyo, Ja- 
pan, resolutions were adopted condemning the declarations 
of Viscount Ishii in America as hypocritical professions to 
conceal the real designs of Japan toward China,, — New 
Korea (San Francisco), p. 3, November 8, 1917. 



92 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

criticized not only by the press of the Eastern 
republic, but by the government officials as 
well. Formal representations were made by 
the Chinese Government both at Tokyo and at 
Washington to the effect that " the Chinese 
Government will not allow itself to be bound by 
any agreement entered into by other nations," 
that China is an independent nation, and ought 
not to be the subject of negotiations between 
foreign countries." China is, indeed, surprised 
*' that America, of all countries, should have 
taken this step and lent herself, however un- 
willingly, to Japanese imperial schemes," as the 
Peking Gazette puts it." 

This protest from China is not inspired alto- 
gether by a sensitive self-respect or an injured 
pride from the fact that sovereign China is 
about to be " protected " by Japan, — the con- 
struction put upon Chinese expressions by many 
journals in America. Rather it is due to the 
Chinese fear of Japan and her conviction that 
Japanese designs in China are contrary to the 
public declarations of the Nipponese statesmen. 
Dr. Ng. Poon Chew, the eminent Chinese 
scholar and publicist, gives expression to the 
enlightened Chinese sentiment regarding the 
new pact as follows : " During Japan's war with 
Russia, twelve years ago, Japan declared to the 

"Press dispatches from Washington, November lo, 1917. 
"Quoted in Literary Digest, p. 8, November 24, 1917. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 93 

world that the motives which impelled her to 
take arms against Russia were to drive Russia 
from Manchuria and restore Manchuria to its 
rightful owner, China. Twelve years have 
elapsed since the conclusion of that war. What 
part of Manchuria has Japan restored to China? 
Not only none, but to-day Japan occupies a 
larger sphere of Manchuria than Russia ever 
occupied. Japan has done everything to hin- 
der, obstruct, and frustrate China's plans to 
develop Manchuria under Chinese Government 
auspices. Japan is the Prussia of Asia. She 
stands to-day for the very principles against 
which the Allied nations are fighting. If Japan 
to-day is allowed a free hand to dispose of 
China the war now being fought at such a ter- 
rible cost in Europe must be fought all over in 
Asia. It is not to the interest of the world to 
permit Japan to have a free hand in China." *' 

3. Effect on Japanese Attitude 
" Is there any substantial reason for the 
Chinese distrust of Japanese policy in China? '* 
the American reader may ask. Had the United 
States Government given China the same pledge 
that Japan has given in the recent American- 
Japanese pact, China would be elated, for it has 
been the history of commercial development in 

^Published in the Sacramento Bee, quoted in the Literary 
Digest, November 24, 1917, pp. 16-17. 



94 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

China of late years that whatever advantage 
Japan obtained from the Chinese she got 
through coercion, whereas American capitalists 
are invited to develop Chinese resources.** 
Time, the great revealer of truth, will in the 
future expose the hidden ambition of Japan 
concerning China, and her real purposes in mak- 
ing this new agreement with America. At 
present, there is only one way in which we can 
form a reasonably accurate opinion as to the 
ulterior motives of an aggressive empire, that 
is to deduce current policies from existing facts 
in the light of past experience. What in 
Japanese diplomacy of the recent past has been 
indicative of the present Japanese Asiatic 
policy? What part should the United States 
take in the shaping of events in the Far East? 
Upon the correct analysis and proper solution 
of this problem hinges the future peace in the 
Pacific basin and the welfare of one-fourth of 
the world's population. If the problem be cor- 
rectly solved, and the situation wisely handled, 
the Pacific Ocean in the future will be a basin 
of cultural and commercial activities ; the United 
States will hold her political prestige and com- 
mercial advantages in the East; the oldest 
civilization in the world will be preserved, and 

** See Minister Wellington Koo's speech at a meeting of 
U. S. Chamber of Commerce, New York Times, February 
lo, 1916. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 95 

China will in time take her place among the 
powers of the world. If, on the other hand, 
the Asiatic question is left to a hit-or-miss policy 
with a lax and indifferent attitude, Asia will 
ultimately be consolidated under Japanese 
domination. Asia, with great natural resources 
and limitless man-power, dominated by an 
aggressive empire, European or Asiatic, is a 
menace to the world's peace, and a direct threat 
to the welfare of the United States. 

The habitable area of the earth is limited, and 
China is the last remaining unprotected El 
Dorado in the world. There are two elements 
that an ambitious nation must have in order to 
be great, — great in the material sense: wealth 
and man-power. China has both; she has 
abundant natural resources to be developed, and 
four hundred million sturdy people to be 
secured for use in war or peace. But China is 
no nation; she is a collection of four hundred 
million individuals. Common ties of political 
aspiration, economic interdependence, and 
social obligation are almost utterly lacking. 
Nationalism in the modern sense of the word is 
an unknown quantity to the masses of China. 
European nations took advantage of this, and 
through one pretext after another obtained 
leases, concessions, and spheres of influence in 
China until the autonomy of that ancient nation 
became only a nominal term. 



96 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

Japan, the infant prodigy of the East, crowded 
for space for her ever-increasing population,'' 
and with an insatiable desire to become a first 
class power among the family of nations, has a 
vision of political and commercial expansion on 
the mainland of Asia. Consolidation of Asia under 
Japanese domination is the soul of Japanese foreign 
policy, and has been so ever since Japan became 
a modern nation." In the first blocking out of 
her program she proposed to annex Korea 
within forty-nine years, but this has been ac- 
complished in twenty-six." Now the same 
process is being repeated in China. Already 
Japan dominates Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, 
Fukien, Shantung and Liaotung.'" The same 
policy — the policy of opportunism — that was 
used so effectively in undermining the Korean 
Government is in full operation in China now, 
and the same Japanese minister, Count Gonsuke 
Hayashi, who was instrumental in destroying 
Korea, is now the Japanese minister at Peking. 
The open door principle is practically destroyed, 



"Annual increase of population in Japan proper is esti- 
mated at 600,000; see W. E. Weyl, "Japan's Menacing 
Birth-rate," Asia, 18: 129-133, Februarj', 1918. 

" See Walter E. Weyl, " Japan's Diplomacy of Necessity," 
Asia, XVII : 593-595, October, 1917. 

" See McKenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea " ; Park, " The 
Tragic History of Korea," Chinese and Korean editions. 

" See Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," " Our Eastern 
Question"; J. W. Jenks, "Japan's Acts in China," World's 
Work, 33 : 312-328, January, 1917. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AGEEEMENT 97 

for in the territories controlled by the Japanese, 
the door is open only to Japanese trade." 

With money borrowed from the British 
capitalists, the Japanese built the South Man- 
churian Railway and shut off British trade. 
British financiers have now come to realize that 
every time they lend a pound to the Japanese, 
that money is used in the East to kill the British 
trade; and to-day the Japanese cannot borrow 
a single shilling in the London markets. Hence 
they turn to the United States." Money they 
must have to develop all the mining and railroad 
concessions wrenched from China. In 1916, 
Baron Shibusawa, the Japanese Morgan and 
the semi-official spokesman of the government, 
came to the United States to arrange a huge 
loan with the bankers of New York. His mis- 
sion was a failure. But had he been successful 
and had he borrowed enough money from 
American capitalists, it is very probable that 
the Japanese could have succeeded in closing 
all the doors of China to the rest of the world, 
as they have done in Manchuria. 

It has been stated time and again that Japan 
entered the European War with the unselfish 



''See O. K. Davis, "Whose Open Door?" Everybody's, 
36:34-46, January, 191 7. 

"See H. K. Tong, "American Money and Japanese 
Brains," Revietv of Reviews, 53 : 452-455, April, 1916 ; " Ja- 
pan, China, and American Money," Harper's Weekly, 
62 : 298-299, March 26, 1916. 



98 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

motive of fulfilling her treaty obligation to her 
ally — England. That may or may not be true. 
But the fact is that Japan is the only nation that 
has profited by this war. It seems likely that 
Japan will occupy all the territories formerly 
held by Germany in the Far East and more. 
Commercially, she is enjoying an unprecedented 
prosperity. She has replaced all the German 
and Austrian, and a part of the Allies' trade in 
the East. Since the war began, Japan's sales 
to the Philippines, Straights Settlements, Brit- 
ish India, Australia, and Spain have more than 
doubled. Sales to Russia are more than twelve 
times what they were;" Egypt has changed 
from a modest customer requiring less than a 
half milhon dollars' worth of goods yearly to a 
fairly important one buying more than five 
times that amount. The United States bought 
in 1916 a hundred million dollars' worth more 
than in 1913. " Japan is enjoying the novel ex- 
perience of engaging in a war which has brought 
great prosperity, with no increase in taxes, no 
issues of bonds, and with no loss to army and 

>> as 

navy. 

^This was true up to the time of the overthrow of the 
Kerensky government, November, 1917. Since then the 
trade relations between Japan and Russia have been uncer- 
tain because of the unstable condition of Russia. 

"Carl Crow, "Get-Rich-Quick Japan," Sunset Magazine, 
39 : 32-33, December, 1917. Also see G. L. Harding, " Ja- 
pan's Part in the War," New York Times, Current History, 
VI : 528-531, September, 1917. 



THE LANSING-ISHII AQEEEMENT 99 

The Lansing-Ishii agreement, regardless of 
what the American people may think of it, is, 
in the opinion of Japanese and Chinese, a de- 
cided victory for Japan and a corresponding de- 
feat for America.*" Recognition of sovereignty 
within sovereignty is contradiction of terms. 
No matter what the intention of the American 
statesmen ill recognizing Japan's special in- 
terests in China, the Japanese purpose in mak- 
ing this agreement is to blindfold America as to 
their ever-increasing activities in China, and to 
make America ignore China's appeal against the 
Japanese aggression. 

"For full discussion of this topic, see the present wri- 
ter's "China's Distrust of Japan," Asia, XVIII : 225-226, 
March, 1918. 



V 

PRESENT POLICIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

I. Japanese Plans and Ambitions 

THE astute statesmen of Japan realize 
the solidarity of public opinion in the 
West. Hence their advance on the 
Asiatic mainland has been very cautious. As 
long as they get what they want piecemeal, it 
will not attract Western attention, nor will any 
single loss be great enough to arouse the Chi- 
nese to a fighting spirit. Through this policy — 
the policy of the small snake with the big toad — 
Japan has swollen her sphere of influence dur- 
ing the last ten years to the largest in the main- 
land of Asia. If this policy is permitted to pro- 
ceed unchecked, Japan will ultimately succeed 
in absorbing the entire continent of Asia with 
its vast natural resources and limitless man- 
power. Then no longer could the British 
colonies discriminate against Japanese immi- 
grants ; * no longer could California pass an 
alien land law; no longer could the United 
States Government assert the principles of 
Monroe Doctrine that the Western Hemisphere 
is closed to imperial colonization. Banzai and 

* See Harry C. Douglas, " What May Happen in the 
Pacific," Review of Reviews, 55 : 394-398, April, 1917. 

100 




Russian *---^ -^ 

French -. — — .,. 

Franco-Belgian — — ♦ -• 

British -^ ■" "■■" 

1 ' - m ' Japanese -^ -i- --- -^ 

German •• — »--*--^ 

American ----- 

--■•■- Chinese —.---——. 

Portugese — 

Japanese Sphere and Desired Sphere 
^g British Sphere 

French Sphere 

French and British Desired Spheres 
P7JI Conflicting Claims of European Powers 

Former Russian Sphere 



I I Neutral Sphere 



Courtesy Asia Magazine of 
American Asiatic Association. 

CHINA IN 1919 

SHOWING RAILWAYS AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 

The Spheres Vary. Broadly from the British Centres of Economic Influence Based on Years of Developed Com- 
merce and Investment to the Japanese, Where Political Authority Advances Hand in Hand With Economic 
Advantage. A Crucial Test of the League of Nations Will Be Its Ability or Failure to End Them by 
Substituting a Workable Plan of International Cooperation. 



PBESENT POLICIES AND OPPOETUNITIES 101 

Dai Nippon will be far more dangerous and for- 
midable than Kultur and Weltpolitik. With these 
outstanding facts and tendencies in view, what 
should be the correct Oriental policy of the 
United States? 

Japan will regard — outwardly, at least — the 
wishes of the United States as long as the 
United States is superior in resources and man- 
power. But Japan will not remain inferior to 
the United States in these two elements essen- 
tial to a nation*s greatness, if her present policy 
is carried out successfully. She patiently fore- 
bore the insolence of China during the early 
years of the Meiji Era, only saying to herself, 
" We will come back at China when we are 
ready and able." She redeemed this pledge to 
herself in 1894. After the Chino-Japanese War, 
Russia, Germany, and France drove her out of 
Liaotung Peninsula. She acquiesced in what 
she deemed to be the humiliating terms of these 
three powers, but with the anticipation of com- 
ing back at them in the future. Come back she 
did in 1904 and 1914, to Russia and Germany 
respectively. The dates 1924 and 1934 are 
open, and Japan has a few more issues to settle 
with foreign nations — especially with the United 
States — and a few more self-made pledges to 
redeem. Here it might be well to remember 
the significant statement of Baron Kato, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, in the Japanese Diet 



102 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

on January 21, 1915, on the pending California 
Alien Land Law question : " The Imperial Gov- 
ernment has found the replies of the American 
Government not at all satisfactory and recog- 
nizes the necessity of elaborating other plans 
for the solution of the pending question. As re- 
gards the nature of these plans, the time to 
report them has not, to our regret, arrived." * 
The American diplomacy in the Far East 
has been a *' diplomacy de luxe," as a Japanese 
publicist once described it. American states- 
men piously believe in the open door and in- 
tegrity of China, but the idea of fighting for 
these ideals has never entered their minds. 
They have honourable intentions in regard to 
their foreign policy and judge the intentions of 
the Japanese statesmen by their own. The 
American lack of preparation, both military and 
psychological, to fight for what she believes in 
concerning China gave Japan freedom of action 
in the East, and the self-deceiving good inten- 
tion of American diplomacy furnished an ample 
opportunity for Japan to hoodwink the United 
States. Count Okuma is a powerful imperial- 
ist; he believes in anything but fairness and non- 
aggression toward China. Yet he is the presi- 
dent of the Japan Peace Society that manu- 
factures peace propaganda, not for home con- 

' Quoted by Millard in "Our Eastern Question," pp. 
223-224. 



X' 



PEESENT POLICIES AND OPPOETUNITIES 103 

sumption, but for export purposes — especially 
to the United States. General Terauchi, the 
premier of Japan, is an out-and-out militarist, 
yet he sends out for American consumption doc- 
trines of peace and democracy as the " national 
sentiment of the Japanese people." At present, 
Japan has no more intention of making an ag- 
gressive war upon the United States than she 
has of making an aggressive war on Great 
Britain. But she wants to create in America an 
impression that Japan is a formidable nation 
with matchless fighting machines, that the 
United States must let her alone and stay out 
of her way in Asia. So far Japan has succeeded 
admirably in all her diplomatic game of bluff 
with the United States. 

The lax and indifferent Oriental policy of the 
American Government and the failure to under- 
stand the nature of Japanese diplomacy have 
caused the decrease of American trade and 
prestige in the East. American exports to 
China fell in ten years (1905-1915) from about 
twenty-eight per cent, of China's total imports 
to less than eight per cent.' The Japanese in 
China are working insidiously to undermine 
American influence and prestige. In exerting 
their pressure to cancel the Chinchow-Aigun 
railway concession, a concession given to the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the Japanese 
"Millard, "Our Eastern Question," p. 356. 



104 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

minister at Peking used these significant words 
in his note to the Chinese Government, January 
31, 1910 : " Before the Chinese Government de- 
termines anything, the consent of my govern- 
ment must first be obtained." * While Minister 
Reinsch was wielding his influence to induce 
China to follow the example of the United 
States in breaking off relations with Germany 
in the spring of 1917, Japanese agents in China 
secretly combined with the German and Aus- 
trian propagandists to block the move. When 
finally the Chinese liberals won over the reac- 
tionaries in breaking off the diplomatic relation 
with Germany, then both official Tokyo and the 
Japanese press sent to America and Europe dis- 
patches containing loud praises of the Chinese 
decision. 

This insidious attempt of the Japanese to un- 
dermine American influence is prevalent wher- 
ever the interests of the two nations come into 
contact. Although it has been denied by the 
Japanese Government and the press, and the 
State Department is reticent on the Japanese 
part of the intrigue in the alleged German- 
Japanese-Mexican alliance to invade the United 
States, presumably because the officials at 
Washington do not wish to complicate matters 
any more than necessary concerning an ally of 

*Note sent to Wai Wu-Pu. See full text of the note, 
Millard, ibid., p. 17. 



PBESENT POLICIES AND OPPOETUNITIES 105 

the United States in the world war, there were 
enough evidences in the intercepted note of the 
German Foreign Minister, Alfred Zimmermann, 
to the German Minister, von Eckhardt, at Mex- 
ico City, and in the information which leaked 
out through non-official channels at Washington 
that Japan was inclined to take sides with Ger- 
many in the attempt to arouse Mexico against 
the United States, if the occasion were op- 
portune and the methods expedient." 

2. American Duties and Opportunities 

Now that the European War is over, there is 

likely to be a realignment of world politics, and 

' The Zimmermann note was dated, January 19, 1917, and 
was given to the press by the State Department, February 
28, 1917. An interesting side-light has been shed on the " pro- 
Ally" attitude of Japan during the war by Hon. Alvan T. 
Fuller of Massachusetts, in his speech in Congress, March 

3. 1919: 

" My trip across the water was uneventful. I found among 
my fellow passengers a most delightful person, who was no 
other than M. Delanney, the French ambassador to Japan. I 
took occasion to ask the ambassador, if, as a result of his 
observation, the Japanese were sincerely pro-Ally. To this 
inquiry the ambassador replied very definitely, ' No, sir,' and 
inquired, ' Who in the world thought they were sincerely 
pro- Ally?' 

"Ambassador Delanney stated to me that the Japanese 
intended to support Germany, but after the commission 
visited here and saw how whole-heartedly we were going into 
the war they were g.fraid to do so. Ambassador Delanney 
stated that he sailed from Japan to Vancouver, and when the 
party arrived and learned the news that Austria had sur- 
rendered the Japanese members of the party were visibly 
disappointed. He likened the emperor and the military caste 
of Japan to that of Germany. He said their methods and 
ideas and ideals were those of Germany" (Congressional 
Record, Vol. 57, No. 86, p. 5465, March 15, 1919, 65th Con- 
gress, 3rd Session). 



106 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

the United States may adopt a new Oriental 
policy befitting its rights and obligations. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance has served its purpose, 
and England and Japan are only nominal allies. 
Already there are signs in both countries of 
mutual distrust.' British resentment of the 
Japanese encroachment upon their interests in 
the East, and the secret attempts of the Jap- 
anese to stir the Hindus against the British rule 
are the straws which indicate the undercurrent 
that drift the two allied nations apart.' In the 
proposal of Japanese intervention in Siberia, 
Great Britain, through her ambassador, Earl 
Reading, at Washington, sounded the United 
States on its disposition to send troops to Asia 
jointly with Japan, before requesting her East- 
ern ally to intervene. From this diplomats at 
Washington and elsewhere drew the inference 
that " Great Britain suspects Japan of an inten- 
tion of staying in Siberia once she gets there. 



'For the sentiment of Japanese publicists toward Great 
Britain and her policies, consult K. K. Kawakami, "Japan 
in World Politics" (New York), 1917. 

' See Millard, " Our Eastern Question," chap. XIII, " Ja- 
pan and Great Britain " ; McKenzie, " The Tragedy of 
Korea," chap. XX, "Prospects for Foreign Trade." For 
the Japanese secret participation in Hindu revolt against 
the English, see the findings in the Hindu revolt plot trials 
in San Francisco, — ^press dispatches, January 19, 1918; also 
see the correspondence between the leaders of the Hindu 
Nationalists in New York, and Japanese Ambassador 
Aimaro Sato at Washington, intercepted by the Department 
of Justice, and " Isolation of Japan in World Politics," 
suppressed by Department of Justice, March, 1918. 



PBESENT POLICIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 107 

Joint intervention would give handle for invok- 
ing joint withdrawal eventually." ' 

Equally as possible as the rupture of the 
Anglo-Japanese alHance is the formation of an 
Anglo-American alliance. The war aims of 
both England and America were practically 
identical and the political aspirations of the two 
countries have much in common. England and 
the United States, the two most enlightened 
and powerful democratic nations in the world, 
combined can curb the ambition of Japan — the 
consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination — 
thereby removing the cause for another world 
war, and give China political independence and 
economic stability. This can be done by ac- 
complishing two things: (1) By having all the 
treaty powers, by some sort of a diplomatic 
agreement, give up the sphere doctrine and re- 
lease the predatory trade privileges extorted 
from China. The limit of five per cent, custom 
duties on all imports and the exemption of for- 
eign traders and manufacturers from internal 
revenue taxes have made it impossible for the 
native traders and manufacturers to compete 
with their foreign competitors and have kept the 
Chinese Government in perpetual insolvency." 
When these obstacles have been eliminated, 

"Press dispatch from Washington (Nebraska State 
Journal), March 2, 1918. 

•See A. P. Winston, "Trade with China Fails to In- 
crease," Asia, XVII : 654, ff., October, 191 7. 



108 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY 

then China can establish her government on a 
more stable basis and begin financial reform 
and industrial enterprises. This will remove the 
cause of international rivalry in China and pave 
the way for the withdrawal of extraterritoriality. 
The Powers will thereby " enfranchise " China, 
as they " enfranchised " Japan in 1899. (2) By 
developing the Chinese natural resources 
through the combined capital of all Powers as 
Secretary Knox suggested in his plan for the 
neutralization of Manchurian railroads in 1909. 
By this plan the investing Powers will have the 
legitimate profit for their investment under the 
Chinese ownership of the enterprise. This will 
do away with the underhanded trade methods 
of rival nations and convert the Chinese field 
into a vast neutral zone of peaceful commerce 
and fair competition. It will also bring economic 
prosperity to the Chinese, which means a 
higher standard of living, enlightenment of the 
masses, and increase of purchasing power. If 
the purchasing power of China's millions be in- 
creased, she will be one of the most attractive 
markets in the world. Treaty Powers, includ- 
ing Japan, will reap the benefit in the end, al- 
though they may feel a seeming sacrifice for a 
time in surrendering their exclusive rights and 
spheres. 

The United States has a unique role to play 
in this realignment of world politics and in the 



PRESENT POLICIES AND OPPOETUNITIES 109 

remaking of China. The Pacific Ocean is fast 
becoming the basin of political and commercial 
activities, and what affects one side of it is 
bound to affect the other. The United States 
cannot afford, for the safety of its own interests, 
to have China dominated by an aggressive and 
militaristic nation, European or Asiatic. The 
effete notion of splendid isolation is out of date, 
and America can no longer hold herself aloof 
and keep away from the entangling alliances, of 
the old world. The world is being too closely 
unified for two incombatable political ideals to 
exist together, — imperialistic autocracy based 
upon militarism, and representative democracy 
founded on political liberty. President Wilson 
crystallized this idea into a political principle 
when he said in his message delivered at a joint 
session of the two houses of the Congress, 
April 2, 191T, . . . "The world must be 
made safe for democracy; its peace must be 
planted upon the tested foundations of political 
liberty. . . . We shall fight for the things 
which we have always carried nearest our 
hearts, — for democracy, for the rights of those 
who submit to authority to have a voice in their 
own governments, for the rights and liberties 
of small nations, for a universal domination 
of right by such a concert of free peoples as 
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
make the world itself at last free." 



110 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY 

It is a clear enunciation of new Americanism. 
The United States fought for her own freedom 
in the Declaration of Independence. She was 
willing to fight for the freedom of the peoples 
of the Western Hemisphere in declaring the 
Monroe Doctrine. In the European War she 
fought for the freedom and democracy of the 
whole world. China, if unselfishly aided and 
wisely guided, can revive her ancient genius and 
develop her vast potential resources, and will 
eventually take her place among the powers of 
the world as a strong, democratic nation. Will 
the United States of America, true to the new 
principles of her political conviction, perform 
her mission toward China in the consummation 
of this noble task? 



PART II 



An Undercurrent Shaping the 

Policy: Japan's Control 

of Publicity 



INTRODUCTION 

IN the foregoing chapters we have examined 
briefly the development of the Oriental 
policy of the United States. We will now 
consider the subtle undercurrent that directs, in 
a large measure, the course of that policy. 

When Germany violated Belgian neutrality 
and invaded France in 1914, the whole world 
raised its voice in indignant protest. But when 
Japan absorbed Korea in breach of faith and 
covenant to the latter Power, and in spite of her 
solemn declarations to the world at the beginning 
of the Russo-Japanese War that she was fighting 
Russia to safeguard the political independence 
and territorial integrity of Korea, the Powers of 
the West apparently connived at the perpetra- 
tion of the crime. The national crimes that 
Japan committed during the course of her im- 
perial expansion on the Asiatic mainland are not 
less horrible nor less excusable than those com- 
mitted by Germany in Belgium and in northern 
France. Yet Japan has received practically no 
censure for what she has done in Korea and 
China; on the contrary, she successfully main- 
tains her position as a worthy member of the 

"3 



114 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

family of the democratic nations of the world. 
One reason for this situation lies in her marvel- 
lously complete and skillful control of publicity, 
a control that enables her to manipulate easily 
the public opinion of the Western Powers and 
to mould their diplomatic policies in the Orient. 
A study, therefore, of the nature and extent of 
Japan's control of publicity will throw much 
light upon the diplomatic relationships of the 
East and the West and will result in a clearer 
understanding of the Oriental policy of the 
United States. 

As early as the close of the Russo-Japanese 
War, before the destruction of Korean inde- 
pendence, Thomas F. Millard, the distinguished 
American publicist, wrote concerning Japanese 
activities in Korea : 

" Nothing could display greater cleverness 
than the manner used by Japan through the 
propaganda to steadily shift her ground in re- 
gard to the main propositions involved in the 
settlement, while at the same time remaining 
carefully posed in an attitude of self-sacrifice. 
Something of a shock will be felt in the Western 
world when the mask, having served its pur- 
pose, is dropped. Meanwhile, pretense is piled 
upon pretense, without being able, however, to 
conceal the undercurrent of reality." * 

The mask has served its purpose and is 
* " The New Far East," p. 102. 



INTEODUCTION 115 

dropped. But the act was performed so skill- 
fully and imperceptibly, like the transition of 
magic pictures on the screen, that the Western 
world felt no shock at all. Japan knows the 
publicity game and plays it well. She knows 
the value of honourable intentions in the public 
opinion of the West, and she employs every 
means within her power to create a most favour- 
able impression of herself and her aspirations 
in the Western world, — especially in the United 
States and England. 

To this end, she has many agencies working 
constantly. They form an elaborate system of 
interior and exterior espionage, publicity prop- 
aganda, press censorship, control of the news 
both as to its sources and its distribution, 
skillful governing of the impressions made upon 
foreigners who visit Japan. 



I 

THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 

I. The Philosophy of the System 

THERE is a wrong impression in the 
West that all the Oriental peoples are 
generally cunning and sly. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Although the 
Westerner may condemn the Chinaman for his 
fogyism and low standard of living, he certainly 
may not condemn him for dishonesty. The 
credit system was firmly established in China 
long before it was known in Western Europe. 
There were no contractual laws in China ; they 
were not needed, as the Chinaman's word is as 
good as his bond. It is a well-known fact that 
the Western banks in the Far East prefer Chi- 
nese cashiers to those of any other nationality. 
Even in Japan, the majority of the cashiers in 
large banks were Chinese, because of their supe- 
rior commercial integrity and high code of hon- 
our, until the Japanese found out that this fact 
was considered a reflection on the honesty of 
the Japanese people before the Western public. 
The Japanese themselves, before coming into 
ii6 



/ 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 117 

contact with the Western world, were not so 
subtle as they are now. The Samurai were pro- 
fessional warriors. They despised wealth and 
manual labour, and upheld honour and bravery. 
But the swift abolition of the feudal system and 
the " gulping " of Western culture, — the prod- 
uct of more than five thousand years of slow 
progress, — in a single generation, has made the 
Japanese civilization of to-day a peculiar struc- 
ture, in which the sense of proportion is almost 
utterly lacking. They have copied the material 
achievements of the West without absorbing the 
underlying spiritual truths; they have adopted 
the policy of expediency rather than principle. 
The military, educational, and industrial sys- 
tems of Japan are modelled after those of Ger- 
many. Their slogans, Banzai and Dai Nippon, 
are other forms of " Deutschland, Deutschland, 
tiber alles, tiber alles in der Welt." There is a 
remarkable similarity between the Japanese spy 
system and that of Germany, as was revealed at 
the opening of the European War; only the 
Japanese system is more elaborate, and carried 
out to finer points. It is more than probable 
that the aggressive Empire of Asia learned the 
dishonourable but expedient trick from the 
military bureaucracy of Europe, and has become 
a greater master of the game. 

It is needless to say that Japan reaped great 
advantages from her spy system during her re- 



118 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

cent wars. The Chino-Japanese War in 1894 
was in many respects like the Franco-Prussian 
War. Every Japanese officer had a thorough 
knowledge of the topography of China, her re- 
sources and military strength, — all acquired 
through the laborious and patient work of spies 
long before the opening of hostilities. The same 
system was used in the preparation for the 
Russo-Japanese War. " They had military 
maps of every nook and corner of Korea and 
Manchuria; they had spies working as coolies 
on the Russian railroads, and in Russian ports 
and shipyards. . . . The collapsible boats, 
with which a pontoon was thrown across the 
Yalu, were made for that special purpose 
months before, when the Korean peninsula was 
yet to be invaded."* Nothing was left to 
chance when Japan struck the first blow, which, 
to the ordinary observer in the West, came like 
a thunderbolt from the clear sky. 

In time of war, when a nation is engaged in 
a death struggle, espionage might be justified 
under the pretext of military necessity. But 
Japan maintains her spy system in time of peace 
as well as in time of war. The most curious fact 
about it is that so far no serious protest has been 
raised by her scholars and publicists against it. 
The only explanation of this strange silence is 

*"The Russo-Japanese War," p. 25 (Collier and Sons, 
New York). 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 119 

that the oft-quoted phrase of Treitschke, " der 
Staat ist Macht," is the ruling motto with the 
better thinkers of Japan, and whatever is done 
for the benefit of the state is justifiable. This 
principle was fully demonstrated in the trial and 
acquittal of Count Miura and his accomplices 
after they murdered the Korean Queen in 1895." 
The Japanese philosophy of the state advocates 
selfishness and deception as motive powers that 
energize the world.' Only they appear in differ- 
ent manifestations in various activities of life. 
The forms of deception in business, for instance, 
are known as shrewdness; in war, they are 
strategy ; in society, cleverness ; and in relations 
between nations, diplomacy. But all these are 
only different combinations of the same element 
— deception. 

This philosophy may find its echoes among 
the followers of Nietzsche and Bernhardi; but 
no believer in liberty and democracy can en- 
dorse it. There are a few things in human 
society that outrage our natural feelings, and 
espionage is one of them. 

2. Spies in Other Lands 
It is not a hasty generalization to say that 

"See "The Far East," February, 1896, vol. i, p. 20; Mc- 
Kenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea," chap. VI. 

'See Liang Ch'i-Chao, "Liberty," pp. 148-152 (Korean 
translation from Chinese text). 



120 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

Japan has spies in practically every country on 
the globe. This does not mean, of course, that 
Japan is preparing for war on every nation in 
the world. But it is the Japanese way of finding 
out what the other people are doing. Although 
subtle rumours are scattered all over the United 
States that Japan has no use for the Philippine 
Islands, and that she would not occupy them 
under any circumstances, as they would be a 
burden to her; * yet it is an undeniable fact that 
the Malay Archipelagoes are honeycombed with 
Japanese spies." In Mexico and South America 
there are several thousand Japanese, mostly 
veterans of the Russo-Japanese War. In one 
year, 1914, 3,6T5 Japanese entered Brazil.' Ac- 
cording to the United States census of 1910, 
there were T2,157 Japanese in the United States, 
and 79,676 in the Hawaiian Islands. It is very 
probable that the number has increased consid- 
erably since. Out of this number, 123,425 were 
men — largely ex-soldiers. 

It is merely a matter of opinion how much 
credence we can attribute to the newspaper re- 
ports. But it is certain that constant and re- 
peated rumours cannot be ignored as being 
utterly false. They may be proofless, but they 

* See " Why Japan does Not Want the Philippines," Re- 
view of Reviews, 51 : 494, April, 1915 ; also, " Philippines 
No Bait to Japan," Literary Digest, 52:1212, April 29, 1916. 

* See S. Henschen, " What is Behind the Japanese Peril," 
Forum, 56:63-78, July, 1916. 

" Figures taken from the Statesmen's Year Book, 1916. 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 121 

are rarely without foundation. It was alleged 
that some time ago the harbour police of New 
York were astonished to see a Japanese aviator 
drop into the bay in his flying machine. He was 
presumably sent to map the coast defense from 
an aeroplane. Japanese " fishermen " were dis- 
covered near the entrance of the Panama Canal. 
They were trying to conduct pearl fishing expe- 
ditions by taking bearings in various sections of 
the bays and waters, and incidentally mapping 
out the forts and approaches to the canal. 

" On April 28, 1916, the Mayor of Los An- 
geles asked the United States Government to 
probe the activities of Japanese in his city. Guns 
and supplies were found hidden in the Japanese 
quarters, motor trucks had been purchased, avi- 
ators were being trained, and many young Jap- 
anese had been making surveys of the coast. 
. . . Several months ago a Japanese was ar- 
rested in Los Angeles for drunkenness. A de- 
tailed map of the United States was found on his 
person. It showed landing places for aeroplanes 
in various parts of the country. A short time 
prior to this another Japanese was arrested in 
San Diego. He carried a complete list of all the 
wireless stations in the United States." * 

Samuel G. Blythe gives an account of his 
knowing a Japanese nobleman in a Western 
hotel as a bell " hop." The films that this Japa- 
^ Chicago Bxaminer, February 4, 1917. 



122 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

nese possessed showed " Mr. Togo, the boy who 
wore the plum-coloured suit and waited on the 
bell, standing on the bridge of a Japanese battle- 
ship, clad in a silk hat and a frock coat, with the 
insignia of a Japanese order on his breast, and 
between two Japanese officers, both in full naval 
uniform. There is a large American military 
post not far from the place where Togo 
officiated." " 

All these reports and many others of similar 
nature may be discarded as fantastic and ficti- 
tious as no better than the description of the 
Japanese spies in Louis Joseph Vance's recent 
novel, " Patria." But there are two sides to 
every question ; perhaps, indeed, this is the case 
with rumours as well as arguments. 

One thing certain is that Japan has made per- 
sistent efforts to get a foothold on the Western 
Hemisphere for her military and naval pur- 
poses. In 1912, when it was known that Japa- 
nese were making secret attempts to acquire 
land in Magdalena Bay, under the pretext of 
establishing a base for Japanese fishing interests. 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, 
introduced a resolution in the Senate, which was 
adopted August 2d, declaring that " when any 
harbour or other place in the American conti- 
nent is so situated that the occupation thereof 
for naval or military purposes might threaten 
• Saturday, Evening Post, May 22, 1915, p. 53. 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 123 

the communications or the safety of the United 
States, the Government of the United States 
could not see, without grave concern, the pos- 
session of such harbour or other place by any 
corporation or association which has such rela- 
tion to another government, not American, as to 
give that government traditional powers of con- 
trol for naval or military purposes." Although 
the name Japanese was not mentioned in the 
resolution, that it was aimed at what Japan was 
trying to do was obvious. The Japanese took 
sufficient hint from this resolution, and gave up 
the attempt. It is quite clear that the American 
Government will not tolerate the acquisition of 
land in the Western Hemisphere by the Jap- 
anese for naval or military purposes, much as it 
is desired by the Tokyo Government. 

In China the Japanese spies are not so con- 
cealed and unobtrusive as they are in the United 
States. A paragraph from the description of the 
Japanese in Manchuria by an unbiased eye-wit- 
ness may be cited to illustrate the operation of 
the system there. 

" During the Russian occupation prior to the 
war, the Japanese Government had sent hun- 
dreds of Japanese into the country with instruc- 
tions to adopt the dress of the Chinese and do- 
mesticate themselves; and many of these per- 
sons succeeded in escaping detection after hos- 
tilities commenced, remaining to act as spies 



124 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

and secret agents. . . . No sooner did the 
Japanese armies occupy the country, and pro- 
mulgate their military regulations, than these 
informers came out of their retirement and 
quickly assumed a position of importance. They 
pointed to the Japanese authorities Chinese who 
were known or suspected to sympathize with or 
have business relations with the Russians. It 
mattered little that the men thus accused might 
be of high standing, and the fact that a majority 
of them, especially officials, could not have 
avoided relations with the Russians. Many 
were executed upon the witness of these profes- 
sional informers, often without even a sem- 
blance of a trial. The regulations provided that 
Chinese who knew of any infraction of them and 
failed to inform the authorities were punishable 
by death; while many were tortured in the at- 
tempt to force them to disclose military infor- 
mation." ' 

3. Espionage in Japan and Korea 
In Japan every foreigner is watched, and 
everything he does and says is carefully re- 
ported and filed In the books of the government 
secret service office. A paragraph from the pen 
of the veteran correspondent, Samuel G. Blythe, 
after his visit to Japan, well illustrates this : 
" Any man you meet may be listening for 
* Millard, " The New Far East," p. 146. 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 126 

governmental purposes to what you say or be- 
cause of that natural curiosity ; but in case you 
say anything you should not, whether the lis- 
tener is a secret agent or not, he goes and re- 
ports your conversation to somebody, for that 
is the first duty of all Japanese — to tell what 
they hear. There are always some of these 
agents about the big hotels. They act as room- 
boys, as bar-boys, as waiters, and in any other 
capacity that will put them in contact with the 
guests. In the days of the Russian war the cor- 
respondents who were held in Tokyo were ac- 
customed to relate their opinions of the Japa- 
nese in front of a certain bar, and each night 
complete reports of what they said were trans- 
mitted to the war office. The bar-boys were 
secret agents. . . . Let a man whose business 
is not definitely stated by him the moment he 
arrives go to any city in Japan, and there will be 
secret-service men set after him immediately. 
Every petty detail will be communicated to 
some secret head and set down painstakingly in 
some secret record. His trunks are likely to be 
opened. The boy in his room at his hotel is 
likely to be a spy. Every move will be watched. 
A man whom I know could do it told me he 
would get me a complete record of my comings 
and goings in Japan for a hundred yen. I told 
him it was not worth it" " 

" Saturday Evening Post, May 22, 1915, p. 53. 



126 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

The organization of the Japanese spy system 
in Korea is pretty nearly perfect. It is a part of 
the military administration in the peninsula, and 
is used most effectively to denationalize the an- 
cient kingdom. A Korean is not permitted to 
go to Europe or America, and even within 
Korea the people are not allowed to travel in 
large groups. " Every one must be registered 
and is given a number, which is known to the 
police. Every time he leaves his village or town 
he must register at the police station and state 
fully the business he intends to transact and his 
destination. The policeman 'phones to this 
place, and if his actions are in any way at vari- 
ance with his report, he is liable to arrest and 
mistreatment, A strict classification is kept on 
the basis of a man's education, influence, position, 
etc. As soon as a man begins to show ability or 
qualities of leadership he is put in class * a,' de- 
tectives are set on his trail, and from thence- 
forth he becomes a marked man, hounded wher- 
ever he goes. Even children are watched or 
bribed for information. If a man escapes the 
country his number is traced, his family or rela- 
tives arrested and perchance tortured until they 
reveal his whereabouts. A man is likely to dis- 
appear any day and perhaps not be heard of 
again."" OiHcially authorized spies are sta- 

"J. E. Moore, "Korea's Appeal for Self-Determination," 
pp. 9-10. 



THE OFFICIAL ESPIONAGE 127 

tioned in every town and village; they force 
their presence even into private household 
parties. Their acts are backed by the Japanese 
gendarmerie, and woe to the native who dares 
to resent their intrusion! He will be charged 
with treason as opposing the government au- 
thorities! The Japanese enlist as sub-spies a 
large number of the worst scoundrels in the 
country. These incorrigibles are paid good 
salaries and in many cases given rewards for 
the merit of their work; not infrequently the 
well-to-do natives are blackmailed by these 
spies, and the government winks at the crime. 
It is not only an opportunity for petty and 
venal natures to vent personal enmities and 
spites, but also a chance to gather a handsome 
fortune for a scoundrel who is not fit for any- 
thing else. 

Such abuse of the method might naturally be 
expected, but the worst feature of it all is that 
it is often used as a machine by the government 
in relentlessly crushing out the spirit of nation- 
alism. If a Korean is suspected of keeping alive 
the spirit of his forefathers, — not rebellion, for 
that would be a hopeless thing at present, — the 
government instructs its spies to bring certain 
charges against him. Upon the witness of the 
spies, he will be imprisoned, his property will be 
confiscated, and he will be puifiished in such a 
way as to be disabled for life ; or he may even be 



128 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

executed on the charge of treason." Like the 
mediaeval " Ironwoman " that crushed its victim 
without bloodshed, this spy system of the Jap- 
anese administration in Korea removes from 
the country the ablest and best educated Ko- 
reans without technically violating the regula- 
tions of the colonial policy of the Japanese Em- 
pire. 

The sad feature of the Korean case is that, 
although the Korean suffers the same hard fate 
as did the Poles and the Armenians before the 
European War, his story is unknown to the out- 
side world. The only time when he had a par- 
tial hearing before the world's court of public 
opinion was during the late wholesale arrest and 
trial of the Korean Christian leaders on the 
charge of conspiracy against the life of Gov- 
ernor-General Terauchi. This time the news 
leaked out because it involved several prominent 
foreign missionaries." 

'^For Japanese prison tortures in Korea, see the Con- 
tinent, June 13, 27, 1912; Sengman Rhee, "The Christian 
Persecution in Korea" (Korean, published in Honolulu, 
T. H.). 

_ " For full account, see the Report sent to the Continua- 
tion Committee by the missionaries in Korea. Also, consult 
Arthur Judson Brown, " The Korean Conspiracy Case " 
(1912) ; Sengman Rhee, " The Christian Persecution in 
Korea " (Korean) ; " A Korean View of Japan's Policy in 
Korea," Missionary, Review of the World, 36 : 450-453, June, 
1913. 



II 

THE GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP 

I. Press Censorship 

IT is only half a century since Japan abol- 
ished fetidalism, but the basis of it — loyalty 
— still remains. This furnishes a fertile 
ground for the growth and fruition of the polit- 
ical philosophies of Machiavelli and Hegel — the 
suppression of the individual for the sake of the 
state. The individual Japanese is not a free citi- 
zen, but a tool of the state. He has no con- 
science of his own except national conscience; 
he has no liberty except his share in national 
liberty. The Japanese scholar or publicist is 
only a mouthpiece of his government. The in- 
dividuals are for the state, but the state is not 
for the individuals, as it is in America and 
Western Europe.* This doctrine of individuals 
existing for the sake of the state brings about 
that unity of purpose and simplicity in ends 
which are the direct correlatives of national 

'See W. E. Griffis, "The Mikado— Institution and Per- 
son" (1915). 

129 



130 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

efficiency. Japan is an ambitious climber and an 
efficient worker. 

With this state-supremacy doctrine in view, 
we can understand — incredible though it may 
seem to the Western mind — that in Japan the 
government outlines its policies, and then forms 
the public opinion to support them.* Practically 
all the publications in the country are more or 
less under the control, direct or indirect, of the 
government. The native press receives orders 
from the government as to the kinds of news 
that it should print or suppress. Rigid censor- 
ship is in force all the time — not only when 
Japan is at war but when Japan is at peace. 
** They suppress not only governmental matters 
but anything that, in the light of their opinion 
of their standing outside, will tend to lower that 
estimate which they think the rest of the world 
has of them." ' The following is a typical order 
issued by the government with reference to 
something the government does not want 
printed. In this case it happens to be one con- 
cerning the navy, but its precision and thor- 
oughness are typical of all orders concerning 
even the least important matters. 

" By an official order of the Navy Department 
the following additions have been made to the 
clauses of the press censorship: Matters con- 

'Nezv Republic, November l8, 1916, p. 66. 
'Saturday^ Evening Post^ May 22, 1915, p. 53, 



THE QOVEENMENT OENSOESHIP 131 

cerning the naval movements of the ally in war, 
which have some reference to the naval strate- 
gies of the Empire ; plans of war ; organizations 
of fleets and ships, their duties, present condi- 
tion and movements; employing of transports, 
their crews, their present condition and their 
movements ; whereabouts of fleets and trans- 
port ships, and their departure and arrival; as to 
goods ordered for service; the naval prepara- 
tions and defenses in naval stations and along 
the coast; present condition of the various com- 
panies engaged in manufacturing war materials 
for the navy by order of the naval arsenal and 
the Navy Department; the positions and names 
of the bases or gathering places ; the same regu- 
lations as to aeroplanes. Beside the foregoing, 
anything that has not been made public by the 
government and has direct or indirect reference 
to naval secrets." * 

Such a thing as a constitutional guarantee of 
a free press is an unheard-of liberty in Japan. 
After the Japanese occupation of Korea, all the 
Korean dailies and magazines were suppressed 
under one pretext after another, and were grad- 
ually abolished." In their places the govern- 
ment established one subsidized daily published 



* Order issued in September, 1914, quoted by Samuel G. 
Blythe, Saturday Bvening Post, May 22, IQ15. 

"See Park, "The Tragic History of Korea" (Chinese 
edition, Shanghai), Sec. 3, chap, 36. 



132 JAPAN'S COITTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

in Korean, Mai III Shin Po, which zealously 
scatters far and wide among the natives the 
doctrine of obedience and loyalty. The Japa- 
nese even propose to establish a Korean daily in 
Hawaii to fight the Korean National Herald in 
Honolulu/ 

In forming public opinion both at home and 
abroad to support its policies, the Japanese 
Government utilizes not only the native press, 
but also the foreign publications in Japan. 
Many prominent English journals published in 
Japan are owned by Japanese.' Most of the 
others are edited by those pro-Japanese foreign- 
ers who have some interest in Japan, financial 
or otherwise. Take, for example, the Japan 
Daily Mail, perhaps the most powerful English 
daily in the Far East. Its founder and former 
editor was Captain Frank Brinkley, a well- 
known Irishman, formerly in the Japanese Gov- 
ernment service, and later foreign adviser to the 
largest Japanese shipping company, the Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha. Concerning Captain Brinkley's 
relation with the Japanese, a prominent English 
journalist writes as follows : 

" Captain Brinkley's great knowledge of Jap- 
anese life and language is admitted and admired 
by all. His independence of judgment is, how- 
ever, weakened by his close official connection 

'Korean National Herald, editorial, November 29, 1916. 
' Japan Magazine, Herald of Asia, etc. 



THE GOVEENMENT CENSOESHIP 133 

with the Japanese Government and by his per- 
sonal interest in Japanese industry. His journal 
is regarded generally as a government mouth- 
piece, and he has succeeded in making himself 
a more vigorous advocate of the Japanese claims 
than even the Japanese themselves. It can 
safely be forecasted that v\rhenever a dispute 
arises between Japanese and British interests 
Captain Brinkley and his journal will play the 
part, through thick and thin, of defenders of 
the Japanese." * 

The above might be said of nearly all the for*'" 
eign editors in Japan. When Japan began the 
wholesale arrest of the Korean Christian leaders 
and educators in 1911-1912, on the charge of a 
conspiracy, the Associated Press agent refused 
to send out the reports of the trial, except in so 
far as favourable to the Japanese. James Gor- 
don Bennett, the owner of the New York Herald^ 
ordered J. K. Ohl, the Herald's experienced and 
trustworthy correspondent at Peking, to pro- 
ceed to Seoul and report the details of the 
** Conspiracy Trial." Mr. Ohl's reports demon- 
strated that the Associated Press was less than 
fair to the Koreans and a little more than fair to 
the Japanese. Immediately great pressure was 
brought to bear by the Associated Press on the 
New York Herald, and the latter was forced to 
say editorially that it was convinced that *' the 
*F. A. McKenzie, "The Tragedy of Korea," p. 216. 



134 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

Associated Press reports were truthful and ade- 
quate," which was a virtual apology on the part 
of the New York Herald for sending its own able 
correspondent to report the trial instead of 
printing the sifted news doled out by the pro- 
Japanese agent of the Associated Press. A New 
York weekly, commenting on this, says edito- 
rially : 

"The external appearance of the case 
strongly indicates that the threat bringing The 
Herald thus to its knees was some intimation 
that its own news franchise in the Associated 
Press was in jeopardy of being revoked. . . . 
If the Associated Press management can make 
such a powerful metropolitan daily as The Herald 
' eat crow ' . . . what can it not do by way 
of dictation and repression with others of its 
constituent papers, which, to say the least, can- 
not be more capable of resisting it than The New 
York Herald is?'*' 

After the reports of the " Conspiracy Trial " 
were brought out to the West largely through 
missionary channels, the Associated Press agent, 
J. Russell Kennedy, who garbled the reports of 
the case, was no longer able to hold his position 
as an unbiased press agent. He resigned his 
position from the Associated Press, and the Jap- 
anese Government promptly awarded his loyal 
service to Japan by making him the head of the 

® The Continent, January g, 1913. 



THE GOVERNMENT CENSOESHIP 135 

Koksai (Japanese National News Agency) at 
Tokyo. 

It might be said that pro-Japanese policy is 
adopted as a matter of expediency on the part of 
some of the journals in Japan. The Japanese 
Government encourages and gives all kinds of 
aid, direct and indirect, to those newspapers that 
follow its poHcy, but insidiously suppresses for- 
eign publications that do not serve its purpose. 
The pressure is so strong that no single journal 
can successfully resist it. The case of the late 
E. T. Bethell and the Korea Daily News may be 
cited as an example of the usual fate of an inde- 
pendent foreign newspaper in the Japanese Em- 
pire. 

In the summer of 1904, Mr, Bethell, a young 
English journalist, settled in Seoul as temporary 
correspondent of a London daily paper, and 
started a modest bilingual journal, the Korea 
Daily News, printed partly in English and partly 
in Korean. He did not hesitate to record the 
facts as he saw them, regardless of their pala- 
table nature to the Japanese. This brought him 
into direct conflict with the Japanese authori- 
ties. For a time it was doubtful whether he 
could withstand the pressure. " The Japanese 
were making his life as uncomfortable as they 
possibly could, and were doing everything to ob- 
struct his work. His mails were constantly tam- 
pered with ; his servants were threatened or ar- 



136 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

rested on various excuses, and his household 
was subjected to the closest espionage. He dis- 
played surprising tenacity, and held on month 
after month without showing any sign of yield- 
ing." ^° He was approached with threat, cajo- 
lery, bribe and everything, in fact, the Japanese 
could think of to win him over to their side. 
But the EngUsh journalist stood his ground like 
a stone wall. 

Failing to conciliate the editor, the Japanese 
sought to cut the ground from under his feet by 
starting an opposition paper printed in English. 
An able Japanese journalist, Mr. Zumoto, be- 
came the editor. With the financial backing of 
the Japanese Government, this new journal, the 
Seoul Press, started out in fine shape, and was 
distributed almost for nothing. But the Korea 
Daily News held more than its own. Finally di- 
plomacy was brought into play, and this young 
English journalist was ordered to leave the 
country and the Korea Daily News was sup- 
pressed by the order of the British Foreign 
Office." 

2. Censorship of Postal and Telegraphic 
Communications 

Prior to the opening of the World War there 
were three general news telegraph services op- 

" McKenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea," p. 213. 
" For full discussion, see McKenzie, " The Tragedy of 
Korea," chap. XIX. 



THE GOVERNMENT CENSOESHIP 137 

crating" to and from the Far East : Reuter (Brit- 
ish), Ostasiatische Lloyd and its connections 
(German), and the Koksai (Japanese National 
News Agency). Of these the Reuter system 
was the most powerful and, perhaps, the least 
biased, although in times past, this agency has 
been accused on many occasions of fulfilling the 
function of keeping a certain point of view to 
the fore; and of obscuring, minimizing, or sup- 
pressing altogether the opposite or contrary 
points of view, according to the wishes of the 
British Government. The British Government 
grants special low telegraphic toll to this serv- 
ice, and being a British concern, it is altogether 
probable that the news gathered and distributed 
by this agency is, consciously or unconsciously, 
somewhat coloured in favour of the British, 
both as a matter of business expediency and of 
patriotism. But the Koksai is aided by the 
Japanese Government to such an extent that no 
other news-gathering agency can compete with 
it in Japan and in her territories. On February 
1, 1914, an agreement to cooperate was made 
between the Koksai and Reuter, with the ap- 
proval of the foreign offices of both the British 
and Japanese Governments. It was agreed that 
Reuter service from Japan should be entirely 
supplied by the Koksai. This gives the semi- 
official news-telegraphic service of Japan a dou- 
ble advantage: the Koksai can send out news 



138 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

items direct to other countries, or it can have 
the Reuter perform the service, in case of any 
advantage to the Japanese. Being the sole 
news-gathering agency in the country, the 
Koksai can handle the news as it sees fit — mini- 
mize or magnify, suppress or create. When 
there is an item of news that cannot be sent out 
without betraying the hand of the government 
behind it, then the Koksai, instead of sending it 
directly to foreign countries, hands the item 
over to the Reuter service in the Far East which 
" sprinkles it through the press, English and 
vernacular, east of Suez, and carries it to Lon- 
don, where it will be picked up by American 
correspondents and services and passed along," 
as news coming from the English news-gather- 
ing agency." 

No dispatch can go in or out of the Japanese 
Empire unless it has the sanction of the govern- 
ment. Any incoming news that does not agree 
with the policy of the government is suppressed. 
A month before the opening of hostilities be- 
tween Japan and Russia the Japanese cut off 
communication between Port Arthur and the 
Russian Legation at Seoul, so that M. Pavloff, 
then Russian minister to Korea, was forced to 
use a special war-ship to communicate with Port 
Arthur. When Count Lamsdorf sent his tele- 

"From an editorial in China Press (Shanghai), October 
13, 1914. 



THE GOVEENMENT CENSORSHIP 139 

gram to Baron Rosen, the Russian minister to 
Japan, in February, 1904, it was delayed three 
days before deUvery." 

The control of the outgoing dispatches is even 
more complete than that of the incoming. 
When the Korean Queen was murdered by the 
Japanese Government assassins in 1895, Colonel 
Cockerill, the famous correspondent of the New 
York 'Herald, was in Seoul. At once he cabled 
the news to his paper, but his message was 
stopped and the money returned to him." At 
the time of the destruction of Korean independ- 
ence, it was impossible for the Korean Govern- 
ment to lodge a formal protest with the powers, 
because of the complete control of communica- 
tion by the Japanese. 

The official supervision of the telegraphic- 
news service gives the Japanese Government an 
ample opportunity to create as well as to sup- 
press news, either for home or foreign consump- 
tion. The part played by President Roosevelt 
at the Portsmouth Conference between Russia 
and Japan was really a service to Japan, as the 
Eastern Empire, although assuming the atti- 
tude of a victor, was at the end of her financial 
strain and was anxious for peace. The results 
of the conference were disappointing to the peo- 
ple who had been led by their press and govern- 

" The Russian Circular Note, issued March 12, 1904. 
" McKenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea," p. 67. 



140 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

merit to entertain high hopes and to make free 
sacrifices for the war. Instead of letting the 
people know the truth, the government created 
an impression among them through its publicity 
channels that the meddling of the United States 
was robbing Japan of substantial fruits of vic- 
tory, and that the people should not hesitate to 
make further sacrifices for the creating and 
maintaining of a bigger army and navy which 
alone could vindicate Japan's rights in the future 
— especially against the United States. *' If pub- 
licity is wanted in the Far East, some publica- 
tion in China frequently is used. For instance, 
soon after Japan declared war against Germany 
a report was published in the Fengfien Daily 
News on August 9, 1914, that an American fleet 
had been dispatched to the Far East to protect 
China against Japan. Japan's vernacular organs 
in China spread this report, and caused some ex- 
citement among the Chinese. The report was 
telegraphed to Tokyo, and for a while it served 
as a topic for bitter editorial criticism of the 
United States. When denial was made by the 
United States, the Japanese press had to drop 
the matter; and it then side-stepped responsi- 
bility by charging the origin of the report to 
Germany. The facts seem to be that the report 
originated in Japan, with the purpose of using it 
for all it was worth to stir up popular feeling 
there against America, then accuse Germany of 



THE GOVEENMENT OENSOESHIP 141 

inciting it ; thus making it serve the various pur- 
poses of further stimulating Japanese resentment 
against America, rousing American resentment 
against Germany, and warning Chinese against 
alleged German and American intrigues." " 

The government interception of private mail 
is not less thorough than the control of dis- 
patches. It is not a war measure or military 
necessity, but a part of the established system 
of national administration, A short account 
given by Samuel G. Blythe, concerning the in- 
discriminate opening of private mail, is interest- 
ing and to the point. It follows : 

" An official in the Department of Communi- 
cation, whom I happen to know, told me with 
great pride, when I was in Japan, that they had 
just secured from Russia a machine which made 
the work of opening and reading letters much 
easier. The former method was to steam the 
letters open, read them, copy them if desired, 
and seal them again. This Russian machine, as 
I understand it, has a blade of great thinness 
and keenness. It slits the envelope in such a 
manner that the cut is barely perceptible along 
the edge of the envelope. Then the writing is 
taken out, read, copied and replaced or des- 
troyed; and the edges are rubbed and stuck to- 
gether by the machine in such a way that the 
fact that they have been cut is not discernible. 

"Millard, "Our Eastern Question," pp. 213-214. 



142 JAPAN'S OONTEOL OP PUBLICITY 

I asked this man why they went to such great 
trouble : 

" * Everybody who knows anything about the 
inside workings of the Japanese Government 
knows that all letters they want to read are 
opened and read anyhow. Why take such elab- 
orate precautions to hide that fact? ' I said. 

" * My dear sir/ he replied, * it is contrary to 
the practice of our government to disclose these 
things.' 

" Japan always has opened letters. . . . No 
one can object if a government opens letters 
that may contain information of use to an 
enemy; but why should letters be opened indis- 
criminately? "^^ 

It goes without saying that such a system is 
highly annoying to foreigners in Japan and 
Korea. Even missionaries, the most subservi- 
ent and non-complaining of all Westerners in 
the Far East, have complained of the Japanese 
interception of their mail." 

But the heaviest blow of the system falls on 
the Koreans. In Korea, under the Japanese 
military administration, the system is not cov- 
ered up, but openly practiced. Both the writer 
and receiver of letters objectionable to the gov- 
ernment are punished. I know of more than 

'' Saturday Evening Post, May 22, 1915. 
" See W. T. Ellis, " Christianity's Fiery Trial in Korea," 
The Continent, June 2y, 1912, pp. 896-899. 



THE GOVERNMENT CENSOESHIP US 

one case in which confiscation of property took 
place on the charge of this " treasonable crime." 
This overt punishment for writing objection- 
able letters may be said to be another point of 
Japanese cleverness in the abolition of the 
Korean nationality. For it creates an atmos- 
phere of fear, which suppresses almost uncon- 
sciously everything that pertains to Korean in- 
dependence or nationality, or anything that in- 
timates criticism of the Japanese administration 
in the peninsula. No Korean in America or in 
any other foreign country dare write anything 
in the least questionable in his letters to his 
friends at home, not because of himself but for 
the sake of those receiving them." 

^*See Missionary^ Review oft the World, June, 1913, vol. 
36: pp. 450-453. 



Ill 

PUBLICITY PROPAGANDA 

I. Official Publications Sf 

THERE is a remarkable similarity be- 
tween the German publicity propa- 
ganda, as it was disclosed at the begin- 
ning of the European War, and the Japanese 
publicity propaganda; only the Japanese method 
is far subtler than the German. Fatherland, 
formerly published in New York, once charac- 
terized Dr. Eliot, the president emeritus of Har- 
vard, as " Foxy Eliot," for the stand he took 
with regard to the belligerents. A Japanese 
organ would never have done this, for the Jap- 
anese have enough knowledge of American psy- 
chology to know that such an attack on one of 
the most venerable educators in the country 
would produce an effect contrary to that in- 
tended. This instance is cited to illustrate the 
difference between the Japanese and the Ger- 
man methods. 

The government publishes or authorizes pri- 
vate concerns to publish year books, annual 

144 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 145 

reports, statistical abstracts, in foreign lan- 
guages, not to inform, but to misinform the 
outside world. Many writers in America and 
Europe have paid unreserved tribute to Japan 
as the wisest colonial administrator of to-day/ 
They base their information on Report on Re- 
forms and Progress in Chosen, an annual pub- 
lished in English by the Japanese administration 
in Korea. From the standpoint of those who 
know the actual condition of Korea to-day, this 
Japanese publication is highly amusing, for it 
gives the reader an impression that, all the way 
from Imperial Rome down to the American 
Commonwealth, there never was a nation so 
wise, just, and humanitarian to a subject people 
as the Japanese are to the Koreans. Indeed, 
the words of Colonel Cockerill have lost nothing 
of their force since they were penned in 1895, 
after the Korean Queen was murdered by the 
Japanese assassins. 

** I decline to believe anything in the shape of 
news sent out by the correspondents of the Jap- 
anese newspapers," wrote the famous American 
correspondent. " A more flagitious and uncon- 
scionable lot of liars I have never known. As 
the Japanese Government exercises a strong 
censorship over its home press, it might be well 
for it to try its repressional hand upon the Jap- 

' See " Korea — A Tribute to Japan," Review of Reviews, 
52:232-233, August, 1915. 



146 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

anese sheet published in Seoul, the Kanjo- 
shimpo, which is labouring zealously, it would 
seem, to bring about the massacre of foreign 
representatives in Korea." ' 

The rapid spread of the pacifist movement 
prior to the opening of the European War was 
taken advantage of by the Japanese and used 
effectively to shield their military ambitions and 
to discourage the increase of armaments in 
America. Eminent pacifists like David Starr 
Jordan visited Japan and brought back reports 
as to the national sentiment of the Japanese 
people to the effect that the ultimate aim of 
Japan is peace, not war; that "war talk on 
either side is fooHsh and criminal. Japan recog- 
nizes the United States as her nearest neigh- 
bour among Western nations, her best customer 
and most steadfast friend. . , , For the fu- 
ture greatness of Japan depends on the return of 
the old peace with * velvet-sandalled feet,' which 
made her the nation she is to-day." ' But if we 
look the facts squarely in the face despite the 
statement of officials and public men of Japan 
to the contrary, the American Peace Society of 
Japan, the Japan Peace Society, and many other 
similar organizations are nothing more than the 
catspaw of the Japanese national program. The 
actions and work of these societies have no 

•Quoted by McKenzie in "The Tragedy o£ Korea," p. 77- 
* David Starr Jordan, "War and Waste," pp. 150-151. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGAEDA 147 

effect upon the policy of Japan, nor do they 
check the rapid growth of Japan's militarism, 
although they have influenced American public 
opinion and have retarded, to a certain extent, 
naval and military preparations on the part of 
the United States. Count Okuma is a powerful 
imperialist; he is liberal in internal affairs, but 
decidedly Bismarckian in foreign policy. In an 
article published in Shin Nijon (May, 1915), he 
wrote : " Diplomacy, to be really effective and 
successful, must be backed up by sufficient na- 
tional strength. It is only ten or fifteen years 
since Japanese diplomacy began to carry weight 
with foreign countries, and it began from the 
time that Western Powers commenced to rec- 
ognize Japan's military strength," Yet this 
Elder Statesman is the President of the Japan 
Peace Society which depicts Japan to the West- 
ern public as posing in an attitude of naive paci- 
fism. A paragraph from an editorial comment 
on the annual meeting and report of the Ameri- 
can Peace Society of Japan by the most inde- 
pendent British daily in Japan is illuminating 
and to the point: 

" Clearly there is some incongruity in the 
American Peace Society of Japan deploring the 
increase of armaments in the United States 
while absolutely silent on the expansion of the 
Japanese army this year by two divisions, and 
the impending program for the enlargement of 



148 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

the Japanese navy. . . . It is curious, indeed, 
that even the Japan Peace Society, which num- 
bers Japanese as well as foreigners among its 
members, and has as its president Count Okuma, 
never seems to consider it essential to oppose 
the expansion of armaments in Japan or to dep- 
recate the chauvinism so often exhibited in Jap- 
anese newspapers and public statements. So 
far as we have observed, the Japan Peace Soci- 
ety has never passed a single resolution against 
the enlargement of the Japanese army or the 
increase of the navy, nor has it uttered a word 
in depreciation of the hostile action which the 
government is often urged to take against 
China. It seems to be chiefly concerned in the 
attitude of other countries toward Japan, espe- 
cially of America, the dangers of militarism and 
armaments in this country being wholly ignored. 
Again, the Japan Society of America, also con- 
cerned in the maintenance of good relations be- 
tween Japan and the United States, some time 
ago published a ' Symposium of Papers by Po- 
litical Leaders and Representative Citizens of 
Japan on the Relations Between Japan and the 
United States.' Some of the declarations in 
that are of the most chauvinistic nature. Mr. 
Takekoshi, a journalist and M. P., says that 
* Korea exists now for Japan, from the view- 
point of imperial policy,' and demands the devel- 
opment of Manchuria also. Another prominent 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 149 

journalist in an article entitled, * Centripetal 
Mikadoism,' shows himself a flamboyant imperi- 
alist. . . . A peace society in Japan which con- 
centrates all its attention on menaces to peace 
abroad while ignoring those at its own doors 
may be adopting a very prudent policy, but it is 
not contributing much to the cause of interna- 
tional good will." * 

It is interesting in this connection to note how 
the Japanese handle figures. According to the 
figures received by the Western statisticians, 
the Korean population in 1912, two years after 
the annexation, was 13,461,299. By December 
31, 1916, this figure had jumped to 17,405,645, 
exclusive of Japanese and Chinese." This ge- 
netic increase of 3,944,346 people in three years 
speaks eloquently for the beneficence of Japa- 
nese rule in Korea. Here, the Japanese, past 
masters as they are in the art of deception, have 
overreached themselves. They explain that the 
more hygienic living and better economic well- 
being under the Japanese rule are the causes of 
the suddenly high birth-rate and the correspond- 
ingly sudden lowering of the death-rate. Even 
if that were granted, an annual increase of ap- 
proximately 9.8 per cent, is inconceivable with 
any people. In Japan itself, during the past five 

* Japan Chronicle, December 2i, 1915. 
"Figures taken from the Statesman's Year Book, 1913, 
1916. 



150 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

years the annual increase of population did not 
exceed 1.3 per cent. In Germany, between 
1905 and 1910, where the race is most prolific 
and the economic conditions for the growth of 
population have been nearly ideal, the annual 
increase was only 1.36 per cent.* Such manipu- 
lation of figures with regard to the Korean pop- 
ulation brought a vigorous protest from Dr. 
Sengman Rhee, the editor of the Korean Pacific 
Magazine. 

" Genetically, the Korean people have been a 
static race for several hundred years," wrote 
Dr. Rhee. " Since the Japanese occupation of 
the country they were put under severe eco- 
nomic strain. They were driven out of former 
occupations to make room for the incoming 
Japanese. Hundreds of native firms went bank- 
rupt, because they were unable to meet the 
Japanese competitors backed by the administra- 
tion. More than three hundred thousand Ko- 
reans emigrated to China since Korea lost her 
identity as a nation. It is a sociological law that 
in hard times people postpone marriage and the 
birth-rate drops. And the Korean people are no 
exception to this rule. There is all the reason 
to believe that the Korean population during 
the last five years would have decreased rather 
than increased. Although I have no definite 
proof to make a positive statement, yet it is very 
"Statesman's Year Book, igi6. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 151 

probable that the Japanese, with their charac- 
teristic foresight in deception, gave out an un- 
der-estimate in 1912 with the view of increasing 
it in a few years. The traditional population of 
Korea was twenty million, and it could not have 
been any less than seventeen million at the time 
of annexation." ^ 

" In the East, in perhaps a greater degree 
than elsewhere," writes Mr. Millard, the editor 
of the China Press and the author of many im- 
portant books on the Far Eastern problems, 
" statistics often are prepared to sustain an hy- 
pothesis. This is especially true, at the present 
time, of some statistics which relate to the eco- 
nomic and fiscal situation of Japan." ' 

2. Government Agencies in Foreign Lands 
What is left undone, in the way of publicity, 
by the press and official publications is accom- 
plished by the semi-official agencies in the West. 
From the Japanese bureau of information in 
New York, or from the one in San Francisco, 
an American can get information on any matter 
concerning Japan; but it is the strict policy of 
the bureau to give out only what the Japanese 
Government wishes to have believed in the 
West." 

^Korean Pacific Magazine, editorial, October, 1916. 
*"The Far Eastern Question," Introduction, 
° The official title of the New York Bureau is " East and 
West News Bureau." It is maintained for promoting a 



152 JAPAIT'S CONTEOL OP PUBLICITY 

The Japan Society of New York is another 
medium of dissemination of everything Japa- 
nese. It was organized in May, 1907. At present 
it boasts an active membership of over a thou- 
sand people including such eminent men as Seth 
Low, Hamilton Holt, William Elliot Griffis, El- 
bert H. Gary, and Jokichi Takamine. American 
libraries are flooded with the bulletins and 
pamphlets of the Japan Society, all distributed 
gratuitously. 

In addition to these sources of propaganda, 
there are paid lecturers and writers who take 
every opportunity to placate the Western 
opinion and present Japan in the most favour- 
able light. Although scholars like Inazo Nitobe 
have travelled in the United States as profes- 
sorial lecturers, in reality they have told their 
college audiences in America what the Japanese 
Government or newspaper could not publish 
without betraying its motive.^" The Japanese 
scholar is, in reality, a co-worker with and a 
mouthpiece of his government. In 1916, when 
Japan deliberately attempted to veto the con- 
tract to repair the Grand Canal in Shantung, 

better understanding between America and Japan. Dr. T. 
lyenaga, a professorial lecturer at Columbia University, is 
the Director of the Bureau. The one in San Francisco is 
known as the "Pacific Press Bureau," headed by K. K. 
Kawakami. 

'"A collection of lectures by Dr. Nitobe, "The Japanese 
Nation — Its Land, Its People and Its Life," distributed 
gratuitously by the Japan Society, New York. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 153 

granted by the Chinese Government to an 
American corporation, and failed, the well- 
known Director of the East and West News 
Bureau, Dr. T. lyenaga, lost no time in offering 
an apologetic excuse for his government : 

" If it is true that Japan made any protest to 
the railway scheme and the reconstruction in 
China of the Grand Canal to be undertaken by 
American capital, I am inclined to think that it 
is simply to put on record the priority of Japan's 
rights in an undertaking of that kind within the 
Province of Shantung. ... So far as Japan is 
concerned, I am sure she welcomes the develop- 
ment of China's resources by whomsoever it is 
undertaken, for such development will certainly 
tend to enhance the purchasing power of the 
Chinese, which in turn will react favourably on 
the Japanese trade in the Chinese market." " 

The war-ridden attention of America was 
somewhat diverted in the fall of 1916 by a new 
set of demands made on China by Japan, known 
as the " Chengchiatun demands," which the 
Peking Gazette characterized as "A Foot-note to 
the Twenty-one Demands." " It was believed 
that the trouble was concocted by the Japanese 
military authorities in China in order to furnish 
a cause for such demands by the Tokyo Govern- 

"/a/'OM Society Bulletin, No. 35, p. 67, November 30, 
1916. 
^'Peking Gasette, September 9, 1916. 



154 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

ment. After the fall of the Okuma Ministry, 
Premier Terauchi and his associates withdrew 
the demands as a matter of expediency in deal- 
ing with the Chinese. At present, they thought, 
a lenient policy toward China would be more 
beneficial to Japan than military bullying. This 
furnished a golden opportunity to bring Japan 
out once again into the limelight of American 
public opinion — to show the West the splendid 
spirit of sacrifice and the magnanimity of Japan. 
Japan, as a nation, never hesitates to admit its 
mistakes, if there be any, and rectify its wrongs, 
— so the Japanese publicists in this country 
would tell us. The following is a paragraph 
from the pen of K. K. Kawakami, the best 
known Japanese author and editor in America, 
on the withdrawal of the " Chengchiatun de- 
mands." 

" However disagreeable such admission may 
be to Japan, we must frankly confess that many 
of the recent troubles, resulting from the con- 
tact of Japanese and Chinese upon Chinese soil, 
have been caused by China ronin (professional 
Japanese agitators in China) as well as by unau- 
thorized actions of army men over whom the 
civilian premier had only inadequate power." " 

Had the cause and nature of the demands not 
been known in America and had the Tokyo 
Government sustained the demands, Mr, Kawa- 
^ Review of Reviews, Febrtiary, 1917, p. I79. 



PUBLICITY PROPAGANDA 155 

kami or any other Japanese writer would prob- 
ably never have said the above. But as it was, 
the occasion was taken advantage of to reveal 
Japan in an attitude of innocent repentance and 
sacrifice, and also to create an impression that 
the Japanese spokesmen in America are frank 
and outspoken in criticizing their own govern- 
ment. It is a curious fact that no Japanese pub- 
licist raised a single point of criticism of his gov- 
ernment for making the " Twenty-one De- 
mands " upon China in 1915, — the demands 
which were far more serious than the "Cheng- 
chiatun demands " in impairing the political in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of China. 
On the contrary, writers like Mr. Kawakami 
misrepresented the facts of the " Twenty-one 
Demands," and attempted to convince the 
American public that Japan was making the de- 
mands with an "unselfish motive to aid China."" 
Besides the Japanese, there are a few West- 
erners in the service of the Japanese Govern- 
ment to help in their publicity propaganda. 
" Paid agents lectured English audiences upon 
the beauties and glories of Nippon." " Honor- 
ary Consuls are appointed not so much to make 

"See K. K. Kawakami, "What Can Japan Do For 
China?" Independent, 82:280-281, May 17, 1915. A com- 
plete record of Japan's Twenty-one Demands made upon 
China in 1915, and the various steps taken in connection 
with them are given in Millard, "Our Eastern Question," 
chapters on "Japan's Aggressions in China." 

" McKenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea," p. 105. 



156 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

trade reports or look after Japanese commercial 
interests, but mainly to cooperate with the 
larger national system and play the local part 
in the pubHcity game." Thus nothing is left 
undone; what is overlooked by the national 
worker is taken up by his local associates. 
"When it comes to publicity," said an Ameri- 
can journalist, " the Japanese catch us in every 
direction." . 

3. Manipulation of Foreign Visitors in Japan 
The remarkable success of the Japanese 
propaganda in controlling the public opinion of 
America has been due largely to the coopera- 
tion of public men on this side of the ocean. All 
the praise we hear of Nippon from the lecture 
platforms and in periodical literature would 
have come to naught if it were not endorsed by 
public men in this country who visit Japan and 
bring back favourable reports. The Japanese 
have shown consummate skill in manipulating 
the distinguished foreigners who visit Japan. 

The Japan Society in America maintains a 
Travel Bureau, issues letters of introduction and 
publishes descriptive travel pamphlets which 
supplement the official traveller's guide pub- 
lished by the Japanese Government. The min- 
ute a globe-trotter lands in Japan he has little 

"There are Japanese Honorary Consuls in New Orleans, 
St. Louis, Denver, Mobile, Galveston, Philadelphia, and 
Boston. They are all Americans. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 167 

chance to see or find out anything for himself, 
especially if he is a distinguished personage. He 
is met at the pier by a polished guide conversant 
with Western manners and language; he is di- 
rected to a hotel; is shown about with great 
kindness and courtesy. He is impressed by the 
politeness and hospitality of the people and is 
charmed by the beautiful scenes and unique fes- 
tivals of the land. The country seems to him a 
land of poets, artists and lovers, where the lotus 
blooms and life is a happy dream of ease and de- 
votion to the service of art. His sense of ad- 
miration and wonder increases when he is 
shown the accomplishments of modern Japan — 
the army, navy, commerce, industry. Here is a 
land where the military virtues are fostered 
without losing sight of the beautiful; where 
there is industry without sordid materialism; 
wealth without the idle rich. The Japanese are 
the most well balanced of all races, the visitors 
write home. " They have become practical, but 
they still love the cherry tree and write poems 
to it; they are developing great business activi- 
ties, but they continue to paint with almost un- 
rivalled delicacy and precision; they support a 
strong army and navy, but both are kept in high 
efficiency for defensive purposes." " 

" It was delightful," said an American gentle- 

" See articles by Hamilton W. Mabie, "Japan To-day and 
To-morrow," in the Outlook, vols, 103, 104, 19x3. 



158 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

man after his visit to Japan. " I never enjoyed 
myself so much. Every time I wanted to go 
anywhere there was an automobile at my dis- 
posal and a Japanese official to show me about 
and explain things to me. I was constantly at- 
tended and made comfortable ; and I was given 
unexampled opportunities for seeing Japan, and 
guided to all the points of interest, and had the 
real Japanese spirit explained to me by culti- 
vated Japanese ofHcials and scholars. My view 
of Japan has entirely changed. I now realize 
how great is the work they are doing, how patri- 
otic they are, how wonderful as a people ! ** 

" Their methods when a distinguished Ameri- 
can gets to Japan are interesting and effica- 
cious," wrote Samuel G. Blythe, after his return 
from Japan in 1915. " Their hospitality is un- 
bounded; their courtesy is unexampled; their 
attentions are flattering; their polite recognition 
and deference are alluring to the susceptible. 
The Japanese capture a distinguished American 
without half trying. They have become experts 
at the game." "* 

The distinguished foreigner is kept constantly 
on the move; is dined, wined, and entertained; 
is invited to give addresses; is taken here and 
there ; is made much of; in certain cases, deemed 
most important by the Japanese, he is presented 
to the Emperor or given a decoration. It is 
^^ Saturday Evening Post, May 22, 1915. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGAUDA 159 

said that when Vice-President Fairbanks was in 
Korea, the Japanese authorities tried their ut- 
most to keep him busy with the official func- 
tions of the government so as to prevent him 
from having private conversations with resident 
Americans." In 1909, when Lord Kitchener 
went through Korea, an English resident, who 
was an old friend of Kitchener, tried to invite 
the distinguished visitor to his home for dinner, 
but the Japanese officials refused the privilege 
on the ground that the details of his visit and 
entertainment had already been arranged. 

When Judge Elbert H. Gary went to Japan in 
1916, he was met on board the ship by the 
Japanese reception committee. His special train 
was to arrive at Tokyo at twilight, so that the 
procession could pass through a mammoth 
electric arch with the sign, "Welcome, Judge 
and Mrs. Gary." The Chairman of the United 
States Corporation was interviewed by dis- 
tinguished Japanese statesmen and financiers; 
was invited to give addresses; was entertained 
at luncheons, banquets, and receptions given in 
his honour; and was shown about the country 
with characteristic Japanese deference and hos- 
pitality. An American journalist who knows 
the Japanese method of capturing distinguished 
foreigners spoke of the Judge at that time as 
being " one of the biggest fishes that got caught 
"See The Continent, June 27, 1912, p, 897. 



160 JAPAIKT'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

in the net of the Japanese pubHcity propaganda 
for some time." In describing Japanese hos- 
pitaHty after his return to America, the steel 
magnate said, " I have never before seen it ex- 
celled nor even equalled. An American gentle- 
man, if he is known and considered worthy and 
representative, will receive invitations by 
Marconi for luncheons or dinners or other func- 
tions from those who are in office or have been 
in some way designated to speak for the senti- 
ment of the people ; he will be met on the ship 
before it is docked by a committee or delegation 
from the city he is approaching; and from the 
time he lands upon Japanese territory until he 
departs he will receive the kindest and most 
liberal hospitality that can be ojffered, and al- 
ways with a grace and charm and simplicity that 
cannot be surpassed. ... I have no doubt 
that the leading and controlling men in Japan 
earnestly desire to maintain cordial, close and 
continuous relations with the people of the 
United States. It seems to me, if we ever have 
serious trouble with Japan it will be as much 
the fault of the United States as it is the fault 
of Japan ; and perhaps more." ^ The Japan 
Society of America gathered all the addresses 
delivered by Judge Gary in Japan, bound them 
in an attractive pamphlet, Japan as Vieived by 

"" From address delivered at the Bankers' Club, New York, 
November g, 1916 (pamphlet mentioned). 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 161 

Judge Blhert H. Gary, and scattered it gratis to all 
the leading libraries in the country as the sane 
and unbiased view of a distinguished American 
business man. When the United States de- 
clared its policy of embargo on steel in 1917, 
Baron Shibusawa, the leading Japanese finan- 
cier and semi-official spokesman of his govern- 
ment, sent the appeal of the Japanese industrial 
concerns direct to Judge Gary to see to it that 
Japan might be exempted from the embargo." 
Indeed, the American steel magnate wielded a 
powerful influence in bringing about the ar- 
rangement by which Japan could get steel from 
the United States, as usual, in return for fur- 
nishing shipping in the Pacific so that the Amer- 
ican vessels there could be transferred to the 
Atlantic for war purposes. 

The average globe-trotter in Japan sees Japan 
through the eyes of the Japanese. He sees 
nothing except what the Japanese want him to 
see, and hears nothing except what the Japa- 
nese want him to hear. " No condition can 
arise in Japan whereby a foreigner can learn 
from a Japanese of anything to the detriment 
of the country. The statesmen will not tell you 
anything. The coolies will not tell you any- 
thing. They are units of concealment. They 
put the good face on everything. ... If 

" Telegram given to the press by Judge Gary, New York, 
October 8, 1917. 



162 JAPAN'S COISTTEOL OP PUBLICITY 

you ask a Japanese to read you from a Japanese 
newspaper, he will carefully skip anything he 
may find in that paper that, as it seems to him, 
would be detrimental to the fair name and fame 
of Japan if communicated to a foreigner. If a 
Japanese — any Japanese — hears anything he 
deems of importance or of use to his country, he 
sees to it that that information gets to the 
proper person. He seeks to show you the 
bright spots." '^ Indeed, the late Richard Hard- 
ing Davis characterized the Japanese method of 
showing Japan to the Westerner as like telling 
a young woman that she might go out to swim 
but she mustn't go near the water.*' 

This unprecedented manipulation of foreign 
visitors, the peculiar trait of the Japanese, has 
far-reaching consequences in forming public 
opinion in the West with regard to Oriental 
politics. Few, if any, escape the Japanese net 
of hospitality and bring back true reports. The 
majority of foreigners leave Japan in a happy 
haze of pleasant impressions and ever afterward 
sing the joys and beauties and wonders of the 
country. They form a bulwark of Japanese de- 
fense in the public sentiment in the West; per- 
sistently refuse to believe anything that is dis- 
paraging to their once kind and generous host; 
and in some cases, they become more vigorous 

** Samuel G. Blythe, Saturday Evening Post, May I, 1915. 
''See "The Russo-Japanese War," chap. VII, "The 
Chroniclers of War.** 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 163 

advocates of the rights of Dai Nippon than the 
Japanese themselves. Especially is this notice- 
able on the part of publicists, such as George 
Kennan, the well-known American journalist, 
who received an unlimited hospitality during his 
stay in Japan, and Dr. George Trumbull Ladd, 
who was made an honorary member of the Im- 
perial Educational Society of Japan and was 
twice decorated by the late Emperor with the 
insignias of the Rising Sun.'* 

The " Twenty-one Demands " made on China 
by Japan on January 18, 1915, is one of the most 
notorious pieces of international robbery in 
modern times. Had China conceded to the 
terms as they were first presented by Mr. Hioki, 
the Japanese minister at Peking, the ancient 
Empire would be a vassal state to-day. The de- 
mands were first presented by the Japanese 
Government to the Chinese coupled with a 
strong admonition to China that both haste and 
secrecy were required in this consideration. 
Continuous pressure was brought on China to 
force her to concede the demands en bloc without 
discussion, and the Chinese officials were warned 
not to inform other powers of the demands and 
negotiations, even confidentially. The Japanese 
Government officially denied, as being utterly 
false, all press reports in China about the de- 

^* Mr. Kennan's articles on Japan in the Outlook, and Dr. 
Ladd's "In Korea With Marquis Ito," and "Benevolent 
Assimilatiou,"^ are decidedly pro- Japanese. 



164 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OP PUBLICITY 

mands. Newspapers in Japan were warned by 
the government not to publish or discuss news 
of the demands, and Japan's diplomatic repre- 
sentatives abroad were instructed to deny and 
discredit any such news. The Japanese min- 
ister at Peking stated in response to inq^uiries 
of other foreign ministers that no demands had 
been made. When copies of the original de- 
mands, procured from the Chinese Government, 
were received by foreign governments, Japan 
still denied the twenty-one demands, and gave 
out a list of eleven articles, omitting the most 
objectionable matters, as " friendly " demands 
made by Japan upon China " in accordance with 
the principle of the maintenance of the terri- 
torial integrity of China." 

As the facts of the case began to leak out, 
those who knew something about the political 
situation in the East were nonplussed at the 
callous selfishness of Japan. " Her statesmen 
have set truth and common decency at defiance 
in a way unparalleled in the most torturous 
diplomacy of the worst courts of the vilest 
period of history,"" as the National Review 
(Shanghai) expressed it. Others refused to 
believe the reports as being utterly incredible. 
At this time Dr. Shailer Mathews returned from 
Japan and made a report that " much of the 
news emanating from Peking is obviously 

'* Quoted in Review of Reviezvs, 52 : 230, August, 1915. 



PUBLICITY PEOPAGANDA 165 

coloured by anti-Japanese feeling, and it is diffi- 
cult to accept any of the reports on their face 
value; and this colouring of reports in the ap- 
parent interest of making trouble between the 
United States and Japan is a menace.'* An in- 
fluential New York weekly shrewdly compared 
the Japanese policy in China with the Monroe 
Doctrine of the United States and said, " The 
Monroe Doctrine . . . was adopted as a 
means of self-protection, and has never been 
made an excuse for aggrandizement or inter- 
ference in the governmental policies of Amer- 
ican Republics. The policy of Japan may be 
likened to that of Monroe Doctrine so far as it 
seeks to protect itself through checking Euro- 
pean aggressions." " 

China waited and stood the pressure as long 
as she was able, and finally conceded the de- 
mands slightly modified, giving Japan the para- 
mount sphere of influence in China. " She 
could not help herself. She had to give way. 
But to say that her giving way and Japan's 
paltry modifications of her demands have 
brought about a peaceful solution is to talk the 
sheerest drivel," said an English journal pub- 
lished in the Far East." 

When the terms of settlement were fully 

'^ Outlook, 110:4, May 5, 1915. 

"Editorial in National Reviezv (Shanghai), quoted in 
Review of Reviews, 52 : 231, August, 1915. 



166 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

known to the West, even the most conservative 
English writers who were in no position to 
criticize the British ally in the time of war, ex- 
pressed their views in unmistakable terms. 
*' Japan has violated, and is now violating, the 
terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance," said J. O. P. Bland. " She 
is taking possession of China's outlying de- 
pendencies and endeavouring to establish the 
beginnings of overlordship in China proper, 
simply because, for the moment, there is noth- 
ing to prevent her from so doing." *' Yet the 
prominent New York weekly commented on the 
settlement of disputes between China and Japan 
as follows : 

"Americans interested in the welfare of China 
and Japan will rejoice that, at a time when in- 
ternational differences have brought about half 
the world into war, these two Oriental countries 
have adjusted their difHculties on a basis of 
mutual compromise." "* 

These things are not said to cast any reflec- 
tion on the New York weekly or on any other 
pro-Japanese journal in America; they are cited 
to illustrate the tremendous influence the 
Japanese exercise over publications in this 
country, through the agencies that have been 
mentioned. 

'^ Nineteenth Century, 78: 1198-1212, November, 1915. 
^^ Outlook, 110:121-123, May 19, 1915. 



CONCLUSION 

COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE 
DIPLOMACY 

THE mainland of Asia has been, during 
the last fifty years, an international 
grab-bag. Each European nation has 
scrambled for its share in the sphere of influence 
and for commercial advantages. The two na- 
tions that have been most active in the struggle 
in eastern Asia are Russia and Japan. But 
Russia is no longer a menace to the peace of 
Asia. The Soviet Government may crumble 
to-morrow, but it is not likely that the people 
will restore their absolute monarchy. Although 
militaristic Russia no longer exists, the civilized 
world is very familiar with the tortuous in- 
trigue and secret diplomacy of the former Rus- 
sian Government. Therefore, by comparing 
the present-day Japanese diplomacy with that 
of Russia under the old regime, the reader will 
get a clearer understanding of the tactics that 
are being employed by the Asiatic Empire in 
her intercourse with other nations. We may 
profitably make, then, a brief comparison of the 

167 



168 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

diplomacies of these two Powers in the course 
of their expansion, territorial and commercial, 
in eastern Asia. 

Russian history from the time of Peter the 
Great down to the abdication of Czar Nich- 
olas II, March 15, 1917, has been a history of 
territorial aggrandizement and political ex- 
ploitation. The diplomacy of such a nation 
would necessarily be stained by indelible records 
of deceit and treachery. Perhaps writers like 
Kipling are justified in designating Russia, until 
the opening of the European War, as a black 
sheep in the European family of nations, and as 
utterly unworthy of British respect and friend- 
ship. 

Japanese diplomacy, on the other hand, is 
subtle and insidious. Its inconsistencies are so 
skillfully covered that an ordinary observer can- 
not notice them at all. The Japanese being the 
cleverest imitators in the world, spare no pains 
in putting on an appearance of honesty and 
frankness in their dealings with other peoples. 
In fact, they are honest when honesty would 
give them greater advantage than dishonesty. 
" In the Japanese philosophy of life," said Col- 
gate Baker, who was born and brought up in 
Japan, " right and wrong are terms of mere ex- 
pediency. It is right to be honest when honesty 
gives you an advantage. It is not wrong to be 
dishonest when you would lose by honesty. 



EU8SIAN AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 169 

There is no conception of right for the sake of 
right." * 

It is obvious that Japanese diplomacy is far 
superior to the crude and brutal Russian 
diplomacy, in so far as obtaining the goal of 
their respective national policies is concerned. 
Whatever is done by Russia is known and 
criticized by outsiders ; but such is not the case 
in Japanese affairs. " From what I know of 
Japan, inside and outside," wrote Thomas F. 
Millard, " I am convinced that Western knowl- 
edge of darkest Russia is as the noonday sun to 
the moon compared to general Western under- 
standing of internal forces which sway the 
policy of Nippon." ' 

During the past ten years of Japanese ex- 
pansion, Japan committed national crimes not 
less horrible than those perpetrated by Russia 
in the worst period of her history. The mili- 
tary tyranny in Korea has been interpreted in 
the Western press as a firm and necessary 
measure. "After the Japanese occupation of 
Manchuria," wrote an American correspondent 
who personally investigated the situation, " be- 
gan the state of affairs which, had it occurred in 
the Balkans or in Manchuria under Russian con- 
trol, would quickly have resounded through the 

'"Real Japanese Character," Independent, 56:641-644, 
March 24, 1904. 
* Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," p. 185. 



170 JAPAN'S CONTEOL OF PUBLICITY 

world." " The Japanese during their expedition 
against the Germans in Kiaochow confiscated 
practically all the property in the Liao-Tung 
Peninsula. The Shantung railway was not a 
German property. It was built by the Chinese 
Government with money borrowed from Ger- 
many. Japan confiscated this railway on the 
pretext that it belonged to Germany.* Dis- 
patches of such nature seldom reach the West, 
and whatever fragmentary news is smuggled 
out by individual witnesses is entirely dis- 
credited in the Western press. The majority of 
American editors refuse to believe anything 
that is contrary to their former opinion of 
Japan; they take great pleasure in quoting the 
stock phrases of the Japanese statesmen, "Japan 
has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more 
territory, no thought of depriving China or any 
other peoples of anything which they now 
possess," " which promises, George Bronson 
Rea, the editor of the Par Eastern Review, prop- 
erly calls " worthless scraps of paper to be torn 
to shreds and scattered to the winds." * 

' Millard, " The New Far East," p. 146. 

* Information given me by Dr. W. J. Hiltner, of the Har- 
vard Medical College in China, who personally investi- 
gated the problem before his return to America on fur- 
lough, November, 1916. " Tsinan-Tsingtau Railway" is the 
official name ; see Millard, " Our Eastern Question," log- 
lio, for full discussion. 

* Count Okuma's " Message to the American People," In- 
dependent, 79:291, August 31, 1914. 

•Quoted in Review of Reviews, 52:231, August, 1915. 



EUSSIAN AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 171 

The respective predicaments of the unfor- 
tunate peoples living under the Russian and the 
Japanese domination are best compared per- 
haps by Park In Sick, a Korean historian and 
editor, who fled his country since the Japanese 
occupation : * 

" To be a subject race is contemptible at its 
best. It is the most intolerable of all slavery, 
when the dominating nation happens to be one 
like Russia or Japan in which the sense of na- 
tional conscience plays no part in colonial ad- 
ministration, and which holds colonies purely 
for material gains. To live under the Russian 
control is like meeting a lion in an open field. 
Other people will hear the roar arid will sympa- 
thize with you at least ; you might find a chance 
to run away from the beast. But to live in a 
country dominated by Japan is like being shut 
up in a small room with hundreds of cobras. 
You have no chance to escape, and the world 
will not know of your death." 

It is but just to admit that Japan is not with- 
out some excuse in her sinister foreign policies. 
The only standard by which we can judge the 
right or wrong of nations in their mutual deal- 
ings is the criterion of world culture — the public 
opinion of the civilized peoples. So far in hu- 

'Park is a profound scholar in Chinese classics. Ex- 
Premier Kang Yu-Wei wrote the preface to his widely read 
book, "The Tragic History of Korea" (Chinese). 



172 JAPAN'S CONTROL OF PUBLICITY 

man history public sentiment has sanctioned 
secret and questionable methods of diplomacy 
as legitimate. What would be looked upon as 
unpardonable dishonesty between individuals is 
often considered as a clever piece of diplomacy 
between nations. A single standard of morality 
is still an ideal, rather than a reality. Espe- 
cially is this true with nations swayed by im- 
perial aspirations and deep-seated militarism. 
Japan, the infant prodigy of the East, ambitious 
of her future and jealous of her rights, has 
chosen the expedient rather than the righteous 
path to reach her place in the sun. Her poets 
have sung the glory and grandeur of war ; her 
philosophers have praised the valour and virtue 
of militarism. Her merchants have practiced 
" dumping " and misrepresentation of goods as 
a matter of course ; her statesmen have adopted 
the Bismarckian " iron and blood " policy as the 
only road to national greatness. Japan is no 
longer the gallant knight she was deemed to be 
in the earlier years of her national ascendency, 
setting out to rescue Asia from the European 
dragon ; she is now the armed bully of the East. 
The Asiatics had looked upon her as their 
teacher and leader; now their hope and faith 
are shattered in finding her a merciless con- 
queror, reigning, sword in hand, over subject 
races. The Japanese national policy may go 
through a process of regeneration, as the world 



EUSSIAN AIJD JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 173 

society is better organized on the basis of 
nationality and individual freedom. Perhaps 
the Western nations, at present, have no right 
to demand of Japan the principles of justice and 
humanity, which they themselves do not prac- 
tice. But they have a right to demand the full 
knowledge of her policies. Open diplomacy is — 
and it ought to be — the cry of the age. " The 
highest reach of injustice," as the wise Plato 
pointed out over twenty centuries ago, "is to 
be deemed just when you are not.'* The 
Koreans, — and, indeed, all subject races — may 
submit to injustice, but they ought to have a 
right to demand, at least, openness on the part 
of their conquerors. 

" E'en in the light let us die, if die we must ! " 



PART III 
Documents in the Case 



A 



TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND JAPAN 

Signed November 22^ 1894; 
Proclaimed March 21, i8p^ 

THE President of the United States of 
America and His Majesty the Emperor 
of Japan, being equally desirous of 
maintaining the relations of good understanding 
which happily exist between them, by extending 
and increasing the intercourse between their re- 
spective States, and being convinced that this 
object cannot better be accomplished than by 
revising the Treaties hitherto existing between 
the two countries, have resolved to complete 
such a revision, based upon principles of equity 
and mutual benefit, and, for that purpose, have 
named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 
The President of the United States of America, 
Walter Q. Gresham, Secretary of State of the 
United States, and His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan, Jushii Shinichiro Kurino, of the Order of 
the Sacred Treasure, and of the Fourth Class; 
who, after having communicated to each other 
their full powers, found to be in good and due 
form, have agreed upon and concluded the fol- 
lowing Articles : 

177 



178 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Article I 

The citizens or subjects of each of the two 
High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty 
to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the ter- 
ritories of the other Contracting Party, and 
shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their 
persons and property. 

They shall have free access to the Courts of 
Justice in pursuit and defense of their rights; 
they shall be at liberty equally with native citi- 
zens or subjects to choose and employ lawyers, 
advocates and representatives to pursue and de- 
fend their rights before such Courts, and in all 
other matters connected with the administra- 
tions of justice they shall enjoy all the rights 
and privileges enjoyed by native citizens or sub- 
jects. 

In whatever relates to rights of residence and 
travel ; to the possession of goods and effects of 
any kind; to the succession to personal estate, 
by will or otherwise, and the disposal of prop- 
erty of any sort and in any manner whatsoever 
which they may lawfully acquire, the citizens or 
subjects of each Contracting Party shall enjoy 
in the territories of the other the same privi- 
leges, liberties, and rights, and shall be subject 
to no higher imposts or charges in these re- 
spects than native citizens or subjects, or citi- 
zens or subjects of the most favoured nation. 
The citizens or subjects of each of the Contract- 
ing Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the 
other entire liberty of conscience, and, subject 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 179 

to the laws, ordinances, and regulations, shall 
enjoy the right of private or public exercise of 
their worship, and also the right of burying 
their respective countrymen, according to their 
religious customs, in such suitable and conveni- 
ent places as may be established and maintained 
for that purpose. 

They shall not be compelled, under any pre- 
text whatsoever, to pay any charges or taxes 
other or higher than those that are, or may be 
paid by native citizens or subjects, or citizens or 
subjects of the most favoured nation. 

The citizens or subjects of either of the Con- 
tracting Parties residing in the territories of the 
other shall be exempted from all compulsory 
military service, whether in the army, navy, na- 
tional guard, or militia; from all contributions 
imposed in lieu of personal service ; and from all 
forced loans or military exactions or contribu- 
tions. 

Article II 

There shall be reciprocal freedom of com- 
merce and navigation between the territories of 
the two High Contracting Parties. 

The citizens or subjects of each of the High 
Contracting Parties may trade in any part of the 
territories of the other by wholesale or retail in 
all kinds of produce, manufactures, and mer- 
chandise of lawful commerce, either in person or 
by agents, singly or in partnership with foreign- 
ers or native citizens or subjects ; and they may 
there own or hire and occupy houses, manufac- 



180 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

tories, warehouses, shops and premises which 
may be necessary for them, and lease land for 
residential and commercial purposes, conform- 
ing themselves to the laws, poHce and customs 
regulations of the country like native citizens or 
subjects. 

They shall have liberty freely to come with 
their ships and cargoes to all places, ports, and 
rivers in the territories of the other, which are 
or may be opened to foreign commerce, and 
shall enjoy, respectively, the same treatment in 
matters of commerce and navigation as native 
citizens or subjects, or citizens or subjects of the 
most favoured nation, without having to pay 
taxes, imposts or duties, of whatever nature or 
under whatever denomination levied in the 
name or for the profit of the Government, public 
functionaries, private individuals, corporations, 
or establishments of any kind, other or greater 
than those paid by native citizens or subjects, or 
citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation. 

It is, however, understood that the stipula- 
tions contained in this and the preceding Article 
do not in any way affect the laws, ordinances 
and regulations with regard to trade, the immi- 
gfration of labourers, police and public security 
which are in force or which may hereafter be 
enacted in either of the two countries. 

Article III 
The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses, 
and shops of the citizens or subjects of each of 
the High Contracting Parties in the territories of 



DOCmviENTa IN THE CASE 181 

the other, and all premises appertaining thereto 
destined for purposes of residence or commerce, 
shall be respected. 

It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a 
search of, or a domiciliary visit to, such dwell- 
ings and premises, or to examine or inspect 
books, papers, or accounts, except under the 
conditions and with the forms prescribed by the 
laws, ordinances and regulations for citizens or 
subjects of the country. 

Article IV 
No other or higher duties shall be imposed on 
the importation into the territories of the 
United States of any article, the produce or 
manufacture of the territories of His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan, from whatever place ar- 
riving; and no other or higher duties shall be 
imposed on the importation into the territories 
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan of any 
article, the produce or manufacture of the terri- 
tories of the United States, from whatever place 
arriving, than on the like article produced or 
manufactured in any other foreign country ; nor 
shall any prohibition be maintained or imposed 
on the importation of any article, the produce 
or manufacture of the territories of either of the 
High Contracting Parties, into the territories of 
the other, from whatever place arriving, which 
shall not equally extend to the importation of 
the like article, being the produce or manufac- 
ture of any other country. This last provision is 
not applicable to the sanitary and other prohibi- 



182 DOCmiENTS IN THE CASE 

tions occasioned by the necessity of protecting- 
the safety of persons, or of cattle, or of plants 
useful to agriculture. 

Article V 
No other or higher duties or charges shall be 
imposed in the territories of either of the High 
Contracting Parties on the exportation of any 
article to the territories of the other than such 
as are, or may be, payable on the exportation 
of the like article to any other foreign country; 
nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the ex- 
portation of any article from the territories of 
either of the two High Contracting Parties to 
the territories of the other which shall not 
equally extend to the exportation of the like ar- 
ticle to any other country. 

Article VI 
The citizens or subjects of each of the High 
Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories 
of the other exemption from all transit duties, 
and a perfect equality of treatment with native 
citizens or subjects in all that relates to ware- 
housing, bounties, facilities, and drawbacks. 

Article VII 
All articles which are or may be legally im- 
ported into the ports of the territones of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan in Japanese ves- 
sels may likewise be imported into those ports 
in vessels of the United States, without being 
liable to any other or higher duties or charges of 



DOCUMEITTS IN THE CASE 183 

whatever denomination than if such articles 
were imported in Japanese vessels; and, recip- 
rocally, all articles which are or may be legally 
imported into the ports of the territories of the 
United States in vessels of the United States 
may likewise be imported into those ports in 
Japanese vessels, without being liable to any 
other or higher duties or charges of whatever 
denomination than if such articles were im- 
ported in vessels of the United States. Such 
reciprocal equality of treatment shall take effect 
without distinction, whether such articles come 
directly from the place of origin or from any 
other place. 

In the same manner, there shall be perfect 
equality of treatment in regard to exportation, 
so that the same export duties shall be paid, and 
the same bounties and drawbacks allowed, in 
the territories of either of the High Contracting 
Parties on the exportation of any article which 
is or may be legally exported therefrom, 
whether such exportation shall take place in 
Japanese vessels or in vessels of the United 
States, and whatever may be the place of desti- 
nation, whether a port of either of the High 
Contracting Parties or of any third Power. 

Article VIII 
No duties of tonnage, harbour, pilotage, light- 
house, quarantine, or other similar or corre- 
sponding duties of whatever nature, or under 
whatever denomination levied in the name or 
for the profit of Government, public function- 



184 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

aries, private individuals, corporations, or estab- 
lishments of any kind, shall be imposed in the 
ports of the territories of either country upon 
the vessels of the other country v^hich shall not 
equally and under the same conditions be im- 
posed in the like cases on national vessels in 
general or vessels of the most favoured nation. 
Such equality of treatment shall apply recipro- 
cally to the respective vessels, from whatever 
port or place they may arrive, and whatever 
may be their place of destination. 

Article IX 
In all that regards the stationing, loading, and 
unloading of vessels in the ports, basins, docks, 
roadsteads, harbours or rivers of the territories 
of the two countries, no privilege shall be 
granted to national vessels which shall not be 
equally granted to vessels of the other country ; 
the intention of the High Contracting Parties 
being that in this respect also the respective 
vessels shall be treated on the footing of perfect 
equality. 

Article X 
The coasting trade of both the High Con- 
tracting Parties is excepted from the provisions 
of the present Treaty, and shall be regulated ac- 
cording to the laws, ordinances and regulations 
of the United States and Japan, respectively. It 
is, however, understood that citizens of the 
United States in the territories of His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan and Japanese subjects in 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 185 

tHe territories of the United States, shall enjoy- 
in this respect the rights which are, or may be, 
granted under such laws, ordinances and regu- 
lations to the citizens or subjects of any other 
country. 

A vessel of the United States laden in a for- 
eign country with cargo destined for two or 
more ports in the territories of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan, and a Japanese vessel laden 
in a foreign country with cargo destined for two 
or more ports in the territories of the United 
States, may discharge a portion of her cargo at 
one port, and continue her voyage to the other 
port or ports of destination where foreign trade 
is permitted, for the purpose of landing the re- 
mainder of her original cargo there, subject al- 
ways to the laws and customs regulation of the 
two countries. 

The Japanese Government, however, agrees 
to allow vessels of the United States to con- 
tinue, as heretofore, for the period of the dura- 
tion of the present Treaty, to carry cargo be- 
tween the existing open ports of the Empire, ex- 
cepting to or from the ports of Osaka, Niigata, 
and Ebisuminato. 

Article XI 
Any ship-of-war or merchant vessel of either 
of the High Contracting Parties which may be 
compelled by stress of weather, or by reason of 
any other distress, to take shelter in a port of 
the other, shall be at liberty to refit therein, to 
procure all necessary supplies, and to put to sea 



186 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

again, without paying any dues other than such 
as would be payable by national vessels. In 
case, however, the master of a merchant vessel 
should under the necessity of disposing of a part 
of his cargo in order to defray the expenses, he 
shall be bound to conform to the regulations and 
tariffs of the place to which he may have come. 

If any ship-of-war or merchant vessel of the 
High Contracting Parties should run aground 
or be wrecked upon the coasts of the other, the 
local authorities shall inform the Consul Gen- 
eral, Consul, Vice-Consul, or Consular Agent of 
the district, of the occurrence, or if there be no 
such consular officers, they shall inform the 
Consul General, Consul, Vice-Consul, or Con- 
sular Agent of the nearest district. 

All proceedings relative to the salvage of Jap- 
anese vessels, wrecked or cast on shore in the 
territorial waters of the United States, shall 
take place in accordance with the laws of the 
United States, and, reciprocally, all measures of 
salvage relative to vessels of the United States, 
wrecked or cast on shore in the territorial 
waters of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, 
shall take place in accordance with the laws, 
ordinances, and regulations of Japan. 

Such stranded or wrecked ship or vessel, and 
all parts thereof, and all furniture and appurte- 
nances belonging thereunto, and all goods and 
merchandise saved therefrom, including those 
which may have been cast into the sea, or the 
proceeds thereof, if sold, as well as all papers 
found on board such stranded or wrecked ship 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 187 

or vessel, shall be given up to the owners or 
their agents, when claimed by them. If such 
owners or agents are not on the spot, the same 
shall be delivered to the respective Consuls Gen- 
eral, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents 
upon being claimed by them within the period 
fixed by laws, ordinances and regulations of the 
country, and such Consular officers, owners, or 
agents shall pay only the expenses incurred in 
the preservation of the property, together with 
the salvage or other expenses which would have 
been payable in the case of the wreck of a 
national vessel. 

The goods and merchandise saved from the 
wreck shall be exempt from all the duties of the 
Customs unless cleared for consumption, in 
which case they shall pay the ordinary duties. 

When a vessel belonging to the citizens or 
subjects of one of the High Contracting Parties 
is stranded or wrecked in the territories of the 
other, the respective Consuls General, Consuls, 
Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents shall be au- 
thorized, in case the owner or master, or other 
agent of the owner, is not present, to lend their 
official assistance in order to afford the neces- 
sary assistance to the citizens or subjects of the 
respective States. The same rule shall apply in 
case the owner, master, or other agent is pres- 
ent, but requires such assistance to be given. 

Article XII 
All vessels which, according to United States 
law, are to be deemed vessels of the United 



188 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

States, and all vessels which, according to Jap- 
anese law, are to be deemed Japanese vessels, 
shall, for the purpose of this Treaty, be deemed 
vessels of the United States and Japanese ves- 
sels, respectively. 

Article XIII 

The Consuls General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, 
and Consular Agents of each of the High Con- 
tracting Parties, residing in the territories of the 
other, shall receive from the local authorities 
such assistance as can by law be given to them 
for the recovery of deserters from the vessels of 
their respective countries. 

It is understood that this stipulation shall not 
apply to the citizens or subjects of the country 
where the desertion takes place. 

Article XIV 
The High Contracting Parties agree that, in 
all that concerns commerce and navigation, any 
privilege, favour or immunity which either High 
Contracting Party has actually granted, or may 
hereafter grant, to the Government, ships, citi- 
zens, or subjects of any other State, shall be 
extended to the Government, ships, citizens, or 
subjects of the other High Contracting Party, 
gratuitously, if the concession in favour of that 
other State shall have been gratuitous, and on 
the same or equivalent conditions if the conces- 
sion shall have been conditional; it being their 
intention that the trade and navigation of each 
country shall be placed, in all respects, by the 



DOCUMEin^S IN THE CASE 189 

other, upon the footing of the most favoured 
nation. 

Article XV 

Each of the High Contracting Parties may 
appoint Consuls General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, 
Pro-Consuls, and Consular Agents, in all the 
ports, cities, and places of the other, except in 
those where it may not be convenient to recog- 
nize such officers. 

This exception, however, shall not be made 
in regard to one of the High Contracting Parties 
without being made likewise in regard to every 
other Power. 

The Consuls General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, 
Pro-Consuls, and Consular Agents, may exer- 
cise all functions, and shall enjoy all privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities which are, or may 
hereafter be granted to Consular officers of the 
most favoured nation. 

Article XVI 
The citizens or subjects of each of the High 
Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories 
of the other the same protection as native citi- 
zens or subjects in regard to patents, trade 
marks and designs, upon fulfillment of the for- 
malities prescribed by law. 

Article XVII 
The High Contracting Parties agree to the 
following arrangement: 



190 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

The several Foreign Settlements in Japan 
shall, from the date this Treaty comes into 
force, be incorporated with the respective Jap- 
anese Communes, and shall thenceforth form 
part of the general municipal system of Japan. 
The competent Japanese Authorities shall there- 
upon assume all municipal obligations and 
duties in respect thereof, and the common funds 
and property, if any, belonging to such Settle- 
ment shall at the same time be transferred to 
the said Japanese Authorities. 

When such incorporation takes place existing 
leases in perpetuity upon which property is now 
held in the said Settlements shall be confirmed, 
and no conditions whatsoever other than those 
contained in such existing leases shall be im- 
posed in respect of such property. It is, how- 
ever, understood that the Consular Authorities 
mentioned in the same are in all cases to be re- 
placed by the Japanese Authorities. All lands 
which may previously have been granted by the 
Japanese Government free of rent for the public 
purposes of the said Settlement shall, subject to 
the right of Eminent domain, be permanently 
reserved free of all taxes and charges for the 
public purposes for which they were originally 
set apart. 

Article XVIII 

This Treaty shall, from the date it comes into 

force, be substituted in place of the Treaty of 

Peace and Amity concluded on the 3d day of the 

3d month of the Tth year of Kayei, correspond- 



DOCUMENTS m THE CASE 191 

ing to the 31st day of March, 1854; the Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce concluded on the 19th 
day of the 6th month of the 5th year of Ansei, 
corresponding to the 29th day of July, 1858; 
the Tariff Convention concluded on the 13th 
day of the 5th month of the 2d year of Keio, 
corresponding to the 25th day of June, 1866; 
the Convention concluded on the 25th day of 
the 7th month of the 11th year of Meiji, corre- 
sponding to the 25th day of July, 1878, and all 
Arrangements and Agreements subsidiary 
thereto concluded or existing between the High 
Contracting Parties; and from the same date 
such Treaties, Conventions, Arrangements and 
Agreements shall cease to be being, and, in 
consequence, the jurisdiction then exercised by 
Courts of the United States in Japan and all the 
exceptional privileges, exemptions and immuni- 
ties then enjoyed by citizens of the United 
States as a part of, or appurtenant to such juris- 
diction, shall absolutely and without notice cease 
and determine, and thereafter all such jurisdic- 
tion shall be assumed and exercised by Japanese 
Courts. 

Article XIX 

This Treaty shall go into operation on the 
l7th day of July, 1899, and shall remain in force 
for the period of twelve years from that date. 

Either High Contracting Party shall have the 
right, at any time thereafter, to give notice to 
the other of its intention to terminate the same, 
and at the expiration of twelve months after 



192 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

such notice is given this Treaty shall wholly 
cease and determine. 

Article XX 

This Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifica- 
tion thereof shall be exchanged, either at Wash- 
ington or Tokyo, as soon as possible and not 
later than six months after its signature. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipoten- 
tiaries have signed the present Treaty in dupli- 
cate and have thereunto affixed their seals. 

Done at the City of Washington the 22d day 
of November, in the eighteen hundred and 
ninety-fourth year of the Christian era, corre- 
sponding to the 22d day of the 11th month of 
the 27 th year of Meiji. 

Walter Q. Gresham [seal]. 
Shinichiro Kurino [seal].: 



B 



THE EMIGRATION TREATY BETWEEN 
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1894 

Signed March ly, 1894; 
Proclaimed December 8, i8p4 

Whereas, on the l7th day of November, A. D. 
1880, and of Kwanghsu, the sixth year, tenth 
moon, fifteenth day, a treaty was concluded be- 
tween the United States and China for the pur- 
pose of regulating, limiting, or suspending the 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 193 

coming of Chinese labourers to, and their resi- 
dence in, the United States; 

And, whereas, the Government of China, in 
view of the antagonism and much deprecated 
and serious disorders to which the presence of 
Chinese labourers has given rise in certain 
parts of the United States, desires to prohibit 
the emigration of such labourers from China to 
the United States; 

And, whereas, the two Governments desire to 
cooperate in prohibiting such emigration, and to 
strengthen in other ways the bonds of friend- 
ship between the two countries; 

And, whereas, the two Governments are de- 
sirous of adopting reciprocal measures for the 
better protection of the citizens or subjects of 
each within the jurisdiction of the other ; 

Now, therefore, the President of the United 
States has appointed Walter Q. Gresham, Sec- 
retary of State of the United States, as his Pleni- 
potentiary, and His Imperial Majesty, the Em- 
peror of China has appointed Yang Yu, Officer 
of the second rank, Sub-Director of the Court 
of Sacrificial Worship, and Envoy Extraordi- 
nary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United 
States of America, as his Plenipotentiary; and 
the said Plenipotentiaries having exhibited their 
respective Full Powers found to be in due and 
good form, have agreed upon the following ar- 
ticles : 

/ Article I 

The High Contracting Parties agree that for 



194 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

a^period of ten years, beginning with the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications of this Conven- 
tion, the coming, except the conditions herein- 
after specified, of Chinese labourers to the 
United States shall be absolutely prohibited. 

/- Article II 

The preceding Article shall not apply to the 
return to the United States of any registered 
Chinese labourer who has a lawful wife, child, 
or parent in the United States, or property 
therein of the value of one thousand dollars, or 
debts of like amount due him and pending set- 
tlement. Nevertheless every such Chinese la- 
bourer shall, before leaving the United States, 
deposit, as a condition of his return, with the 
collector of customs of the district from wiiich 
he departs, a full description in writing of his 
family, or property, or debts, as aforesaid, and 
shdll be furnished by said collector with such 
certificate of his right to return under this 
Treaty as the laws of the United States may 
now or hereafter prescribe and not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Treaty; and should 
the written description aforesaid be proved to be 
false, the right of return thereunder, or of con- 
tinued residence after return, shall in each case 
be forfeited. And such right of return to the 
United States shall be exercised within one year 
from the date of leaving the United States ; but 
such right of return to the United States may be 
extended for an additional period, not to exceed 
one year, in cases where by reason of sickness or 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 195 

other cause of disability beyond his control, 
such Chinese labourer shall be rendered unable 
sooner to return — which facts shall be fully re* 
ported to the Chinese Consul at the port of de- 
parture, and by him certified, to the satisfaction 
of the collector of the port at which such Chi- 
nese subject shall land in the United States. 
And no such Chinese labourer shall be per- 
mitted to enter the United States by land or sea 
without producing to the proper officer of the 
customs the return certificate herein required, f 

Article III 

The provisions of this Convention shall not 
affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese 
subjects, being officials, teachers, students, mer- 
chants or travellers, for curiosity or pleasure, but 
not labourers, of coming to the United States 
and residing therein. To entitle such Chinese 
subjects as are above described to admission 
into the United States, they may produce a cer- 
tificate from their Government or the Govern- 
ment where they last resided vised by the diplo- 
matic or consular representatives of the United 
States in the country or port where they depart. 

It is also agreed that Chinese labourers shall 
continue to enjoy the privilege of transit across 
the territory of the United States in the course 
of their journey to or from other countries, sub- 
ject to such regulations by the Government of 
the United States as may be necessary to pre- 
vent said privilege of transit from being abused. 



196 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Article IV 
In pursuance of Article III of the Immigra- 
tion Treaty between the United States and 
China, signed at Peking on the l7th day of No- 
vember, 1880 (the 15th day of the tenth month 
of Kwanghsu, sixth year), it is hereby under- 
stood and agreed that Chinese labourers or Chi- 
nese of any other class, either permanently or 
temporarily residing in the United States, shall 
have for the protection of their persons and 
property all rights that are given by the laws 
of the United States to citizens of the most fa- 
voured nation, excepting the right to become 
naturalized citizens. And the Government of 
the United States reaffirms its obligation, as 
stated in said Article III, to exert all its power 
to secure protection to the persons and property 
of all Chinese subjects in the United States, 

Article V 
The Government of the United States, hav- 
ing by an Act of the Congress, approved May 5, 
1892, as amended by an Act approved Novem- 
ber 3, 1893, required all Chinese labourers law- 
fully within the limits of the United States be- 
fore the passage of the first-named Act to be 
registered as in said Acts provided, with a view 
of affording them better protection, the Chinese 
Government will not object to the enforcement 
of such acts, and reciprocally the Government 
of the United States recognizes the right of the 
Government of China to enact and enforce simi- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 197 

lar laws or regulations for the registration, free 
of charge, of all labourers, skilled or unskilled 
(not merchants as defined by said Acts of Con- 
gress), citizens of the United States in China, 
whether residing within or without the treaty 
ports. 

And the Government of the United States 
agrees that within twelve months from the date 
of the exchange of the ratifications of this Con- 
vention, and annually, thereafter, it will furnish 
to the Government of China registers or reports 
showing the full name, age, occupation and 
number or place of residence of all other citizens 
of the United States, including missionaries, re- 
siding both within and without the treaty ports 
of China, not including, however, diplomatic 
and other officers of the United States residing 
or travelling in China upon official business, to- 
gether with their body and household servants. 

Article VI 

This Convention shall remain in force for a 
period of ten years beginning with the date of 
the exchange of ratifications, and, if six months 
before the expiration of the said period of ten 
years, neither Government shall have given no- 
tice of its final termination to the other, it shall 
remain in full force for another like period of 
ten years. 

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipo- 
tentiaries, have signed this Convention and have 
hereunto affixed our seals. 



198 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Done, in duplicate, at Washington, the 17th 
day of March, A. D. 1894. 

Walter Q. Gresham [seal]. 
(Chinese Signature) [seal]. 



PROTOCOL BETWEEN CHINA AND THE 
TREATY POWERS, SEPTEMBER 7, 1901 

The plenipotentiaries of Germany, His Excel- 
lency M. A. Munn von Schwarzenstein ; of Aus- 
tria-Hungary, His Excellency M. M. Czikann 
von Wahlborn; of Belgium, His Excellency M. 
Joostens ; of Spain, M. B. J. de Cologan ; of the 
United States, His Excellency M. W. W. Rock- 
hill; of France, His Excellency M. Paul Beau; 
of Great Britain, His Excellency Sir Ernest 
Satow; of Italy, Marquis Salvago Raggi; of 
Japan, His Excellency M. Jutaro Komura; of 
the Netherlands, His Excellency M. F. M. Kno- 
bel; of Russia, His Excellency M. M. deGiers; 
and of China, His Highness Yi-K'uang Prince 
Ching of the first rank. President of the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency Li 
Hung-chang, Earl of Su-i of the first rank, 
Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Grand Secretary of 
the Wen-hua Throne Hall, Minister of Com- 
merce, Superintendent of the Northern trade. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 199 

Governor-General of Chihli, have met for the 
purpose of declaring that China has complied 
to the satisfaction of the Powers with the con- 
ditions laid down in the note of the 22d of De- 
cember, 1900, and which were accepted in their 
entirety by His Majesty the Emperor of China 
in a decree dated the 27th of December. 

Article I* 

By an Imperial Edict of the 9th of June last, 
Tsai Feng, Prince of Ch'un, was appointed Am- 
bassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, 
and directed in that capacity to convey to His 
Majesty the German Emperor the expression of 
the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of 
China and of the Chinese Government for the 
assassination of His Excellency the late Baron 
von Ketteler, German Minister. 

Prince Ch'un left Peking the 12th of July last 
to carry out the orders which had been given 
him. 

Article I^ 

The Chinese Government has stated that it 
will erect on the spot of the assassination of His 
Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler a com- 
memorative monument, worthy of the rank of 
the deceased, and bearing an inscription in the 
Latin, German, and Chinese languages, which 
shall express the regrets of His Majesty the 
Emperor of China for the murder committed. 

Their Excellencies the Chinese Plenipoten- 
tiaries have informed His Excellency the Ger- 



200 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

man Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22d 
of July last, that an arch of the whole width of 
the street would be erected on the said spot, and 
that work on it was begun the 25th of June last. 

Article II* 

Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st of Febru- 
ary, 1901, inflicted the following punishments on 
the principal authors of the outrages and crimes 
committed against the foreign Governments 
and their nationals: 

Tsai-I Prince Tuan and Tsai Lan Duke Fu- 
kuo were sentenced to be brought before the 
autumnal court of assize for execution, and it 
was agreed that if the Emperor saw fit to grant 
them their lives, they should be exiled to Turkes- 
tan and there imprisoned for life, without the 
possibility of commutation of these punish- 
ments. 

Tsai Hsun Prince Chuang, Ying Nien, Presi- 
dent of the Court of censors, and Chao Shu- 
Chiao, President of the Board of punishments, 
were condemned to commit suicide. 

Yu Hsien, Governor of Shanhsi, Chi Hsiu, 
President of the Board of rites, and Hsu Cheng- 
yu, formerly senior vice-President of the Board 
of punishments, were condemned to death. 

Posthumous degradation was inflicted on 
Kang Yi, assistant Grand Secretary, President 
of the Board of works, Hsu Tung, Grand Secre- 
tary, and Li Ping-heng, formerly Governor- 
General of Szu-ch'uan. 

An Imperial Edict of February 13th, 1901, re- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 201 

habilitated the memories of Hsu Yung-yi, Presi- 
dent of the Board of War, Li Shan, President of 
the Board of works, Hsu Ching-cheng, senior 
vice-President of the Board of works, Lien 
Yuan, vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council, 
and Yuan Chang, vice-President of the court of 
sacrifices, who had been put to death for having 
protested against the outrageous breaches of in- 
ternational law of last year. 

Prince Chuang committed suicide the 21st of 
February, 1901, Ying Nien and Chao Shu-chiao 
the 24th, Yu Hsien was executed the 22d, Chi 
Hsiu and Hsu Cheng-yu on the 26th. Tung Fu- 
hsiang, General in Kan-su, has been deprived of 
his office by Imperial Edict of the 13th of Febru- 
ary, 1901, pending the determination of the 
final punishment to be inflicted on him. 

Imperial Edicts dated the 29th of April and 
19th of August, 1901, have inflicted various pun- 
ishments on the provincial officials convicted of 
the crime and outrages of last summer. 

Article II^ 
An Imperial Edict promulgated the 19th of 
August, 1901, ordered the suspension of official 
examination for five years in all cities where for- 
eigners were massacred or submitted to cruel 
treatment. 

Article III 
So as to make honourable reparation for the 
assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, chancellor of the 
Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor 



202 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

of China by an Imperial Edict of the 18th oif 
June, 1901, appointed Na Tung, vice-President 
of the Board of revenue, to be his Envoy Ex- 
traordinary, and specially directed him to con- 
vey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the 
expression of the regrets of His Majesty the 
Emperor of China and of his Government at 
the assassination of the late Mr. Sugiyama. 

Article IV 

The Chinese Government has agreed to erect 
an expiatory monument in each of the foreign 
or international cemeteries v^^hich were dese- 
crated and in which the tombs were destroyed. 

It has been agreed with the Representatives 
of the Powers that the legations interested shall 
settle the details for the erection of these monu- 
ments, China bearing all the expenses thereof, 
estimated at ten thousand taels for the ceme- 
teries at Peking and within its neighbourhood, 
and at five thousand taels for the cemeteries in 
the provinces. The amounts have been paid 
and the list of these cemeteries is enclosed here- 
with. 

Article V 

China has agreed to prohibit the importation 
into its territory of arms and ammunition, as 
well as of materials exclusively used for the 
manufacture of arms and ammunition. 

An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th 
of August, 1901, forbidding said importation for 
a terra of two years. New Edict may be issued 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 203 

subsequently extending this by other successive 
terms of two years in case of necessity recog- 
nized by the Powers. 

Article VI 

By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th of May, 
1901, His Majesty the Emperor of China agreed 
to pay the Powers an indemnity of four hundred 
and fifty millions of Haikwan taels. This sum 
represents the total amount of the indemnities 
for States, companies or societies, private indi- 
viduals, and Chinese referred to in Article VI of 
the note of December 22d, 1900. 

(a) These four hundred and fifty millions 
constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of 
the Haikwan tael to the gold currency of each 
country, as indicated below : 

Haikwan tael — marks 3-05S 

— Austria-Hungary crown. . 3.595 

— ^gold dollar 0.742 

— francs 3-750 

— ^pound sterling 3s. od. 

— yen 1.407 

— Netherlands florin 1-796 

— ^gold rouble 1412 

This sum in gold shall bear interest at 4 per 
cent, per annum, and the capital shall be reim- 
bursed by China in thirty-nine years in the man- 
ner indicated in the annexed plan of amortiza- 
tion. 

Capital and interest shall be payable in gold 
or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the 
dates at which the different payments fall due. 



204 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

The amortization shall commence the 1st of 
January, 1902, and shall finish at the end of the 
year 1940. The amortizations are payable an- 
nually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st 
of January, 1903. 

Interest shall run from the 1st of July, 1901, 
but the Chinese Government shall have the 
right to pay off within a term of three years, 
beginning January, 1902, the arrears of the 
first six months, ending the 31st of December, 
1901, on condition, however, that it pays com- 
pound interest at the rate of 4 per cent, per 
annum on the sums the payments of which shall 
have thus been deferred. Interest shall be pay- 
able semi-annually, the first payment being fixed 
on the 1st of July, 1902. 

(b) The service of the debt shall take place in 
Shanghai, in the following manner : 

Each Power shall be represented by a dele- 
gate on a commission of bankers authorized to 
receive the amount of interest and amortization 
which shall be paid to it by the Chinese authori- 
ties designated for that purpose, to divide it 
among the interested parties, and to give a re- 
ceipt for the same. 

(c) The Chinese Government shall deliver to 
the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking a 
bond for the lump sum, which shall subse- 
quently be converted into fractional bonds bear- 
ing the signatures of the delegates of the Chi- 
nese Government designated for that purpose. 
This operation and all those relating to issuing 
of the bonds shall be performed by the above- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 205 

mentioned Commission, in accordance with the 
instructions which the Powers shall send their 
delegates. 

(d) The proceeds of the revenue assigned to 
the payment of the bonds shall be paid to the 
commission. 

(e) The revenues assigned as security for the 
bonds are the following: 

1. The balance of the revenues of the Impe- 
rial maritime Customs after payment of the in- 
terest and amortization of preceding loans se- 
cured on these revenues, plus the proceeds of 
the raising to five per cent, effective of the pres- 
ent tariff on maritime imports, including articles 
until now on the free list, but exempting foreign 
rice, cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion 
and coin. 

2. The revenue of the native customs, admin- 
istered in the open ports by the Imperial mari- 
time Customs. 

3. The total revenue of the salt gabelle, exclu- 
sive of the fraction previously set aside for other 
foreign loans. 

The raising of the present tariff on imports to 
five per cent, effective is agreed to on the con- 
ditions mentioned below. 

It shall be put in force two months after the 
signing of the present protocol, and no excep- 
tions shall be made except for merchandise 
shipped not more than ten days after the said 
signing. 

(1) All duties levied on imports "ad va- 
lorem " shall be converted as far as possible and 



206 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

as soon as may be into specific duties. This con- 
version shall be made in the following manner: 
The average value of merchandise at the time 
of their landing during the three years 189Y, 
1898, and 1899, that is to say, the market price 
less the amount of import duties and incidental 
expenses, shall be taken as the basis for the val- 
uation of merchandise. Pending the result of 
the work of conversion, duties shall be levied 
" ad valorem." 

(2) The beds of the rivers Peiho and 
Whangpu shall be improved with the financial 
participation of China. 

Article VII 

The Chinese Government has agreed that the 
quarter occupied by the legations shall be con- 
sidered as one specially reserved for their use 
and placed under their exclusive control, in 
which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, 
and which may be made defensible. 

The limits of this quarter have been fixed as 
follows on the annexed plan : 

On the west, the line 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 

On the north, the line 5, 6, Y, 8, 9, 10. 

On the east, Ketteler Street (10, 11, 12). 

Drawn along the exterior base of the Tartar 
wall and following the line of the bastions, on 
the south the line 12.1. 

In the protocol annexed to the letter of the 
16th of January, 1901, China recognized the 
right of each Power to maintain a permanent 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 207 

guard in the said quarter for the defense of its 
legation. 

Article VIII 
The Chinese Government has consented to 
raze the forts of Taku and those which might 
impede free communication between Peking 
and the sea; steps have been taken for carrying 
this out. 

Article IX 

The Chinese Government has conceded the 
right to the Powers in the protocol annexed to 
the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, to occupy 
certain points, to be determined by an agree- 
ment between them, for the maintenance of 
open communication between the capital and 
the sea. The points occupied by the Powers 
are: 

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, 
Chun-liang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lutai, Tang-shan, 
Lan-chow, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai 
kuan. 

Article X 
The Chinese Government has agreed to post 
and to have published during two years in all 
district cities the following Imperial edicts : 

(a) Edicts of the 1st of February, prohibiting 
forever, under pain of death, membership in any 
anti-foreign society. 

(b) Edicts of the 13th and 21st of February, 
29th of April, and 19th of August, enumerating 
the punishments inflicted on the guilty. 



208 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

(c) Edicts of the 19th of August, 1901, pro- 
hibiting examinations in all cities where foreign- 
ers were massacred or subjected to cruel treat- 
ment. 

(d) Edict of the 1st of February, 1901, declar- 
ing all governors-general, governors, and pro- 
vincial or local officials responsible for order in 
their respective districts, and that in case of new 
anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the 
treaties which shall not be immediately re- 
pressed, these officials shall immediately be dis- 
missed, without possibility of being given new 
functions or new honours. 

The posting of these edicts is being carried on 
throughout the Empire. 



Article XI 

The Chinese Government has agreed to nego- 
tiate the amendments deemed necessary by the 
foreign Governments to the treaties of com- 
merce and navigation and the other subjects 
concerning commercial relations, with the ob- 
ject of facilitating them. 

At present, and as a result of the stipulation 
contained in Article VI concerning the indem- 
nity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist 
in the improvement of the courses of the rivers 
Peiho and Whangpu, as stated below. 

(a) The works for the improvement of the 
navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898, with 
the cooperation of the Chinese Government, 
have been resumed under the direction of an 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 209 

international Commission. As soon as the ad- 
ministration of Tientsin shall have been handed 
back to the Chinese Government, it will be in a 
position to be represented on this Commission, 
and will pay each year a sum of sixty thousand 
Haikwan taels for maintaining the works. 

(b) A conservancy Board, charged with the 
management and control of the works for 
straightening the Whangpu and the improve- 
ment of the course of that river, is hereby 
created. 

This Board shall consist of member^ repre- 
senting the interests of the Chinese Government 
and those of foreigners in the shipping trade of 
Shanghai. The expenses incurred for the works 
and the general management of the undertaking 
are estimated at the annual sum of four hun- 
dred and sixty thousand Haikwan taels for the 
first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied 
in equal portions by the Chinese Government 
and the foreign interests concerned. Detailed 
stipulations concerning the composition, duties, 
and revenues of the conservancy Board are em- 
bodied in annex hereto. 



Article XII 
An Imperial Edict of the 24th of July, 1901, 
reformed the Office of foreign affairs (Tsungli 
Yamen), on the lines indicated by the Powers, 
that is to say, transformed it into a Ministry of 
foreign affairs (Wai-wu Pu), which takes pre- 
cedence over the six other Ministries of the 



210 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

State. The same edict appointed the principal 
members of this Ministry. 

An agreement has also been reached concern- 
ing the modification of Court ceremonial as re- 
gards the reception of foreign Representatives 
and has been the subject of several notes from 
the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance of 
which is embodied in a memorandum herewith 
annexed. 

Finally, it is expressly understood that as re- 
gards the declarations specified above and the 
annexed documents originating with the for- 
eign Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is 
authoritative. 

The Chinese Government having thus com- 
plied to the satisfaction of the Powers with the 
conditions laid down in the above-mentioned 
note of December 22d, 1900, the Powers have 
agreed to accede to the wishes of China to ter- 
minate the situation created by the disorders of 
the summer of 1900. In consequence thereof 
the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to 
declare in the name of their Governments that, 
with the exception of the legation guards men- 
tioned in Article VII, the international troops 
will completely evacuate the city of Peking on 
the lYth of September, 1901, and, with the ex- 
ception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, 
will withdraw from the province of Chihli on the 
22d of September. 

The present final Protocol has been drawn up 
in twelve identic copies and signed by all the 
Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Countries. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 



211 



One copy shall be given to each of the foreign 
Plenipotentiaries, and one copy shall be given to 
the Chinese Plenipotentiaries. 



Peking, ph September, igoii 



A. V. MUMM. 

m. czikann. 

joostens. 

b. j. de cologan. 

w. vv. rockhill. 

Beau. 



Ernest Satow. 
Salvago Raggi. 
jutaro komura. 
F. M. Knobel. 

M. DE GlERS. 



Signatures 

and 

seals of 

Chinese 

Plenipoten- 
tiaries. 



D 



THE HAY DOCTRINE: THE HAY- VON 
BULOW CORRESPONDENCE 

Mr. Hay, American Secretary of State, to Mr. 
White, American Ambassador to Germany : 



Sir; 



Department of State, 
Washington, September 6, iSgg. 



At the time when the Government of the 
United States was informed by that of Germany 
that it had leased from His Majesty the Em- 
peror of China the port of Kiaochow and the 
adjacent territory in the province of Shantung, 
assurances were given to the Ambassador of the 
United States at Berlin by the Imperial German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that the rights and 
privileges insured by treaties with China to citi- 
zens of the United States would not thereby 



212 DOCUMENTS DT THE CASE 

suffer or be in any wise impaired within the area 
over which Germany had thus obtained control. 

More recently, however, the British Govern- 
ment recognized by a formal agreement with 
Germany the exclusive right of the latter coun- 
try to enjoy in said leased area and the contigu- 
ous "sphere of influence or interest " certain 
privileges, more especially those relating to rail- 
roads and mining enterprises ; but, as the exact 
nature and extent of the rights thus recognized 
have not been clearly defined, it is possible that 
serious conflicts of interests may at any time 
arise, not only between British and German sub- 
jects within said area, but that the interests of 
our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby. 

Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of 
irritation and to insure at the same time to the 
commerce of all nations in China the undoubted 
benefits which should accrue from a formal rec- 
ognition by the various Powers claiming 
" spheres of interest " that they shall enjoy per- 
fect equality of treatment for their commerce 
and navigation within such " spheres," the Gov- 
ernment of the United States would be pleased 
to see His German Majesty's Government give 
formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in 
securing like assurances from the other inter- 
ested Powers, that each within its respective 
sphere of whatever influence — 

First. Will in no way interfere with any 
treaty port or any vested interest within any so- 
called " sphere of interest " or leased territory 
it may have in China. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 213 

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the 
time being shall apply to all merchandise landed 
or shipped to all such ports as are within said 
" sphere of interest " (they be " free ports "), 
no matter to what nationality it may belong, 
and that duties so leviable shall be collected by 
the Chinese Government. 

Third. That it will levy no higher dues on 
vessels of another nationality frequenting any 
port in such " sphere " than shall be levied on 
vessels of its own nationality, and no higher rail- 
road charges over lines built, controlled, or op- 
erated within its " sphere " on merchandise be- 
longing to citizens or subjects of other nationali- 
ties transported through such " sphere " than 
shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging 
to its own nationals transported over equal dis- 
tances. 

The liberal policy pursued by His Imperial 
German Majesty in declaring Kiaochow a free 
port and in aiding the Chinese Government in 
the establishment there of a custom-house are 
so clearly in line with the proposition which this 
Government is anxious to see recognized that 
it entertains the strongest hope that Germany 
will give its acceptance and hearty support. 

The recent Ukase of His Majesty the Em- 
peror of Russia declaring the port of Ta-lien- 
wan open during the whole of the lease under 
which it is held from China to the merchant 
ships of all nations, coupled with the categorical 
assurances made to this Government by His Im- 
perial Majesty's representative at this capital at 



214 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

the time, and since repeated to me by the pres- 
ent Russian Ambassador, seem to insure sup- 
port of the Emperor to the proposal measure. 
Our Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg 
has in consequence been instructed to submit it 
to the Russian Government and to request their 
early consideration of it. A copy of my instruc- 
tion on the subject to Mr. Tower is herewith 
enclosed for your confidential information. 

The commercial interests of Great Britain 
and Japan will be so clearly served by the de- 
sired declaration of intentions, and the views of 
the Governments of these countries as to the 
desirability of the adoption of measures insuring 
the benefits of equality of treatment of all for- 
eign trade throughout China are so similar to 
those entertained by the United States, that 
their acceptance of the proposition herein out- 
lined and their cooperation in advocating their 
adoption by the other Powers can be confidently 
expected. I enclose herewith copy of the in- 
struction which I have sent to Mr. Choate on 
the subject. 

In view of the present favourable conditions, 
you are instructed to submit the above con- 
siderations to His Imperial German Majesty's 
Minister for Foreign AflFairs, and to request his 
early consideration of the subject. 

Copy of this instruction is sent to our Ambas- 
sadors at London and at St. Petersburg for their 
information. 

I have, etc. 

John Hay. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 215 

Count von Btilow, His Imperial German Maj- 
esty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr, 
White: 

(Translation.) 



I 



Foreign Office, 
Berlin, February ig, igoo. 
Mr. Ambassador: 

Your Excellency informed me, in a memoran- 
dum presented on the 24:th of last month, that 
the Government of the United States of 
America had received satisfactory replies from 
all the Powers to w^hich an inquiry had been ad- 
dressed similar to that contained in Your Excel- 
lency's note of September 26th last, in regard to 
the policy of the open door in China. While 
referring to this, Your Excellency thereupon 
expressed the wish that the Imperial Govern- 
ment would now also give its answer in writing. 
Gladly complying with this wish, I have the 
honour to inform Your Excellency, repeating 
the statements already made verbally, as fol- 
lows : As recognized by the Government of the 
United States of America, according to Your 
Excellency's note referred to above, the Impe- 
rial Government has, from the beginning, not 
only asserted, but also practically carried out to 
the fullest extent in its Chinese possessions ab- 
solute equality of treatment of all nations with 
regard to trade, navigation, and commerce. The 
Imperial Government entertains no thought of 
departing in the future from this principle, 
which at once excludes any prejudicial or disad- 
vantageous commercial treatment of the citi- 



216 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

zens of the United States of America, so long as 
it is not forced to do so, on account of consid- 
erations of reciprocity, by a divergence from it 
by other governments. If, therefore, the other 
Powers interested in the industrial development 
of the Chinese Empire are willing to recognize 
the same principle, this can only be desired by 
the Imperial Government, which in this case 
upon being requested will gladly be ready to 
participate with the United States of America 
and the other Powers in an agreement made 
upon these lines, by which the same rights are 
reciprocally secured. 
I avail myself, etc. • 

BULOW. 



E 

THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCES 

{ist) Agreement, Concluded January jo, IQ02 

Article I. — The High Contracting Parties, 
having mutually recognized the independence 
of China and Korea, declare themselves to be 
entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tenden- 
cies in either country. Having in view, how- 
ever, their special interests, of which those of 
Great Britain relate principally to China, while 
Japan, in addition to the interests which she 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 217 

possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar 
degree politically, as well as commercially and 
industrially, in Korea, the High Contracting 
Parties recognize that it will be admissible for 
either of them to take such measures as may be 
indispensable in order to safeguard those inter- 
ests if threatened either by the aggressive action 
of any other Power, or by disturbances arising 
in China or Korea, and necessitating the inter- 
vention of either of the High Contracting 
Parties for the protection of the lives and prop- 
erty of its subjects. 

Article II. — If either Great Britain or Japan, 
in the defense of their respective interests as 
above described, should become involved in war 
with another Power, the other High Contract- 
ing Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and 
use its efforts to prevent others from joining in 
hostilities against its ally. 

Article III. — If, in the above event, any other 
Power or Powers should join in hostilities 
against that Ally, the other High Contracting 
Party will come to its assistance, and will con- 
duct the war in common, and will make peace in 
mutual agreement with it. 

Article IV. — The High Contracting Parties 
agree that neither of them will, without consult- 
ing the other, enter into separate arrangements 
with another Power to the prejudice of the in- 
terests above described. 

Article V. — Whenever, in the opinion of either 
Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned in- 
terests are in jeopardy the two Governments 



218 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

will communicate with each other fully and 
frankly. 

Article VI. — The present Agreement shall 
come into effect immediately after the date of its 
signature, and remain in force for five years 
from that date. In case neither of the High 
Contracting Parties should have notified twelve 
months before the expiration of the said five 
years the intention of terminating it, it shall re- 
main binding until the expiration of one year 
from the day on which either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall have denounced it. But 
if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, 
either ally is actually engaged in war, the Alli- 
ance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is con- 
cluded, 

'{sd) Signed at London August 12, IQ05 
The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C, Har- 
dinge : 

Foreign Office, September 6, 1905. 
Sir: 

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, 
a copy of a new Agreement concluded between 
His Majesty's Government and that of Japan in 
substitution for that of the 30th of January, 
1902. You will take an early opportunity o£ 
communicating the new Agreement to the Rus- 
sian Government. 

It was signed on the 12th August, and you 
will explain that it would have been immedi- 
ately made public but for the fact that negotia- 
tions had at that time already commenced be- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 219 

tween Russia and Japan, and that the pubHcation 
of such a document whilst those negotiations 
were still in progress would obviously have been 
improper and inopportune. 

The Russian Government will, I trust, recog- 
nize that the new Agreement is an international 
instrument to which no exception can be taken 
by any of the Powers interested in the affairs of 
the Far East. You should call special attention 
to the objects mentioned in the preamble as 
those by which the policy of the Contracting 
Parties is inspired. His Majesty's Government 
believed that they may count upon the good will 
and support of all the Powers in endeavouring 
to maintain peace in Eastern Asia and in seek- 
ing to uphold the integrity and independence of 
the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal 
opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
all nations in that country. 

On the other hand, the special interests of the 
Contracting Parties are of a kind upon which 
they are fully entitled to insist, and the an- 
nouncement that those interests must be safe- 
guarded is one which can create no surprise, and 
need give rise to no misgivings. 

I call your special attention to the wording of 
Article II, which lays down distinctly that it is 
only in the case of an unprovoked attack made 
on one of the Contracting Parties by another 
Power or Powers, and when that Party is de- 
fending its territorial rights and special interests 
from aggressive action, that the other Party is 
bound to come to its assistance. 



220 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Article III, dealing with the question of 
Korea, is deserving of special attention. It rec- 
ognizes in the clearest terms the paramount po- 
sition which Japan at this moment occupies and 
must henceforth occupy in Korea, and her right 
to take any measures which she may find neces- 
sary for the protection of her political, military, 
and economic interests in that country. It is, 
however, expressly provided that such measures 
must not be contrary to the principle of equal 
opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
other nations. The new treaty no doubt differs 
at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. 
It has, however, become evident that Korea, 
owing to its close proximity to the Japanese 
Empire and inability to stand alone, must fall 
under the control and tutelage of Japan. 

His Majesty's Government observe with sat- 
isfaction that this point was readily conceded by 
Russia in the Treaty of Peace recently con- 
cluded with Japan, and they have every reason 
to believe that similar views are held by other 
Powers with regard to the relations which 
should subsist between Japan and Korea. 

His Majesty's Government venture to antici- 
pate that the alliance thus concluded, desig- 
nated as it is with objects which are purely 
peaceful and for the protection of rights and in- 
terests the validity of which cannot be con- 
tested, will be regarded with approval by the 
Government to which you are accredited. They 
are justified in believing that its conclusion may 
not have been without effect in facilitating the 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 221 

settlement by which the war has been so hap- 
pily brought to an end, and they earnestly trust 
that it may, for many years to come, be instru- 
mental in securing the peace of the world in 
those regions which come within its scope. 
I am, etc. 

(Signed) Landsdowne.; 



Xlnclosure.) 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND JAPAN 

Signed at London, August 12, 190^ 

(Preamble) 

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, 
being desirous of replacing the Agreement con- 
cluded between them on the 30th January, 
1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the 
following Articles which have for their objects : 

(fl) The consolidation and maintenance of 
the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia 
and of India; 

(b) The preservation of the common interest 
of all Powers in China by insuring the independ- 
ence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and 
the principle of equal opportunities for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations in China; 

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights 
of the High Contracting Parties in the regions 



222 DOCUMENTS IK THE CASE 

of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of 
their special interests in the said regions : 

Article I. — It is agreed that whenever, in the 
opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of 
the rights and interests referred to in the pre- 
amble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the 
two Governments will communicate with one 
another fully and frankly, and will consider in 
common the measures which should be taken to 
safeguard those menaced rights or interests. 

Article II. — If by reason of unprovoked attack 
or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the 
part of any other Power or Powers either Con- 
tracting Party should be involved in war in de- 
fense of its territorial rights or special interests 
mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, 
the other Contracting Party will at once come 
to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the 
war in common, and make peace in mutual 
agreement with it. 

Article III. — ^Japan possessing paramount po- 
litical, military and economic interests in Korea, 
Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to 
take such measures of guidance, control, and 
protection in Korea as she may deem proper 
and necessary to safeguard and advance those 
interests, provided always that such measures 
are not contrary to the principle of equal oppor- 
tunities for the commerce and industry of all 
nations. 

Article IV. — Great Britain having a special in- 
terest in all that concerns the security of the 
Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 223 

take such measures in the proximity of that 
frontier as she may find necessary for safeguard- 
ing her Indian possessions. 

Article V. — The High Contracting Parties 
agree that neither of them will, without consult- 
ing the other, enter into separate arrangements 
with another Power to the prejudice of the ob- 
jects described in the preamble of this Agree- 
ment. 

Article VI. — As regards the present war be- 
tween Japan and Russia, Great Britain will con- 
tinue to maintain strict neutrality unless some 
other Power or Powers should join in hostilities 
against Japan, in which case Great Britain will 
come to the assistance of Japan, and will con- 
duct the war in common, and make peace in 
mutual agreement with Japan. 

Article VII. — The conditions under which 
armed assistance shall be afforded by either 
Power to the other in the circumstances men- 
tioned in the present Agreement, and the means 
by which such assistance is to be made available, 
will be arranged by the Naval and Military 
authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will 
from time to time consult one another fully and 
freely upon all questions of mutual interest. 

Article VIIL — The present Agreement shall, 
subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into 
effect immediately after the date of its signature, 
and remain in force for ten years from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting 
Parties should have notified twelve months be- 
fore the expiration of the said ten years the in- 



224 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

tention of terminating it, it shall remain bind- 
ing until the expiration of one year from the 
day on which either of the High Contracting 
Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when 
the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either 
ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance 
shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly 
authorized by their respective Governments, 
have signed this Agreement and have affixed 
thereto their Seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day 
of August, 1905. 

(L. S.) Landsdowne, 

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs. 

(L. S.) Tadasu Hayashi, 

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court 
of St. James. 



{^d) Alliance Treaty Signed July i^, igii 
{Preamble) 
The Government of Japan and the Govern- 
ment of Great Britain having in view the im- 
portant changes which have taken place in the 
situation since the conclusion of the Anglo- 
Japanese Agreement of August 12, 1905, and 
believing that the revision of that Agreement 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 225 

responding to such changes would contribute to 
general stability and repose, have agreed upon 
the following stipulations to replace the Agree- 
ment above mentioned, such stipulations hav- 
ing the same object as the said Agreement, 
namely : — 

A. — The consolidation and maintenance of 
the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia 
and India. 

B. — The preservation of the common in- 
terests of all the Powers in China by insuring 
the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities 
for the commerce and industry of all nations in 
China. 

C. — The maintenance of the territorial rights 
of the High Contracting Parties in the regions 
of Eastern Asia and of India and the defense of 
their special interests on those regions : — 

Article I. — It is agreed that whenever, in the 
opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any 
of the rights and interests referred to in the 
preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the 
two Governments will communicate with one 
another fully and frankly, and will consider in 
common the measures which should be taken to 
safeguard those menaced rights and interests. 

Article II. — If by reason of an unprovoked at- 
tack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on 
the part of any other Power or Powers, either 
of the High Contracting Parties should be in- 
volved in war in defense of its territorial rights 
or special interests mentioned in the preamble 



226 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

of this Agreement, the other High Contracting 
Party will at once come to the assistance of its 
ally and will conduct the war in common and 
make peace in mutual agreement with it. 

Article III. — The High Contracting Parties 
agree that neither of them will, without con- 
sulting the other, enter into a separate agree- 
ment with another Power to the prejudice of 
the objects described in the preamble of this 
Agreement. 

Article IV.— Should either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties conclude a treaty of general 
arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that 
nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such 
contracting party an obligation to go to war 
with the Power with whom such an arbitration 
treaty is in force. 

Article V. — The conditions under which armed 
assistance shall be afforded by either Power to 
the other in circumstances entered into the 
present Agreement, and the means by which 
such assistance is to be made available, will be 
arranged by the military and naval authorities 
of the High Contracting Parties, who will from 
time to time consult one another fully and 
frankly upon all questions of mutual interests. 

Article VI. — The present Agreement shall 
come into effect immediately after the date of 
its signature, and remain in force for ten years 
from that date (same proviso as first Agree- 
ment as to expiry). 

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly 
authorized by their respective Governments, 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 227 

have signed this Agreement and have affixed 
their seals thereto. 

Done at London, July 13, 1911. 

T. Kato, 
The Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan at the Court of St. James. 

Edward Grey, 
H. B. M^'s Secretary pf State fpt Foreign Affairs, 



SENATE RESOLUTION 103 

64th Congress, ist Session 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

February 21, 1916 

Mr. Stone submitted the following resolu- 
tion, which was considered and agreed to.* 

Resolution 
Resolved, That the President be requested, if 
not incompatible with the public interests, to 
transmit to the Senate the correspondence, or 
so much thereof as in his opinion may be made 
public, had between the official representatives 
of the Government of the United States and the 
representatives of the Government of Korea re- 

* Senator Stone of Missouri was the Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relatione, 



228 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

lating to the occupation of Korea and the estab- 
lishment of a protectorate over said country by 
Japan during, or as an incident of, the Russian- 
Japanese War of nineteen hundred and four and 
nineteen hundred and five. 



MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 

To the Senate: 

In response to the resolution adopted by 
the Senate on February 21, 1916, requesting 
the President, if not incompatible with the pub- 
lic interests, to transmit to the Senate the corre- 
spondence, or so much thereof as in his opinion 
may be made public, had between the official 
representatives of the Government of the United 
States and the representatives of the Govern- 
ment of Korea, relating to the occupation of 
Korea and the establishment of a protectorate 
over said country by Japan, during, or as an 
incident of, the Russian-Japanese War of 
1904-05, I transmit herewith a report by the 
Secretary of State on this subject. 

The report of the Secretary of State has my 
approval. 

WooDRow Wilson. 
The White House, 

Washington, February 23, 1916. 



DOCUMElJfTS IN THE CASE 229 

H 

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND COREA 

Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation 

Signed at Yin-Chuen (Gensan), May 22, 1882. 

Ratification advised by the Senate, January 
9, 1883. 

Ratified by the President, February 13, 1883. 

Ratifications exchanged at Seoul, May 19, 
1883. 

Proclaimed, June 4, 1883. 

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 

A Proclamation 
Whereas a treaty of peace and amity and 
commerce and navigation between the United 
States of America and the Kingdom of Corea 
or Chosen was concluded on the twenty-second 
day of May, one thousand eight hundred and 
eighty-two, the original of which treaty being 
in the English and Chinese languages is word 
for word as follows : 

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM 

OF CHOSEN 

The United States of America and the King- 
dom of Chosen, being sincerely desirous of 
establishing permanent relations of amity and 



230 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

friendship between their respective peoples, 
have to this end appointed — that is to say, the 
President of the United States— R. W. Shufeldt, 
Commodore U. S. Navy, as his Commissioner 
Plenipotentiary, and His Majesty, the King of 
Chosen, Shin-Chen, President of the Royal 
Cabinet, Chin-Hong-Chi, member of the Royal 
Cabinet, as his Commissioners Plenipotentiary, 
who, having reciprocally examined their re- 
spective full powers, which have been found to 
be in due form, have agreed upon the several 
following articles: 

Article I. — There shall be perpetual peace and 
friendship between the President of the United 
States and the King of Chosen and the citizens 
and subjects of their respective Governments. 

If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively 
with either Government, the other will exert 
their good offices, on being informed of the 
case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, 
thus showing their friendly feelings. 

Article II. — After the conclusion of this Treaty 
of amity, and commerce, the High Contract- 
ing Powers may each appoint Diplomatic Rep- 
resentatives to reside at the Court of the other, 
and may each appoint Consular Representatives 
at the ports of the other, which are open to for- 
eign commerce, at their own convenience. 

These officials shall have relations with the 
corresponding local authorities of equal rank 
upon a basis of mutual equality. 

The Diplomatic and Consular Representa- 
tives of the two Governments shall receive 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 231 

mutually all the privileges, rights and immuni- 
ties without discrimination, which are accorded 
to the same classes of Representatives from the 
most favoured nation. 

Consuls shall exercise their functions only on 
receipt of an exequatur from the Government, to 
which they are accredited. Consular authori- 
ties shall be bona Me officials. No merchants 
shall be permitted to exercise the duties of the 
office, nor shall Consular officers be allowed to 
engage in trade. All ports, to which no Con- 
sular Representatives have been appointed, the 
Consuls of other Powers may be invited to act, 
provided that no merchant shall be allowed to 
assume Consular functions, or the provisions of 
this Treaty may, in such cases, be enforced by 
the local authorities. 

If Consular Representatives of the United 
States in Chosen conduct their business in an 
improper manner, their exequatur may be re- 
voked, subject to the approval previously ob- 
tained of the Diplomatic Representative of the 
United States. 

Article III, — Whenever United States vessels, 
either because of stress of weather, of by want 
of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest 
open port in Chosen, they may enter any port 
or harbour, either to take refuge therein, or to 
get supplies of wood, coal and other necessaries, 
or to make repairs, the expenses incurred 
thereby being defrayed by the ship's master. 
In such event the officers and people of the 
locality shall display their sympathy by render- 



232 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

ing full assistance, and their liberality by fur- 
nishing the necessities required. 

If a United States vessel carries on a clandes- 
tine trade at a port not open to foreign com- 
merce, such vessel with her cargo shall be seized 
and confiscated. 

If a United States vessel be wrecked on the 
coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on being 
informed of the occurrence, shall immediately 
render assistance to the crew, provide for their 
present necessities, and take the measures neces- 
sary for the salvage of the ship and the preserva- 
tion of her cargo. They shall also bring the 
matter to the knowledge of the nearest Con- 
sular Representative of the United States, in 
order that steps may be taken to send the crew 
home and to save the ship and cargo. The 
necessary expenses shall be defrayed either by 
the ship's master or by the United States. 

Article IV. — All citizens of the United States 
of America in Chosen, peaceably attending to 
their own afiFairs, shall receive and enjoy for 
themselves and everything appertaining to 
them, the protection of the local authorities of 
the Government of Chosen, who shall defend 
them from all insult and injury of any sort. If 
their dwellings or property l3e threatened or 
attacked by mobs, incendiaries, or other violent 
or lawless persons, the local officers, on requisi- 
tion of the Consul, shall immediately dispatch 
a military force to disperse the rioters, appre- 
hend the guilty individuals, and punish them 
with the utmost rigour of the law. Subjects of 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 233 

Chosen, guilty of any criminal act toward citi- 
zens of the United States, shall be punished by 
the authorities of Chosen according to the laws 
of Chosen; and citizens of the United States, 
either on shore or in any merchant-vessel, who 
may insult, trouble or wound the persons or in- 
jure the property of the people of Chosen, shall 
be arrested and punished only by the Consul or 
other public functionary of the United States 
thereto authorized, according to the laws of 
the United States. 

When controversies arise in the Kingdom of 
Chosen between citizens of the United States 
and subjects of His Majesty, which need to be 
examined and decided by the public officers of 
the two nations, it is agreed between the two 
Governments of the United States and Chosen 
that such cases shall be tried by the proper of- 
ficial of the nationality of the defendant, accord- 
ing to the laws of that nation. 

The properly authorized official of the plain- 
tiff's nationality shall be freely permitted to at- 
tend the trial, and shall be treated with the 
courtesy due to his position. He shall be 
granted all proper facilities for watching the 
proceedings in the interests of justice. If he so 
desires, he shall have the right to be present, to 
examine and to cross-examine witnesses. If he 
is dissatisfied with the proceedings, he shall be 
permitted to protest against them in detail. 

It is, however, mutually agreed and under- 
stood between the High Contracting Powers 
that whenever the King of Chosen shall have 



234 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

so far modified and reformed the statutes and 
judicial procedure of his Kingdom that, in the 
judgment of the United States, they conform to 
the laws and course of justice in the United 
States, the right of exterritorial jurisdiction 
over United States citizens in Chosen shall be 
abandoned, and thereafter United States citi- 
zens, when within the limits of the Kingdom of 
Chosen, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the native authorities. 

Article V. — Merchants and merchant-vessels 
of Chosen visiting the United States for pur- 
poses of traffic, shall pay duties and tonnage 
dues and all fees according to the Customs 
Regulations of the United States, but no higher 
or other rates of duties and tonnage dues shall 
be exacted of them than are levied upon citizens 
of the United States or upon citizens or sub- 
jects of the most favoured nation. 

Merchants and merchant-vessels of the 
United States visiting Chosen for purposes of 
traffic shall pay duties upon all merchandise im- 
ported and exported. The authority to levy 
duties is of right vested in the Government of 
Chosen. The tariff of duties upon exports and 
imports, together with the Customs Regula- 
tions for the prevention of smuggling and other 
irregularities, will be fixed by the authorities of 
Chosen and communicated to the proper officials 
of the United States, to be by the latter notified 
to their citizens and duly observed. It is, how- 
ever, agreed in the first instance, as a general 
measure, that the tariff upon such imports as 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 235 

are articles of daily use shall not exceed an ad 
valorem duty of ten per centum; that the tariff 
upon such imports as are luxuries, as, for in- 
stance, foreign wines, foreign tobacco, clocks 
and watches, shall not exceed an ad valorem duty 
of thirty per centum, and that native produce 
exported shall pay a duty not to exceed five per 
centum ad valorem. And it is further agreed 
that the duty upon foreign imports shall be paid 
once for all at the port of entry, and that no 
other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any 
sort shall be levied upon such imports either in 
the interior of Chosen or at the ports. 

United States merchant-vessels entering the 
ports of Chosen shall pay tonnage dues at the 
rate of five mace per ton, payable once in three 
months on each vessel, according to the Chinese 
calendar. 

Article VI. — Subjects of Chosen who may visit 
the United States shall be permitted to reside 
and to rent premises, purchase land, or to con- 
struct residences or warehouses in all parts of 
the country. They shall be freely permitted to 
pursue their various callings and avocations, 
and to traffic in all merchandise, raw and manu- 
factured, that is not declared contraband by law. 

Citizens of the United States who may resort 
to the ports of Chosen which are open to for- 
eign commerce, shall be permitted to reside at 
such open ports within the limits of the con- 
cessions and to lease buildings or land, or to 
construct residences or warehouses therein. 
They shall be freely permitted to pursue their 



236^ DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

various callings and avocations within tHe limits 
of the port, and to traffic in all merchandise, raw 
and manufactured, that is not declared contra- 
band by law. 

No coercion or intimidation in the acquisi- 
tion of land or buildings shall be permitted, and 
the land-rent as fixed by the authorities of 
Chosen shall be paid. And it is expressly 
agreed that land so acquired in the open ports 
of Chosen still remain an integral part of the 
Kingdom, and that all rights of jurisdiction over 
persons and property within such areas remain 
vested in the authorities of Chosen, except in 
so far as such rights have been expressly re- 
linquished by this Treaty. 

American citizens are not permitted either to 
transport foreign imports to the interior for 
sale, or to proceed thither to purchase native 
produce. Nor are they permitted to transport 
native produce from one open port to another 
open port. 

Violation of this rule will subject such mer- 
chandise to confiscation, and the merchants of- 
fending will be handed over to the Consular 
Authorities to be dealt with. 

Article VII.— The Governments of the United 
States and of Chosen mutually agree and un- 
dertake that subjects of Chosen shall not be per- 
mitted to import opium into any of the ports 
of the United States, and citizens of the United 
States shall not be permitted to import opium 
into any of the open ports of Chosen, to trans- 
port it from one open port to another open port. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 237 

or to traffic in it in Chosen. This absolute pro- 
hibition which extends to vessels owned by the 
citizens or subjects of either Power, to foreign 
vessels employed by them, and to vessels owned 
by the citizens or subjects of either Power and 
employed by other persons for the transporta- 
tion of opium, shall be enforced by appropriate 
legislation on the part of the United States and 
of Chosen, and offenders against it shall be 
severely punished. 

Article VIII. — Whenever the Government of 
Chosen shall have reason to apprehend a 
scarcity of food within the limits of the King- 
dom, His Majesty may by Decree temporarily 
prohibit the export of all breadstuffs, and such 
Decree shall be binding on all citizens of the 
United States in Chosen upon due notice having 
been given them by the Authorities of Chosen 
through the proper officers of the United States ; 
but it is to be understood that the exportation 
of rice and breadstufifs of every description is 
prohibited from the open port of Yin-Chuen. 

Chosen having of old prohibited the exporta- 
tion of red-ginseng, if citizens of the United 
States clandestinely purchase it for export, it 
shall be confiscated and the offenders punished. 

Article IX. — The purchase of cannon, small 
arms, swords, gunpowder, shot and all muni- 
tions of war is permitted only to officials of the 
Government of Chosen, and they may be im- 
ported by citizens of the United States only un- 
der a written permit from the authorities of 
Chosen. If these articles are clandestinely im- 



238 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE ' 

ported, they shall be confiscated and the offend- 
ing parties shall be punished. 

Article X. — The officers and people of either 
nation residing in the other shall have the right 
to employ natives for all kinds of lawful work. 

Should, however, subjects of Chosen, guilty 
of violations of the laws of the Kingdom, or 
against whom any action has been brought, con- 
ceal themselves in the residences or warehouses 
of United States citizens, or on board United 
States merchant-vessels, the Consular Authori- 
ties of the United States, on being informed of 
the fact by the local authorities, will either per- 
mit the latter to dispatch constables to make 
the arrests, or the persons will be arrested by 
the Consular Authorities and handed over to 
the local constables. 

Officials or citizens of the United States shall 
not harbour such persons. 

Article XI. — Students of either nationality 
who may proceed to the country of the other, 
in order to study the language, literature, laws 
or arts shall be given all possible protection and 
assistance in evidence of cordial good will. 

Article XII. — This, being the first Treaty 
negotiated by Chosen, and hence being general 
and incomplete in its provisions, shall in the first 
instance be put into operation in all things 
stipulated herein. As to stipulations not con- 
tained herein, after an interval of five years, 
when the officers and people of the two Powers 
shall have become more familiar with each 
other's language, a further negotiation of com- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 239 

mercial provisions and regulations in detail, in 
conformity with international law and without 
unequal discrimination on either part shall be 
had. 

Article XIII . — This Treaty, and future official 
correspondence between the two contracting 
Governments shall be made, on the part of 
Chosen, in the Chinese language. 

The United States shall either use the 
Chinese language, or, if English be used, it shall 
be accompanied with a Chinese version, in order 
to avoid misunderstanding. 

Article XIV. — The High Contracting Powers 
hereby agree that, should at any time the King 
of Chosen grant to any nation or to the mer- 
chants or citizens of any nation any right, privi- 
lege or favour, connected either with navigation, 
commerce, political or other intercourse, which 
is not conferred by this Treaty, such right, privi- 
lege and favour shall freely inure to the benefit 
of the United States, its public officers, mer- 
chants and citizens, provided always that when- 
ever such right, privilege or favour is accom- 
panied by any condition, or equivalent con- 
cession granted by the other nation interested, 
the United States, its officers and people shall 
only be entitled to the benefits of such right, 
privilege or favour upon complying with the 
conditions or concessions connected there- 
with.- 

In faith whereof the respective Commis- 
sioners Plenipotentiary have signed and sealed 
the foregoing at Yin-Chuen in English and 



240 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Chinese, being three originals of each test of 
even tenor and date, the ratifications of which 
shall be exchanged at Yin-Chuen within one 
year from the date of its execution, and immedi- 
ately thereafter this Treaty shall be in all its 
provisions publicly proclaimed and made known 
by both Governments in their respective coun- 
tries, in order that it may be obeyed by their 
citizens and subjects respectively. 

Chosen, May, the 22nd, A. D. 1882. 

[seal] R. W. Shufeldt, Commodore, U. S. N. 

Envoy of the U. S. to Chosen. 
[seal] Shin Chen, Chin Hong Chi, 

Members of the Royal Cabinet of Chosen. 

And whereas the Senate of the United States 
of America by their resolution of the ninth of 
January, one thousand eight hundred and 
eighty- three (two- thirds of the Senators present 
concurring), did advise and consent to the rati- 
fication of said treaty subject to the condition 
following, viz : 

Resolved, That it is the understanding of the 
Senate in agreeing to the foregoing resolution, 
that the clause, " Nor are they permitted to 
transport native produce from one open port to 
another open port," in Article VI of said treaty, 
is not intended to prohibit and does not prohibit 
American ships from going from one open port 
to another open port in Corea or Chosen to 
receive Corean cargo for exportation, or to dis- 
charge foreign cargo. 



DOCUMENTS m THE CASE 241 

And whereas, said treaty has been duly rati- 
fied on both parts, subject to said condition, 
and the respective ratifications thereof ex- 
changed. 

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Chester A. 
Arthur, President of the United States of Amer- 
ica, have caused the said convention to be made 
public, to the end that the same, and every 
clause and article thereof, may be observed and 
fulfilled with good faith by the United States 
and the citizens thereof. 

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the seal of the United States 
to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington this Fourth 
day of June, in the year of our Lord one thou- 
sand eight hundred and eighty-three and of the 
Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundredth and seventh. 

Chester A. Arthur. 

By the President. 
Fredk. T. Frelinghuysen, 
Secretary of State. 



PETITION FROM THE KOREANS OF 
HAWAII TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 

Honolulu, T. H., 
July 12, 1905. 
To His Excellency, 

The President of the United States. 
Your Excellency, — The undersigned have 



242 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

been authorized by the 8,000 Koreans now re- 
siding in the territory of Hawaii at a special 
mass meeting held in the city of Honolulu, on 
July 12, 1905, to present to your Excellency the 
following appeal: — 

We, the Koreans of the Hawaiian Islands, 
voicing the sentiments of twelve millions of our 
countrymen, humbly lay before your Excellency 
the following facts: — 

Soon after the commencement of the war be- 
tween Russia and Japan, our Government made 
a treaty of alliance with Japan for offensive and 
defensive purposes. By virtue of this treaty 
the whole of Korea was opened to the Japanese, 
and both the Government and the people have 
been assisting the Japanese authorities in their 
military operations in and about Korea. 

The contents of this treaty are undoubtedly 
known to your Excellency, therefore we need 
not embody them in this appeal. Suffice it to 
state, however, the object of the treaty was to 
preserve the independence of Korea and Japan 
and to protect Eastern Asia from Russia's ag- 
gression. 

Korea, in return for Japan's friendship and 
protection against Russia, has rendered services 
to the Japanese by permitting them to use 
the country as a base of their military opera- 
tions. 

When this treaty was concluded, the Koreans 
fully expected that Japan would introduce re- 
forms into the governmental administration 
along the line of the modern civilization of 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 243 

Europe and America, and that she would advise 
and counsel our people in a friendly manner, 
but to our disappointment and regret the Japa- 
nese Government has not done a single thing 
in the way of improving the condition of the 
Korean people. On the contrary, she turned 
loose several thousand rough and disorderly 
men of her nationals in Korea, who are treating 
the inoffensive Koreans in a most outrageous 
manner. The Koreans are by nature not a 
quarrelsome or aggressive people, but deeply 
resent the high-handed action of the Japanese 
toward them. We can scarcely believe that 
the Japanese Government approves the out- 
rages committed by its people in Korea, but it 
has done nothing to prevent this state of af- 
fairs. They have been, during the last eighteen 
months, forcibly obtaining all the special privi- 
leges and concessions from our Government, so 
that to-day they practically own everything that 
is worth having in Korea. 

We, the common people of Korea, have lost 
confidence in the promises Japan made at the 
time of concluding the treaty of alliance, and we 
doubt seriously the good intentions which she 
professes to have toward our people. For 
geographical, racial, and commercial reasons we 
want to be friendly to Japan, and we are even 
willing to have her as our guide and example 
in the matters of internal reforms and educa- 
tion, but the continuous policy of self-exploita- 
tion at the expense of the Koreans has shaken 
our confidence in her, and we are now afraid 



244 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

that she will not keep her promise of preserving 
our independence as a nation, nor assisting us 
in reforming internal administration. In other 
words, her policy in Korea seems to be ex- 
actly the same as that of Russia prior to the 
war. 

The United States has many interests in our 
country. The industrial, commercial, and re- 
ligious enterprises under American manage- 
ment, have attained such proportions that we 
believe the Government and people of the 
United States ought to know the true conditions 
of Korea and the result of the Japanese becom- 
ing paramount in our country. We know that 
the people of America love fair play and advo- 
cate justice toward all men. We also know 
that your Excellency is the ardent exponent of 
a square deal between individuals as well as 
nations, therefore we come to you with this 
memorial with the hope that your Excellency 
may help our country at this critical period of 
our national life. 

We fully appreciate the fact that during the 
conference between the Russian and Japanese 
peace envoys, your Excellency may not care to 
make any suggestion to either party as to the 
conditions of their settlement, but we earnestly 
hope that your Excellency will see to it that 
Korea may preserve her autonomous Govern- 
ment and that other Powers shall not oppress 
or maltreat our people. The clause in the 
treaty between the United States and Korea 
gives us a claim upon the United States for 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 245 

assistance, and this is the time when we need 
it most. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servants, 

[{Sgd.) P. K. YoGN.' 

Syngman Rhee. 



I 

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE CASES OF 
KOREA AND BELGIUM ' 

The Special Envoy of the Korean Emperor 
tells for the time the full story of his attempt to 
get President Roosevelt to intervene against 
Japan. 

By Homer B. Hulbert 

A few weeks ago I published in The Times a 
letter asserting that Theodore Roosevelt's at- 
tack upon President Wilson for his failure to 
protest against Germany's attack upon Belgium 
came with poor grace from a man who himself 
was guilty of a far more reprehensible breach of 
international obligation in 1905, when Japan 
forced her protectorate upon Korea. 

Mr, Roosevelt has now come out with a state- 
ment that he was wholly justified in acquiescing 
in the extinction of Korean independence, and 
* From the New York Times, March s, 1916. 



246 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

he makes the specific charges that my statement 
was consciously false when I said that he was 
aware, in advance, of the contents of the letter 
which I brought to him from the Emperor of 
Korea. In view of this charge there is nothing 
left me to do but to give a full and detailed ac- 
count of the entire transaction and leave it to 
the American people to judge whether Korea 
received a fair deal at the hands of the Roose- 
velt Administration. 

At the beginning of the Japanese-Russian 
War the Korean Government declared its 
neutrality, but the Japanese ignored this 
declaration and committed a direct breach of 
international law in landing troops on the soil 
of the peninsula. The fact that the Korean 
army was too small to oppose this act detracts 
nothing from the culpability of Japan. Having 
entered the country thus illegally, Japan 
hastened to make a treaty with Korea whereby 
the latter virtually became her ally in the war 
and put herself in jeopardy of lawful seizure 
and annexation by Russia in case of Russia's 
ultimate success. In this treaty Japan specific- 
ally guaranteed the sovereignty of Korea from 
molestation. It was a war measure necessi- 
tated by the circumstances and was of a tempo- 
rary character merely. In allowing Japan to 
take charge of the communications of the 
empire, Korea merely acted up to the spirit of 
the alliance, which was that Japan should be 
given every facility to prosecute the war against 
Russia. Whether this was pleasing to the 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 247 

Korean Government or not has nothing what- 
ever to do with the legal aspect of the case. 
None of the treaty powers took any action that 
indicated in any way their impression that this 
treaty was a genuine impairment of Korean 
autonomy, as indeed it could not be if its terms 
were faithfully lived up to. For Theodore 
Roosevelt to say that Japan by this act virtually 
assumed a protectorate over Korea shows either 
that he has only the most rudimentary notions 
of international law or else that the wish was 
father to the thought. It was no more an im- 
pairment of Korea's sovereignty than the pres- 
ence of British troops in France is an impair- 
ment of French sovereignty. 

But after the war was over it soon became ap- 
parent that Japan had no intention of carrying 
out her treaty obligations. The Emperor of 
Korea became convinced that the autonomy of 
his country was about to be impaired by his 
ally, the Emperor of Japan. This being the 
case, the time had arrived when the first clause 
in the treaty between Korea and the United 
States might rightly be cited. The Emperor 
asked me to be the bearer of a message to 
President Roosevelt, calling upon him to imple- 
ment that clause of the treaty. 

Now, I had been favourable to the Japanese 
side in the struggle against Russia, as is amply 
proved by my editorials in the Korea Review, of 
which I was the editor and proprietor. I real- 
ized that the military weakness of Korea would 
give Japan a chance to say that a protectorate 



248 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

over the country would be necessary for Japan's 
safety. I therefore advised the Emperor that 
his appeal would be greatly strengthened if he 
should insert the statement that if it seemed 
proper to the United States and the other treaty 
powers interested, Korea would consent to the 
establishment of a joint protectorate over Korea 
for a period of years until things should have 
been so adjusted that the permanent neutrality 
of the country would be assured. The Emperor 
inserted such a clause in the letter. Having 
received this document for transmission, I im- 
mediately went to the United States Minister 
in Seoul, Mr. E. V. Morgan, and made a clear 
and full statement of my mission. I told him 
I was about to start for America with a letter 
to President Roosevelt from the Emperor, ask- 
ing the American Government to interfere with 
its good offices to prevent the unlawful seizure 
of Korea by Japan, which seemed to be threat- 
ening. I did not propose to indulge in any 
clandestine operations which might embarrass 
my own Government. Naturally I did not 
make any public statement of my intentions, al- 
though several of my friends in Seoul were 
aware of the purpose of my going. 

Mr. Morgan listened with interest to what I 
had to say, made no objection of any kind, and 
even went so far as to advise me that when I 
arrived in America I should retain a good inter- 
national lawyer to help me put the matter 
through. Not only so, but he allowed me to 
send the document to America in the legation 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 249 

mail pouch, for I was somewhat in fear that 
the Japanese might take it from my person as 
I passed through Japan on my way. 

There was considerable gossip in Seoul over 
my sudden resignation from the service of the 
Korean Government and my departure from 
Korea with my family so promptly, and the 
Japanese doubtless divined the cause back of it. 
On the day before I started the Japanese Charge 
d'Aflfaires in Seoul met me and urged me not to 
go, giving various plausible reasons, and finally 
making some broad hints at substantial finan- 
cial advantages that I should enjoy by giving 
up my contemplated trip. However, I went. 

I sailed from Yokohama on the China, of the 
Pacific Mail Steamship Line. Just before we 
sailed a spy in the employ of the Japanese came 
aboard. I recognized him, and just for the fun 
of the thing I kept out of his way till just a 
moment before the anchor was raised. Then 
I came upon him suddenly. He started per- 
ceptibly and stammered out something about 
my going on the China or the Empress of China, 
which sailed the same hour. I laughed and said 
that I was booked for the China. I have always 
regretted that I did not change over to the 
Empress boat after he went ashore, for I should 
have reached Washington four days earlier. 
At this point I would like to ask any reasonable 
American citizen whether it is possible to be- 
lieve that Mr. Morgan did not notify the Wash- 
ington Government by cable and secure instruc- 
tions in the premises. If he did not do so it 



250' DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

was a gross breach of diplomatic duty. It is 
simply unthinkable. 

The Japanese authorities immediately began 
to bring pressure on the Emperor and his 
Cabinet to grant a Japanese protectorate. They 
were met by a firm refusal. The Emperor held 
firm, and declared that under no circumstances 
would he consent to such an impairment of 
Korea's suzerain rights. Again and again the 
Japanese returned to the attack, but without 
success. Meanwhile I passed Honolulu, San 
Francisco, Chicago, Pittsburg, and was only 
one day from Washington. Japan had not yet 
been able to force her " protection " upon 
Korea. But it had to be done at any cost, 
either of ethics or of blood. 

That night, while I was crossing the Cum- 
berland Mountains, the Japanese seized the 
palace in Seoul, filled it with gendarmes and 
police, blocked every approach to the Emperor, 
brought the Emperor and his Cabinet together, 
and peremptorily demanded that they sign the 
death warrant of Korean independence. The 
Emperor and all his Ministers refused point- 
blank. Entreaties, flatteries, threats, all were 
unavailing. But the reader may say, " How do 
you know? You were in America." This is 
how I know. In 1909, in the City of Seoul, at 
two o'clock in the morning, escaping from the 
espionage of fifteen or more Japanese spies, I 
climbed over the back wall of my compound, 
made my way down through the tortuous 
streets of that city until I reached the home of 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 251 

Han Kyu-Sul, who was Prime Minister at the 
time the deed was performed. I spent the rest 
of the night with him, and it is from his lips I 
heard the damning details. All the older resi- 
dents of Seoul knew Han Kyu-Sul as a thorough 
gentleman, against whom, even in that Oriental 
country, there had never been a suspicion of 
graft or official indirection. I would take his 
word as implicitly as my own brother's. And 
this is what happened : 

The Japanese, made desperate by the failure 
of cajolery and menace, took Han Kyu-Sul, the 
Premier, into a side room. There Field Mar- 
shal Hasegawa and Minister Hayashi demanded 
his consent. He refused. Hasegawa drew his 
sword on the unarmed man, but he stood firm. 
They left him there under guard and went back 
to the rest of the Cabinet. These men believed 
that Han Kyu-Sul had been killed, and they 
were, from their standpoint, justified in their 
suspicions. I should have believed the same 
thing. Three of them capitulated and signed 
the document. The Emperor never signed it, 
nor did his Prime Minister, nor were these three 
traitors given orders by the Emperor to sign. 
It is said, with what truth I cannot say, that the 
Japanese themselves stole the Great Seal of 
State from the Foreign Office and themselves 
affixed it to the paper. This seal was affixed 
within sixty minutes of my arrival at the rail- 
way station in Washington, D. C. 

I immediately secured the Emperor's letter 
from the friend in Washington, to whom it had 



252 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

been sent, as I have said, in the legation mail 
pouch. I then consulted an old-time acquaint- 
ance of mine, who held, and still holds, a high 
official position at Washington, and asked him 
the best way to approach the President, since I 
was unacquainted with the rules of etiquette 
which govern such transactions. This friend 
sent a message to the President telling him that 
I had arrived in Washington from the Emperor 
of Korea with an important communication. 
The answer came back that, since it was a dip- 
lomatic matter, the President could not see me 
himself, but that the missive should be taken to 
the State Department. 

I hastened to do so, but was told that the Sec- 
retary of State was extremely busy and that I 
had better come the following day. They were 
too busy to receive a message from a friendly 
power that was in its death throes! I went 
straight to the President's office building adjoin- 
ing the White House and asked to see the Presi- 
dent's secretary. This was refused me, but I 
was met by an under-secretary, whose name I 
never ascertained, who very blandly said, " Mr. 
Hulbert, we know all about this letter. You 
have been given instructions to go to the State 
Department. Nothing can be done here." 

There seemed to be nothing for it but to wait. 
Meanwhile I was being importuned by the 
newspaper men to divulge the purpose of my 
coming. Why should they have pressed the 
matter so strongly? I had told no one of my 
mission excepting those who would be discreet. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 253 

I see here another evidence that the fact had 
leaked out through official channels. There- 
fore, the men at the head of affairs must have 
known the nature of my mission. It is one of 
the keenest regrets of my life that I did not, 
then and there, make a full statement for the 
press, and tell the American people that the 
Emperor of a friendly power was standing at 
the door of this Government demanding with- 
out avail a courteous hearing. But I thought it 
would be discourteous to the President and to 
the Secretary of State to divulge the matter 
before I had laid it before them. Discourteous ! 
The following day I went to the State Depart- 
ment and asked admittance to the Secretary of 
State. I was told that this was the day when 
the various Ambassadors and Ministers from 
other countries were accustomed to call on the 
Secretary and that for this reason it would be 
impossible to see him. I had better come next 
day! On that day the American Government 
accepted Japan's unsupported statement that 
the protectorate had been secured and that it 
was all satisfactory to the Korean Government, 
Without a word of inquiry at the Korean Lega- 
tion at Washington, without a word to the Em- 
peror of Korea, without a single diplomatic for- 
mality in consideration of the Korean people 
and Government, the American Administration 
accepted Japan's bald statement, cabled the 
American Minister in Seoul to close the legation 
and broke off friendly intercourse with a treaty 
power, weak, to be sure, and needing all things, 



254 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

but a power to which we had been saying for 
twenty-five years that America stands for a 
square deal, for right as against mere brute 
force, a power that had given to Americans 
more opportunities for productive enterprise 
than to all other peoples combined, a power to 
which we had given our promise that if in her 
hour of need she should appeal to us we would 
exert our good offices in her behalf. 

The next day I was allowed to see the Secre- 
tary of State. Assistant Secretaries Bacon and 
Adee were present, and perhaps one or two 
others. I do not remember. 

Now I had made what may be called a tech- 
nical mistake. I had consented to act as a mes- 
senger from the Emperor without receiving 
from him any credentials except the message 
which I brought. I came simply to transmit the 
document and let that speak for itself. Nor did 
this Government, either then or later, question 
the genuineness of that missive, as indeed, they 
could not well have done since it bore the Em- 
peror's private seal. 

The Secretary of State asked Assistant Secre- 
tary Adee whether, in view of the fact that I 
bore no special credentials, the matter could be 
discussed with me. The reply was that it could 
not. The Secretary of State received the docu- 
ment, then turned to me in a very pointed man- 
ner, which may not have been but certainly 
sounded like a rebuke : " Mr. Hulbert, do you 
want us to get into trouble with Japan? " 

Coming upon the expert decision of Assistant 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 265 

Secretary Adee that I was in no position to dis- 
cuss the matter, this question nettled me a trifle 
and I declined to discuss it. I have sometimes 
wished that I had not, and yet perhaps it was as 
well, for if I had said anything it would have 
been this : " If it lies between the stultification 
of the American Government and trouble I will 
take the trouble every time," but of course this 
might have been considered discourteous I I 
said that I was merely commissioned to deliver 
the document, and then retired. 

I am told that a few days after this occurred 
one of the most eminent international lawyers 
in America went to Secretary Root with a copy 
of the Korean treaty, placed his finger on that 
first clause in which we guarantee to use our 
good offices for Korea, and asked the Secretary 
to read it; and that when the Secretary had read 
it he exclaimed, " I did not know that was 
there." 

The following day I received a cablegram 
from the Emperor. It had been taken over to 
Chefoo by boat so as to escape transmission by 
Japanese lines. In it the Emperor declared that 
the treaty was null and void, that it had been 
secured at the point of the sword, that it had 
been wrested from his Foreign Minister under 
duress, and that he himself had never signed it 
or acquiesced in its signature. 

I took that cablegram to the State Depart- 
ment. I was received by Assistant Secretary 
Bacon, who took the cablegram and said that it 
would be put on file, or words to that effect. A 



256 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

few days later I received from Secretary Root a 
letter referring to the document that I had 
placed in his hands, and saying that since the 
Emperor of Korea had desired secrecy to be ob- 
served and had already taken final action in this 
matter referred to, it would be impossible for 
the American Government to move in the 
matter. 

No, our Government had done all its moving 
earlier in the game. Why the matter of secrecy 
should have been brought up I do not know. 
The Emperor is no such novice in politics as to 
suppose that the American Government could 
have moved to help Korea without letting the 
Japanese Government suspect that he (the Em- 
peror) had appealed for such help. They did 
not expect me to shout the matter from the 
housetops, I should fancy. 

Soon after this I returned to Korea. I was 
told there by some friends that Mr. Morgan 
had, perhaps inadvertently, intimated that " We 
knew that Japan was going to take Korea, but 
we did not expect it quite so soon." 

This brings up the question why it was that 
two months before the seizure of Korea by 
Japan the American Minister at Seoul, Dr. H. 
N. Allen, was suddenly recalled and Mr. E. V. 
Morgan put in his place. I believe an effort was 
made to learn the reason, that the President and 
the Secretary of State were non-committal, but 
that another member of the Cabinet intimated 
that Dr. H. N, Allen was so friendly with the 
royal family in Seoul that without a change in 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 257 

the legation it would be difficult for the Admin- 
istration to carry out the policy upon which it 
had determined. 

One question remains. When was that policy 
determined upon? I do not know; but taking 
all things into consideration, and putting two 
and two together, I am forced to believe that it 
was determined upon at the time of the Ports- 
mouth Treaty. 

This is a correct account, so far as I can re- 
member, of the seizure of Korea by Japan and 
the part that our Government played in it. 
Some of my statements can be corroborated by 
others, some rest upon my unsupported word, 
but the part that can be corroborated is suffi- 
cient to prove my main contention. 

I am quite willing to grant that my belief in 
President Roosevelt's previous knowledge of 
the contents of that letter rests upon circum- 
stantial evidence, but I ask the American people 
to decide for themselves whether his memory is 
not, perhaps, slightly at fault when he declares 
that he did not know the exact wording but the 
essential gist and purport of the letter several 
days before it was delivered. I trust it is within 
the bounds of courtesy to ask him to tell the 
people of this country why the message from 
the Emperor was held off for two days until he 
had taken action in the matter. If he was at 
that time convinced that Korea's autonomy was 
already injured beyond repair, why did he not 
receive the message and answer it according to 
the tenor of his belief? If he says that it was 



258 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

because I had no credentials, how comes it that 
he did not also know what I had come to do 
without credentials? I ask him how it came 
about that one of his under-secretaries in the 
White House knew more about the contents of 
that letter than he himself did. 

In conclusion, I may say that in my estima- 
tion comparatively little blame should rest upon 
Elihu Root in this matter. He was necessarily 
under instructions. Whether those instructions 
were agreeable to him or not the world will 
never know, but I hope they were not. To my 
mind he was less culpable than unfortunate. 



KOREA UNDER JAPAN' 

Henry Chung 
" If the lips are destroyed, the teeth get cold." 
This is a literal translation of a Korean proverb, 
Chinese in origin. The Chinese orator and dip- 
lomat in the feudal period of the Chow dynasty 
who originated this epigram conceived, long be- 
fore the birth of European nations, the principle 
of balance of power as necessary to the peace 
and independence of nations contiguous in ter- 
ritory. At the opening of the twentieth cen- 
tury Korea was the lips and China was the 
teeth. Nov^T^ the lips are destroyed, and the un- 
protected surface of, the Chinese teeth are ex- 

'From the Chinese Students' Monthly, vol, XIII, No. 7, 
pp. 400-403, May, 1918. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 259 

posed to the corrosion of Japanese aggression. 
Every Chinese who carries the welfare of his 
Fatherland in his heart ought, therefore, to 
study with vital interest the recent history of 
Korea, for there we find the example of what 
may befall China, unless the present tendency 
of Japanese imperial expansion on Asiatic main- 
land is checkmated either by China herself or by 
a concerted action of Western powers in the 
Eastern theatre of international politics. 

In destroying a nation — if the destruction be 
complete — two things are essential: economic 
subjection and spiritual massacre. The former 
is a comparatively easy matter as its execution 
is based entirely on physical force, but the latter 
requires time and assiduous effort on the part 
of the conquering nation. Japan, profiting by 
the experience of the colonizing nations of the 
West, is applying in Korea a method the most 
unique and effective known in the history of 
imperial conquests. When Bismarck wanted to 
Prussianize Poland, he moved several million 
Germans into German Poland to help assimilate 
the Poles. Money was appropriated by the 
German Government to buy land from the Poles 
for these newcomers. The Poles clung to their 
lands and refused to be assimilated, with the 
consequence that the price of land in German 
Poland went up and the Poles became prosper- 
ous. Japan pursued the same policy in a more 
efficacious way. The Oriental Colonization 
Company was organized under the direction of 
the government, and is supported by an annual 



260 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

subsidy of 500,000 yen ($250,000) from the im- 
perial treasury. Its purpose is to colonize 
Korea with Japanese who are unable to make a 
living in Japan proper. A Japanese emigrant 
is given free transportation to Korea, and is 
provided with a home and a piece of land to- 
gether with necessary implements and provi- 
sions when he gets there. He is expected to pay 
back to the company in three or four years what 
he thus receives. For this purpose the Japanese 
Government in Korea confiscated all pubHc 
lands formerly under the control of local com- 
munities, and all lands owned by Buddhist tem- 
ples and cultivated by Buddhist priests. But 
these were far from being enough to meet the 
demand. Korea has an area of 80,000 square 
miles inhabited by 15,000,000 agricultural popu- 
lation. The Oriental Colonization Company 
tried to buy lands from the Koreans, but the 
Koreans refused to sell them. Here the govern- 
ment aid was brought in. All financial machin- 
ery in Korea is controlled by the Bank of 
Chosen, a government bank in Seoul. This 
powerful financial institution through its branch 
banks and agencies called in all the specie in the 
country and made the land practically money- 
less as far as the circulating medium was con- 
cerned. Cash the Koreans must have to pay 
taxes and to buy the necessities of life. The 
only way they could get money was to sell their 
real estate. The value of land dropped to one- 
half, in many localities as low as one-fifth, of its 
original value. Then the Bank of Chosen sent 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 261 

out agents all over the country and bought the 
land for tens of thousands of Japanese emi- 
grants sent over by the Oriental Colonization 
Company. This process has been repeated time 
and again. The Koreans know the game of the 
government, but they have no means to coun- 
teract this government speculation. Technic- 
ally, the Japanese Government in Korea has 
never carried on a wholesale confiscation of in- 
dividual property, but this governmental specu- 
lation is nothing short of confiscation. Already 
more than one-fifth of the richest land in Korea 
is in the hands of the Japanese, and the amount 
is increasing steadily. 

In commerce and industry, the Japanese have 
the complete monopoly. While Korea was in- 
dependent, all nations enjoyed equal commercial 
privileges. Now the Nipponese tradesmen prac- 
tically drive out all other nationals and have the 
market to themselves. The Korean merchant 
cannot compete with his Japanese competitor 
because of the preferential treatment shown by 
the government. All the rights to develop the 
resources of the country are given to the Japa- 
nese, and Korean enterprise, even of the hum- 
blest sort, is insidiously hampered by the Jap- 
anese. Thus the Korean people are reduced to 
industrial serfdom, and are forced to submit to 
Japanese rule through economic pressure. 

The Korean has a proud history and a civili- 
zation of four thousand years back of him, and 
he is unwilling to abandon his traditional cul- 
ture under any circumstances. Something more 



262 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

than mere economic pressure and political domi- 
nation is needed to extinguish the soul of Korea. 
History and literature are the records of past 
achievements, and language is the medium of 
expression that gives birth to the pregnant ge- 
nius. The Japanese statesmen fully appreciate 
the importance of this triple support of national 
consciousness. They made a systematic collec- 
tion of all works of Korean history and litera- 
ture in public archives and private homes and 
burned them. This is undoubtedly the greatest 
injustice that the Korean people have suffered 
at the hands of the Japanese. Korean scholars 
consider this as an irreparable loss second only 
to the destruction of the Alexandrian Library 
by Omar in 640. Priceless treasures have been 
destroyed in this needless vandalism of the 
Japanese. All Korean periodical literature — 
from local newspapers to scientific journals — 
has been completely stamped out. In order to 
create in the West a favourable impression of 
their rule in Korea, the Japanese Government 
has a subsidized organ, the Seoul Press, This 
daily, published in English, disseminates only 
the kind of news that the Japanese wish to have 
known in the West. It is an official camouflage. 
This publicity channel is further strengthened 
by the " Annual Report on Reforms and Prog- 
ress in Chosen," a well illustrated volume pub- 
lished in English by the government, and sent 
out gratis to all great men and large libraries in 
America and Great Britain. These publications 
picture vividly the " contentment and prosper- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 263 

ity " that the Japanese rule is bringing to the 
Koreans. And what they say usually find 
echoes in the West through a few men who have 
been decorated in Japan with gold war medals 
and the insignias of the Rising Sun. These 
men take delight in returning the favours that 
they have received in Japan by singing the glory 
and grandeur of Japanese Asiatic policy, and by 
picturing Japanese administration in Korea as a 
" benevolent assimilation." ^ 

The Japanese language has been made the 
official tongue, not only in official documents but 
in schools and public gatherings. Here the 
Christian Church stands as an obstacle. A vast 
majority of Korean Christians cannot read 
Japanese, and the church services cannot be in- 
telligibly conducted in a foreign tongue. To 
curb the spreading influence of Christianity and 
to crush out completely the one obstacle to the 
denationalizing of Korea, the Governor General 
Terauchi (now Premier of Japan), in 1912, in- 
stituted what is known in the church annals of 
Korea as " The Persecution of the Church." 
Prominent church men, leaders in Korean 
thought and education, were charged with con- 
spiracy and put in prison, and their activities 
ended. Prominent American missionaries were 
brought in the trial as being connected with the 
conspiracy to assassinate the governor general 
of Korea. Here, however, the Japanese over- 

* See G. T. Ladd, " Annexation of Korea : An Essay in 
Benevolent Assimilation," Yale Review u. s. 1 : 639-656, July, 
1912. 



264 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

stepped themselves. Their charges against the 
Korean church aroused considerable criticism in 
the West, and when they saw that their attempt 
was producing a reaction, they stopped the per- 
secution of the Korean Christians, and satisfied 
themselves in limiting the activities of the 
church. At present there is pending a negotia- 
tion between the Japanese authorities and the 
missionary body in Korea concerning the mis- 
sionary schools in the peninsula. The mission 
schools in Korea have been deprived of their 
former rights under the old Korean administra- 
tion, and are denied the privileges that Christian 
mission schools enjoy in Japan proper. They 
are insidiously discriminated against by the Jap- 
anese authorities on the ground that they serve 
as the hiding places of Korean nationalism.' 

Under pretext of unifying the educational sys- 
tem of Korea and bringing it up to a " higher 
standard," the Japanese Government in Korea 
passed educational regulations which forbid re- 
ligious services and the teaching of history, 
geography, and the Korean language in all the 
schools in Korea. Furthermore, they provide 
that all Korean schools shall be under the strict 
supervision of Japanese educators, and that the 
Korean children shall be taught to salute the 
Japanese flag and worship the Japanese Em- 
peror's tablet. Korean students who go to 

'A full discussion o£ the negotiation between the Jap- 
anese authorities and the missionaries in Korea concerning 
the school regulations is given by Arthur Judson Brown in 
International Reviezv of Missions, VI : 74-99, January, 1917. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 265 

Japan to complete their education are advised 
to attend trade or technical schools, but they 
are practically barred from higher institutions 
of learning. It is almost impossible for a Ko- 
rean student to specialize in such subjects as law, 
history or economics in the Imperial University 
at Tokyo, and no Korean student is permitted 
to go to Europe or America to finish his educa- 
tion. " Korea has been Prussianized," says 
Tyler Dennett, w^ho has visited the East twice, 
once as a magazine writer, and later in connec- 
tion with the Centenary Commission of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church. " Japan has even 
gone so far as to forbid Korean students to 
come to the United States to finish their educa- 
tion. The Prussianizing of Alsace-Lorraine 
never went to such an extent as that." * 

The tragedy in the case of the Korean is that 
he suffers the fate of a conquered race, alike 
with the Poles and the Bohemians, yet his plight 
is unknown to the outside world. Japan knows 
the value of honourable intentions in the public 
opinion of the West, so she, through the clever 
manipulation of publicity propaganda, has cre- 
ated an impression in the West that she is a 
gallant knight that guards Asia from the Euro- 
pean dragon. She compares her position to- 
ward Korea and China with that of the United 
States toward the Philippines and Mexico, and 
has announced, through the Lansing-Ishii agree- 
ment of last year, her imperial policy in the 

* Tyler Dennett, "The Road to Peace, via China," Out- 
look, 117: i68-i6p, October 3, 1917. 



266 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

East as the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine." The 
same policy that undermined Korea — the policy 
of an opportunist with all its necessary accom- 
paniment of deceit, cajolery, intimidation, and 
treachery — is in full operation in China. In the 
same manner as she professed to guarantee the 
political independence and territorial integrity 
of Korea up to the very eve of the destruction 
of Korean independence, Japan now declares 
that " Japan not only will not seek to assail the 
integrity or the sovereignty of China, but will 
eventually be prepared to defend and maintain 
the integrity and independence of China against 
any aggressor," as Viscount Ishii puts it. In- 
deed, it would be the greatest of all tragedies in 
the world's history, should China, the oldest of 
nations and the cradle of Oriental civilization, 
follow the footsteps of Korea into the pit of na- 
tional destruction. Will China awake to the 
impending danger before it is too late? 



THE ROOT-TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT DE- 
CLARING THE MUTUAL POLICY OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
IN THE FAR EAST 

Imperial Japanese Embassy, 
Washington, November 30, ipiS. 
Sir: 

The exchange of views between us, which 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 267 

has taken place at the several mterviews which 
I have recently had the honour of holding Mrith 
you, has shown that Japan and the United 
States holding important outlying insular pos- 
sessions in the region of the Pacific OceaUj the 
Governments of the two countries are animated 
by a common aim, policy, and intention in that 
region. 

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, 
policy, and intention would not only tend to 
strengthen the relations of friendship and good 
neighbourhood, which have immemorially ex- 
isted between Japan and the United States, but 
would materially contribute to the preservation 
of the general peace, the Imperial Government 
have authorized me to present to you an outline 
of their understanding of that common aim, pol- 
icy, and intention : ♦ 

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to 
encourage the free and peaceful development of 
their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 

2. The policy of both Governments, uninflu- 
enced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed 
to the maintenance of the existing status quo in 
the region above mentioned and to the defense 
of the principle of equal opportunity for com- 
merce and industry in China. 

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved recip- 
rocally to respect the territorial possessions be- 
longing to each other in said region. 

4r. They are also determined to preserve the 
common interest of all powers in China by sup^ 
porting by all pacific means at their disposal the 



268 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

independence and integrity of China and the 
principle of equal opportunity for commerce and 
industry of all nations in that Empire. 

5. Should any event occur threatening the 
status quo as above described or the principle of 
equal opportunity as above defined, it remains 
for the two Governments to communicate w^ith 
each other in order to arrive at an understand- 
ing as to what measures they may consider it 
useful to take. 

If the foregoing outline accords with the view 
of the Government of the United States, I shall 
be gratified to receive your confirmation. 

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Ex- 
cellency the assurance of my highest considera- 
tion. 

K. Takahira. 
Honorable Elihu Root, 
Secretary of State. 



Department of State, 
Washington, November 30, igo8. 
Excellency : 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt 
of your note of to-day setting forth the result 
of the exchange of views between us in our re- 
cent interviews defining the understanding of 
the two Governments in regard to their policy 
in the region of the Pacific Ocean. 

It is a pleasure to inform you that this ex- 
pression of mutual understanding is welcome to 
the Government of the United States as appro- 
priate to the happy relations of the two coun- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 269 

tries and as the occasion for a concise mutual 
affirmation of that accordant policy respecting 
the Far East which the two Governments have 
so frequently declared in the past. 

I am happy to be able to confirm to Your 
Excellency, on behalf of the United States, the 
declaration of the two Governments embodied 
in the following words : 

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to 
encourage the free and peaceful development of 
their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 

2. The policy of both Governments, uninflu- 
enced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed 
to the maintenance of the existing status quo in 
the region above mentioned, and to the defense 
of the principle of equal opportunity for com- 
merce and industry in China. 

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved recip- 
rocally to respect the territorial possessions be- 
longing to each other in said region. 

4. They are also determined to preserve the 
common interests of all powers in China by sup- 
porting by all pacific means at their disposal the 
independence and integrity of China and the 
principle of equal opportunity for commerce and 
industry of all nations in that Empire. 

5. Should any event occur threatening the 
status quo as above described or the principle of 
equal opportunity as above defined, it remains 
for the two Governments to communicate with 
each other in order to arrive at an understand- 
ing as to what measures they may consider it 
useful to take. 



270 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of 
my highest consideration. 

Elihu Root. 
His Excellency 

Baron Kogora Takahiea, 
Japanese Ambassador. 



M 

THE PREMIER OF JAPAN TO THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 

A Message from Count Okuma} 

I gladly seize the opportunity to send, 
through the medium of The Independent, a mes- 
sage to the people of the United States, who 
have always been helpful and loyal friends of 
Japan. 

It is my desire to convince your people of the 
sincerity of my Government and of my people 
in all their utterances and assurances connected 
with the present regrettable situation in Europe 
and the Far East. 

Every sense of loyalty and honour oblige 
Japan to cooperate with Great Britain to clear 
from these waters the enemies who in the past, 
the present and the future menace her interests, 
her trade, her shipping and her people's lives. 

This Far Eastern situation is not of our seek- 
ing. 

* Published in The Independent (New York), August 31, 
1914. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 271 

It was ever my desire to maintain peace as 
will be amply proved; as President of the Peace 
Society of Japan I have consistently so en- 
deavoured. 

I have read with admiration the lofty mes- 
sage of President Wilson to his people on the 
subject of neutrality. 

We, of Japan, are appreciative of the spirit 
and motive that prompted the head of your 
great nation and we feel confident that his mes- 
sage will meet with a national response. 

As Premier of Japan I have stated and I nozv 
again state to the people of America and of the world 
that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure 
more territory, no thought of depriving China or any 
other peoples of anything which they now possess. 

My Government and my people have given 
their word and their pledge, which will be as 
honourably kept as Japan always keeps prom- 
ises. 

Tokyo, August 24, 1914. 

N 

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 

Official translation of Document handed to 
President Yuan Shi Kai by Mr. Hioki, the 
Japanese Minister, on January 18, 1915. 

Group I 
The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government being desirous of maintaining the 



V 



272 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

peace of Eastern Asia and of further strength- 
ening the friendly relations existing between 
the two neighbouring nations, agree to the fol- 
lowing Articles: 

Article i. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that when the Japanese Government hereafter 
approaches the German Government for the 
transfer of all rights and privileges of whatso- 
ever nature enjoyed by Germany in the Prov- 
ince of Shantung, whether secured by Treaty^ 
or in any other manner, China shall give her 
full assent thereto. 

Article 2, — The Chinese Government agrees 
that within the Province of Shantung and 
along its sea border no territory or island of any 
name or nature shall be ceded or leased to any 
third Power. 

Article 5. — The Chinese Government consents 
to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or 
Lungkou to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Rail- 
way. 

Article 4, — The Chinese Government engages, 
in the interest of trade and for the residence of 
foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible 
certain important cities and townsjn the Prov- 
ince of Shantung as commercial ports. What 
places shall be opened are to be jointly decided 
upon in a separate agreement. 

Group II 
The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government, since the Chinese Government has 
always acknowledged the special position en- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 273 

joyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles : 

Article i. — The two contracting parties mutu- 
ally agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur 
and Dalny and the term of lease of the South 
Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden 
Railway shall be extended to the period of 
ninety-nine years. 

Article ^.—Japanese subjects in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have 
the right to lease or own land required either 
for erecting suitable buildings for trade and 
manufacture or for farming. 

Article 5. — ^Japanese subjects shall be free to 
reside and travel in South Manchuria and East- 
ern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business 
and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever. 

Article 4. — The Chinese Government agrees 
to grant to Japanese subjects the right of open- 
ing the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern 
Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be 
opened, they shall be decided upon jointly. 

Article 5. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned 
herein below the Japanese Government's con- 
sent shall be first obtained before action is 
taken : 

{a) Whenever permission is granted to the 
subject of a third Power to build a railway or to 
make a loan with a third Power for the purpose 
of building a railway in South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia. 

(6) Whenever a loan is to be made with a 



274 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

third Power pledging the local taxes of South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as se- 
curity. 

Article 6. — The Chinese Government agrees 
Ithat if the Chinese Government employs polit- 
ical, financial or military advisers or instructors 
in South Manchuria or Eastern Mongolia, the 
Japanese Government shall first be consulted. 

Article f. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that the control and management of the Kirin- 
Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the 
Japanese Government for a term of ninety-nine 
years dating from the signing of this agreement. 

Group III 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government, seeing that Japanese financiers 
and the Hanyehping Company have close rela- 
tions with each other at present and desiring 
that the common interests of the two nations 
shall be advanced, agree to the following ar- 
ticles ; 

Article J.— The two contracting parties mutu- 
ally agree that when the opportune moment ar- 
rives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a 
joint concern of the two nations and they 
further agree that without the previous consent 
of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose 
of the rights and property of whatsoever nature 
of the said company nor cause the said company 
to dispose freely of the same. 

Article 2. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that all mines in the neighbourhood of those 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 275 

owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not 
be permitted, without the consent of the said 
company, to be worked by other persons outside 
of the said company ; and further agrees that if 
it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, 
it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly af- 
fect the interests of the said company, the con- 
sent of the said company shall first be obtained. 

Group IV 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government with the object of effectively pre- 
serving the territorial integrity of China agree 
to the following special article : 

The Chinese Government engages not to cede 
or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or 
island along the coast of China. 

Group V 

Article i. — The Chinese Central Government 
shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in 
political, financial, and military affairs. 

Article 2. — ^Japanese hospitals, churches and 
schools in the interior of China shall be granted 
the right of owning land. 

Article 5. — Inasmuch as the Japanese Govern- 
ment and the Chinese Government have had 
many cases of dispute between Japanese and 
Chinese police which caused no little misunder- 
standing, it is for this reason necessary that the 
police departments of important places (in 
China) shall be jointly administered by Japa- 
nese and Chinese or that the police departments 



276 DOCUMENTS m THE CASE 

of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, 
so that they may at the same time help to plan 
for the improvement of the Chinese Police 
Service. 

Article 4. — China shall purchase from Japan a 
fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per 
cent, or more of w^hat is needed by the Chinese 
Government) or that there shall be established 
in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked ar- 
senal. Japanese technical experts are to be em- 
ployed and Japanese material to be purchased. 

Article 5. — China agrees to grant to Japan the 
right of constructing a railway connecting Wu- 
chang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another 
line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and an- 
other between Nanchang and Chaochou. 

Article 6. — If China needs foreign capital to 
work mines, build railways and construct har- 
bour works (including dockyards) in the Prov- 
ince of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted. 

Article 7. — China agrees that Japanese sub- 
jects shall have the right of missionary propa- 
ganda in China. 



A RESUME OF JAPAN'S PROCEDURE IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE TWENTY- 
ONE DEMANDS' 

(a) Presentation of demands in twenty-one ar- 
* From Millard, " Our Eastern Question," pp. 147-148. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 277 

tides, coupled with a strong admonition to 
China that both haste and secrecy were insisted 
on by Japan. 

(6) Continuous pressure on China to force 
her to concede the demands en bloc, without dis- 
cussion. 

(c) Repeated warning to China not to inform 
other Powers of the negotiations, even confi- 
dentially. 

(d) First publications of news about the de- 
mands were categorically and officially denied 
by Japan. 

(e) Newspapers in Japan were warned by the 
Government not to publish or discuss news 
about the demands. 

(/) Japan's diplomatic representatives abroad 
were instructed to deny and discredit news 
about the demands. 

(g) The Minister at Peking denied to in- 
quiries of other legations that any demands had 
been made. 

(h) When copies of the original demands, 
procured from the Chinese Government, were 
received by other foreign Governments, Japan 
still denied the twenty-one demands, and pre- 
sented a list of eleven articles, omitting the most 
objectionable matters. 



278 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

P 

THE REVISED DEMANDS 

Presented by Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, 
TO the Chinese Government on April 26, 
1915, Yielded to by the Chinese Gov- 
ernment on May 8, 191 5 

Group I 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government being desirous of maintaining the 
peace of Eastern Asia and of further strength- 
ening the friendly relations existing between 
the two neighbouring nations agree to the fol- 
lowing articles : 

Article i. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that when the Japanese Government hereafter 
approaches the German Government for the 
transfer of all rights and privileges of whatso- 
ever nature enjoyed by Germany in the Prov- 
ince of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or 
in any other manner, China shall give her full 
assent thereto. 

Article 2. — The Chinese Government engages 
that within the Province of Shantung and along 
its sea border no territory or island or land of 
any name or nature shall be ceded or leased to 
any third Power. 

Article 3. — The Chinese Government consents 
that as regards the railway to be built by China 
herself from Chefoo or Lungkow, to connect 
with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Ger- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 279 

many is willing to abandon the privilege of 
financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will 
approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a 
loan. 

Article 4. — ^The Chinese Government engages, 
in the interest of trade and for the residence of 
foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as 
possible certain suitable places in the Province 
of Shantung as commercial ports. 

The Following to be Subject of an Exchange 
OF Notes: 

The places which ought to be opened are to 
be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, 
by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese 
minister must be consulted before making a de- 
cision. 

Group II 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government, with a view to developing their 
economic relations in South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following 
articles : 

Article i. — The two contracting Powers mutu- 
ally agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur 
and Dalny and the term of the South Man- 
churian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Rail- 
way, shall be extended to ninety-nine years. 

Article 2. — ^Japanese subjects in South Man- 
churia may lease or purchase necessary land for 
erecting suitable buildings for trade and manu- 
facture or for prosecuting agricultural enter- 
prises. 



280 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

Article 5. — ^Japanese subjects shall be free to 
reside and travel in South Manchuria and to en- 
gage in business and in manufacture of any- 
kind whatsoever. 

Article 3a. — The Japanese subjects referred to 
in the preceding two articles besides being re- 
quired to register with local authorities pass- 
ports, which they must procure under the exist- 
ing regulations, shall also observe police laws 
and ordinances and tax regulations which are 
approved by the Japanese Consul. Civil and 
criminal cases in which the defendants are Jap- 
anese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Jap- 
anese Consul ; those in which the defendants are 
Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chi- 
nese authorities. In either instance the authori- 
ties on the plaintiff side can send a delegate to 
attend the proceedings; but mixed civil cases 
between Chinese and Japanese relating to land 
shall be tried and adjudicated by the delegates 
of both nations conjointly in accordance with 
Chinese laws and local usage. When the judi- 
cial system in the said region is completely re- 
formed all the civil and criminal cases concern- 
ing Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by 
Chinese law courts. 

Article 4. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that Japanese subjects shall be permitted forth- 
with to investigate, select, and then prospect for 
and open mines at the following places in South 
Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in 
which mines are being prospected for or 
worked ; until the mining ordinance is definitely 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 281 

settled, methods at present in force shall be 
followed : 

Province of Feng-tien 



Locality 


District 


Mineral 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 


Coal 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


Pen-hsi 


do. 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 


do. 


T'ieh Ch'ang 


T'ung-hua 


do. 


Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin 


do. 


An Shan Chan region 


From Liao-yang 






to Pen-hsi 


Iron 



Province of Kirtn {Southern Portion) 

Sha Sung Kang Ho-Lung C. & I. 

Kang Yao Chi-lin (Kirin) Coal 

Chia P'i Kou Hua-tien Gold 

Article 5. — The Chinese Government declares 
that China will hereafter provide funds for 
building railways in South Manchuria ; if foreign 
capital is required the Chinese Government 
agrees to negotiate for a loan with Japanese 
capitalists first. 

Article ^a. — The Chinese Government agrees 
that hereafter, when a foreign loan is to be made 
on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria 
(not including customs and salt revenue on the 
security of which loans have already been made 
by the Central Government), it will negotiate 
for the loan with Japanese capitalists first. 

Article 6. — The Chinese Government declares 
that hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors 
on political, financial, military, or police matters 



282 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japa- 
nese will be employed first. 

Article 7. — The Chinese Government agrees 
speedily to make a fundamental revision of the 
Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, 
taking as a standard the provisions in railway 
loan agreements made heretofore between 
China and foreign financiers. If, in future, 
more advantageous terms than those in existing 
railway loan agreements are granted to foreign 
financiers, in connection with railway loans, the 
above agreement shall again be revised in ac- 
cordance with Japan's wishes. 

Matters Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia 

1. The Chinese Government agrees that 
whenever a loan is to be made with a third 
Power, pledging the local taxes of Eastern In- 
ner Mongolia as security, China must negotiate 
with the Japanese Government first. 

2. The Chinese Government agrees that 
China will herself provide funds for building 
the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia ; if for- 
eign capital is required she must negotiate with 
the Japanese Government first. 

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the 
interest of trade and the residence of foreigners, 
to open by herself as soon as possible certain 
suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as 
commercial ports. The places which ought to 
be opened are to be chosen and the regulations 
to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but 



DOCUMENTS IE THE CASE 283 

the Japanese Minister must be consulted be- 
fore reaching a decision. 

4. If there are Japanese and Chinese who 
desire to cooperate in agricultural enterprises, 
including incidental manufacture, the Chinese 
Government shall forthwith give its permission. 

Group III 
The relations between Japan and the Han- 
yehping Company being very intimate, if the 
said Company comes to an agreement with the 
Japanese capitalists for cooperation the Chinese 
Government shall forthwith give its consent 
thereto. The Chinese Government further 
agrees that without the consent of the Japanese 
capitalists China will not convert the company 
into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it nor 
cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other 
than Japanese. 

Group IV 
China to make a declaration by herself in ac- 
cordance with the following principle: No part 
of China's coast, bays, harbours or islands shall 
be ceded or leased to another power. 

Group V 

Yangtze Railways — to be confirmed by exchange of 
notes 

A 

As regards the right of financing by loan the 
Wuchang-Kiukiang-Nanchang Railways, the 
Nanchang-Hangchow Railway, and the Nan- 



284 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

chang-Chaochow Railway, if it is clearly ascer- 
tained that other powers have no objection 
China shall grant the said right to Japan. 

B 

As regards the right of financing by loan the 
Wuchang-Kiukiang-Nanchang Railways, the 
Nanchang-Hangchow Railway, and the Nan- 
chang-Chaochow Railway, the Chinese Govern- 
ment shall promise not to grant the said right to 
any foreign power before Japan comes to an un- 
derstanding with the power which is heretofore 
interested therein. 

Fukien — to be confirmed by exchange of notes 

The Chinese Government agrees that no 
power shall be permitted to establish along the 
coast of Fu-kien a dockyard, a coaling station 
for military use, or a naval base; nor will any 
other installations for military purposes be per- 
mitted. The Chinese Government further 
agrees that China will not use foreign capital to 
put up by herself the above-mentioned establish- 
ments or installations. 

Mr. Lu, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, stated as follows : 

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever 
in future it considers this step necessary, engage 
numerous Japanese advisers. 

2. Whenever in future Japanese subjects de- 
sire to lease or purchase land in the interior of 
.China for establishing schools or hospitals the 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 285 

Chinese Government shall forthwith give its 
consent thereto. 

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in the 
future the Chinese Government will send mili- 
tary officers to Japan to negotiate with Japanese 
military authorities the matter of purchasing 
arms or that of establishing joint arsenals. 

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as 
follows : 

As relates to the question of propagating re- 
ligion (Buddhism), the same shall be taken up 
again for negotiation in the future. 



CHINA'S REPLY TO THE JAPANESE 
ULTIMATUM 

The reply of the Chinese Government to the 
Ultimatum of the Japanese Government, de- 
livered to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs on the 8th of May, 1915. 

On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock 
p, M., the Chinese Government received an 
Ultimatum from the Japanese Government to- 
gether with an Explanatory Note of seven 
articles. The Ultimatum concluded with the 
hope that the Chinese Government up to six 
o'clock P. M. on the 9th of May, will give a satis- 
factory reply, and it is hereby declared that if 
no satisfactory reply is received before or at the 
designated time, the Japanese Government will 
take steps she may deem necessary. 



286 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

The Chinese Government with a view to pre- 
serving the peace of the Far East, hereby ac- 
cepts, with the exception of those five articles of 
Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the 
articles of Groups I, II, III and IV, and the ex- 
change of notes in connection with Fukien 
Province in Group V as contained in the re- 
vised proposals presented on the 26th of April 
and in accordance with the Explanatory Note of 
seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of 
the Japanese Government with the hope that 
thereby all outstanding questions are settled, so 
that the cordial relationship between the two 
countries may be further consolidated. The 
Japanese Minister is hereby requested to ap- 
point a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to make the literary improvement of the 
text and sign the Agreement as soon as possible. 



AMERICAN NOTE OF PROTEST IN REGARD 

TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

JAPAN AND CHINA 

Delivered to the Chinese Government by the Amer- 
ican Minister at Peking on May i6, igi5 * 

In view of the circumstances of the negotia- 
tions which have taken place or which are now 

*An identical note was handed to the Japanese Govern- 
ment through the American embassy at Tokyo. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 287 

pending between the Government of China and 
the Government of Japan and the agreements 
which have been reached and as a result thereof, 
the Government of the United States has the 
honour to notify the Government of the Chinese 
Republic that it cannot recognize any agree- 
ment or undertaking which has been entered 
into, or which may be entered into between the 
Governments of China and Japan impairing the 
treaty rights of the United States and its citi- 
zens in China, the political or territorial in- 
tegrity of the Republic of China, or the inter- 
national policy, commonly known as the open 
door policy. 



THE PEKING PETITION 

To the President of the United States, Washington: 

We whose names are subscribed to this peti- 
tion and to the accompanying Memorial do most 
urgently beg that the American Government, in 
compliance with the high mandates of the 
Christian civilization of the twentieth century, 
and in defense of the vital interests of the Amer- 
ican as well as of the Chinese republic, and in 
furtherance of the sacred cause of world peace 
on the Pacific . , . will immediately, in 



288 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

conjunction if possible with Great Britain and 
.the other powers, but if necessary alone, de- 
mand of the Chinese — not the Japanese — gov- 
ernment representation, as parties in interest, in 
the conferences on the Twenty-one Demands 
now proceeding, which demands vitally afiect 
American and world interests guaranteed under 
the Open Door Agreement. We further beg 
that, pending the arrival of such representatives 
of America and of Great Britain and other 
powers, the Chinese and Japanese Governments 
shall be requested to suspend negotiations, in 
order that the interests of all nations may be 
effectively secured against infringement. And 
still further we beg that the governments both 
of China and Japan may be notified that the 
presence of unusual bodies of Japanese troops 
on Chinese soil at this time not only embarrasses 
freedom of negotiations but constitutes an out- 
rage on the rights, and a serious menace to the 
peace and safety, of Americans and of foreigners 
generally, and that pending the removal of such 
excessive contingents of Japanese troops all 
negotiations should be suspended. With all 
sentiments of profound respect we submit this 
Petition and accompanying Memorial, claiming 
no superior wisdom but only superior oppor- 
tunities of acquaintance with the situation in its 
present serious aspect, and in its inevitable 
future consequences. We request that if not 
incompatible with the public interest this 
Petition and Memorial, with our names at- 
tached, may be communicated to the Associated 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 289 

Press for such further use as may serve the in- 
terests involved. 

Peking, Easter, 1915^ 
Charles F. Hubbard, 

Minister of the Union Foreign Churcht 
W. A. P. Martin, 

Ex-President of the Imperial Universityf 
Chauncey Goodrich, 

Chairman of the Mandarin Revision Committeej, 
H. H. LowRY, 

President of Peking University. 
John Whorry, 

Chairman of the Union Wen-Li Bible Revision 
Committee. 
Courtney H. Fenn, 

Principal Union Theological College* 
Edward W. Thwing, 

Superintendent International Reform Bureau. 



THE LANSING-ISHH AGREEMENT 

Department of State, 
Washington, November 2, 1917. 
Excellency : 

I have the honour to communicate herein my 
understanding of the agreement reached by us 
in our recent conversation touching the ques- 
tions of mutual interest to our governments re- 
lating to the Republic of China. 

In order to silence mischievous reports that 
have from time to time been circulated, it is 
believed by us that a public announcement once 



290 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

more of the desires and intentions shared by our 
two governments with regard to China is ad- 
visable. 

The Governments of the United States and 
Japan recognize that territorial propinquity 
creates special relations between countries, and, 
consequently, the Government of the United 
States recognizes that Japan has special in- 
terests in China, particularly in the part to 
which her possessions are contiguous. 

The territorial sovereignty of China, never- 
theless, remains unimpaired, and the Govern- 
ment of the United States has every confidence 
in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japa- 
nese Government that, while geographical 
position gives Japan such special interests, they 
have no desire to discriminate against the trade 
of other nations or to disregard the commercial 
rights heretofore granted by China in treaties 
with other powers. 

The Governments of the United States and 
Japan deny that they have any purpose to in- 
fringe in any way the independence or territorial 
integrity of China, and they declare, further- 
more, that they always adhere to the principle 
of the so-called " open door," or equal oppor- 
tunity for commerce and industry in China. 

Moreover, they mutually declare that they 
are opposed to the acquisition by any Govern- 
ment of any special rights or privileges that 
would affect the independence or territorial in- 
tegrity of China, or that would deny to the sub- 
jects or citizens of any country the full enjoy- 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 291 

ment of equal opportunity in the commerce and 
industry of China. 

I shall be glad to have your Excellency con- 
firm this understanding of the agreement 
reached by us. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of 
my highest consideration. 

(Signed) Robert Lansing. 

His Excellency, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, 

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
of Japan, on special mission^ 

The Special Mission of Japan, 
Washington, November 2, 1917* 
Sir: 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt 
of your note of to-day, communicating to me 
your understanding of the agreement reached 
by us in our recent conversations touching the 
questions of mutual interest to our governments 
relating to the Republic of China. 

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, un- 
der authorization of my government, the un- 
derstanding in question set forth in the follow- 
ing terms : 

[Here the Special Ambassador repeats the 
language of the agreement as given in Secre- 
tary Lansing's note.] 

(Signed) K. Ishii. 

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
of Japan, on special mission. 

Honorable Robert Lansing, 
Secretary of State. 



292 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

u 

THE NEW SINO-JAPANESE MILITARY 
AGREEMENT 

The Substance of the Secret Agreement Concluded 
on March ig, 1918, between Premier Tuan Chi-jui 
of China and the Japanese Military Commission 
in Peking.^ (From Millard's Review, Shanghai, 
China, May 25, 1918.) 

Just why there has been so much secrecy con- 
cerning the nature of the negotiations between 
Japan and China which are now said to be ter- 
minated if indeed they are of so excellent a 
nature as the guarded statements concerning 
them would lead one to believe, is rather hard 
to understand. . . . The public can gain 
some sort of an idea as to the nature of the new 
agreement by a perusal of the following trans- 
lation of the purported agreement as it has been 
made public in some of the native newspapers : 

Article I. — In view of the penetration of enemy 
influence into the eastern territory of Russia, 
and of the likelihood of the peace of the two con- 
tracting parties being disturbed thereby, China 
and Japan mutually agree actively to undertake 
the obligations of war participation by measures 
designed jointly to guard against the action of 
the enemy. 

*A full discussion of the agreement is given in Millard's 
Review (Shanghai), May 25, 1918, vol. IV, pp. 453-455. 
457-463, 480-483. 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 293 

Article II. — The two countries shall mutually 
recognize and respect the equality of the other 
regarding position and interests in carrying out 
joint military measures. 

Article III. — When it is necessary to take ac- 
tion based on this agreement, orders will be 
issued by both China and Japan to their troops 
and people, calling on them to be frankly sincere 
in dealing with each other in the area of mili- 
tary operations; and the Chinese officials shall 
cooperate and assist the Japanese troops in the 
area involved so that there may be no hindrance 
to military movements. Japanese troops shall 
on their part respect Chinese sovereignty and 
shall not cause any inconvenience to the Chinese 
people by violating local customs and traditions. 

Article IV. — Japanese troops in Chinese terri- 
tory shall withdraw from China as soon as war 
is ended. 

Article V. — If it be found necessary to send 
troops outside of Chinese territory, troops will 
be jointly sent by the two countries. 

Article VI. — The war area and war respon- 
sibilities shall be fixed by mutual arrangement 
of the military authorities of the two countries 
as and when occasion arises in accordance with 
their respective military resources. 

Article VII. — In the interests of convenience, 
the military authorities of the two countries 
shall undertake the following affairs during the 
period necessary for the execution of joint 
measures : — 

1. The two countries shall mutually assist 



294 DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 

and facilitate each other in extending the means 
of communications (post and telegraph) in con- 
nection with military movements and trans- 
portation. 

2. When necessary for war purposes con- 
struction operations may be carried on and the 
same shall be decided, when occasion arises, by 
mutual consent of the chief commanders of the 
two countries. The said construction-opera- 
tions shall be removed when the war is ended. 

3. The two countries shall mutually supply 
each other with military supplies and raw mate- 
rials for the purpose of jointly guarding against 
the enemy. The quantity to be supplied shall 
be limited to the extent of not interfering with 
the necessary requirements of the country sup- 
plying the same. 

4. Regarding questions of military sanita- 
tion in the war area the two countries shall 
render mutual assistance to each other. 

5. Officers directly concerned with war 
operations shall mutually be sent by the two 
countries for cooperation (the two countries 
shall exchange staff officers for military co- 
operations?). If one party should ask for the 
assistance of technical experts, the other shall 
supply the same. 

6. For convenience; military maps of the 
area of war operations will be exchanged. 

Article VIII. — When the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
way is used for military transportation, the pro- 
visions of the original treaty relating to the 
management and protection of the said line shall 



DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE 295 

be respected. The method of transportation 
shall be decided as occasion arises. 

Article IX. — Details regarding the actual per- 
formance of this Agreement shall be discussed 
by mutual agreement of the delegates appointed 
by the Military Authorities of the two countries 
concerned. 

Article X. — Neither of the two countries shall 
disclose the contents of the Agreement and its 
appendix, and the same shall be treated as mili- 
tary secrets. 

Article XI. — This Agreement shall become 
valid when it is approved by both governments 
after being signed by the military representa- 
tives of the two countries. As to the proper 
moment for the beginning of war operations, 
the same shall be decided by the highest organs 
of the two countries. The provisions of this 
Agreement and the detailed steps arising there- 
from shall become null and void on the day the 
joint war measures against the enemy end. 

Article XII. — Two copies of the Chinese and 
of the Japanese text of this Agreement shall be 
drawn, one of each shall be kept by China and 
Japan. The Chinese and Japanese texts shall 
be identical in meaning. 



Selected Bibliography 

I. Bibliographies 
There are no general bibliographies covering the 
Orient. The following are a few of the most im- 
portant on special topics and countries : 
. Courant, M., Bibliographie Coreanne (3 Vols., 

Paris, 1896). 
V Select List of Books (with references to peri- 
odicals) Relating to the Far East, and Select 
List of References on Chinese Immigration, 
compiled by A. P. C. Griffin, Library of Con- 
gress, Washington, 1904. 
Japan Year Book, bibliography (Tokyo). 
Von Wenckstern, F., Bibliography of the Japa- 
nese Empire (Vol. i, Leiden, 1895; Vol. 2, 
Tokyo, 1907). 
Bibliographies appear at the end of each coun- 
try in: 

The Encyclopedia Britannica (nth edition, 

London, 1910). 
The New International Encyclopedia (2d edi- 
tion, New York, 1914). 
Statesman's Year Book (London). 
For all books published on the subject in the British 
Empire consult: 

British Museum Catalogues (London). 
The Publishers' Circular ltd. (Fetter Lane, E. C, 
London). 
For American publications consult : 
Book Review Digest (monthly) and Record of 
Cumulative Book Index (annual), published 
by the H. W. Wilson Co., White Plains, N. Y. 
296 



SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 297 

Publishers' Trade List Annual and The Pub- 
lishers' Weekly, published by the R. R. Bow- 
ker Co., New York City. 

United States Catalogue of Books in Print (Jan. 
I, 1912). 

United States Library of Congress Catalogue. 



II. Sources 

Treaties, Documents, Government Reports, Mem- 
oirs, etc. : 

, Drage, Geoffrey, Russian Affairs, Appendix, 
647-729 (London, 1904). 

. Hertlet, China Treaties: Treaties, etc., between 
Great Britain and China, and between China 
and Foreign Powers, 3d Edition, 2 Vols. 
(London, 1908). 
y-McKenzie, F. A., The Tragedy of Korea, Ap- 
pendix, 263-312 (New York, 1907). 

„ Mannix, W. F., Memoirs of Li Hung Chang 
(New York, 1913). 

V Millard, Thomas F., Our Eastern Question, Ap- 
pendix, 393-543 (New York, 1916). 

* Pooley, A. M., The Secret Memoirs of Count 
Tadasu Hayashi (London, 1915). 
Consult also the United States Statutes at Large, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, Foreign Relations, 
Consular and Trade Reports (Government 
Printing Office, Washington). 

The Bureau of Statistics has published : 

Commercial China in 1^04: Area, Popidation, 
Production, Railways, Telegraphs, and Trans- 
portation Routes, and Foreign Commerce and 
Commerce of the United States with China 
(Summary of Commerce and Finance, Jan- 
uary, 1904). 
Commercial Japan in 1904: Area, Population, 
Production, Railways, Telegraphs, and Trans- 
portation Routes, and Foreign Commerce and 



298 SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 

"Commerce of the Unitel States with Japan 
(Summary of Commerce and Finance, Feb- 
ruary, 1904). 
Much source material will be found in the 

British Parliamentary Papers, China. 
♦^British Foreign Office Reports on the Trade of 
Korea, Annual Series. 
British Annual Consular Reports (London). < 
Chinese Imperial Customs Reports (Shanghai), 
Japanese Official Publications (Tokyo) : 

Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889). 
Financial and Economic Annual of Japan. 
Reports of the Various Government Departments 

(annual). 
Returns of the Foreign Commerce and Trade of 
Japan (annual). 
The Japanese Government also publishes the fol- 
lowing books primarily for the purpose of informing 
the Western public : 

^ Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in 

Chosen (Seoul). 
^ Korea Year Book (Seoul). 
. An Official Guide to Eastern Asia: Vol. I., Man- 
churia and Chosen; Vols. 11. and III., Japan; 
Vol. IV. China (Tokyo and London, 1916). 

III. Secondary Works on Political, Historical, 
Economic, and Diplomatic Relations 

A. Histories: 

Boulger, Demetrius C, The History of China, 

revised edition (London, 1900). 
Brinkley, Frank, Japan and China, 12 Vols. 
(London, 1903-1904). 
*■ Griffis, William Elliot, Corea, the Hermit Nation 
(New York, 1897). 
" The Mikado's Empire, 2 Vols, (New 
York, 1904). 
^ Hosic, Alexander, Manchuria: Its People, Re- 
sources, and History (London, 1901). 



SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 299 

V Hulbert, H. B., The History of Korea, 3 Vols. 
(Seoul, 1905). 
Longford, Joseph H., The Story of Old Japan 
(London, 1910). 
«^ " The Story of Korea (New York, 
1911). 
Macgowan, J., A History of China from the 
Earliest Days Down to the Present (London, 
1897). 
McLaren, Walter W., A Political History of 
Japan During the Meiji Era, i86'^-igi2 (New 
York, 1916). 
Parker, Edward H., China, Past and Present 

(London, 1903). 
Williams, Samuel W., A History of China (New 
York, 1897). 
** The Middle Kingdom, 2 Vols. (New 
York, 1883). 

B. American Relations with the Far East : 
Callahan, J. M., American Relations in the Pa- 
cific and the Far East (Baltimore, 1901). 

Colquhoun, A. R., Greater America (New York, 

1904). 
Coolidge, A. C, The United States as a World 

Power (New York, 1908). 
c^ Fish, Carl Russell, American Diplomacy (New 

York, 1915). 
Foster, John W., American Diplomacy in the 

Orient (New York, 1903). 
Latane, J. H., America as a World Power 

(American Nation, XXV., New York, 1907). 

C. American- Japanese Relations Including the 
Question of Japanese Immigration, Naturalization in 
America, etc. 

Flowers, Montaville, Japanese Conquest of^ 
American Opinion (New York, 1916)5 



300 SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Gulick, Sidney L., The American Japanese 
Problem (New York, 1914). 
" American Democracy and Asiatic Citi- 
zenship (New York, 1918). 
Kawakami, K. K., American Japanese Relations 
(New York, 1912). 
" Asia at the Door (New York, 1914). 

Japan to America, edited by Naoichi Masaoka 

(Japan, 1915). 
Mills, Harry Alvin, The Japanese Problem in the 

United States (New York, 1914). 
Nitobe, Inazo O., Intercourse between the United 

States and Japan (Baltimore, 1891). 
America to Japan, edited by Lindsay Russell 

(New York, 1915). 
Steiner, J. F., The Japanese Invasion (Chicago, 

1917). 
Treat, Payson J., Early Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States and Japan (Balti- 
more, 1917). 
[Books on Chinese Immigration are not listed in 
this bibliography. Those who desire to study the 
subject should consult Select List of References on 
Chinese Immigration, compiled by A. P. C. Grififin, 
Library of Congress, Washington, 1904.] 



D. China- Japanese War: 
History of Peace Negotiations between China 

and Japan, officially revised (Tientsin, 1895). 
United States Fom^rw i?^/ofioMJ, 1894, appendix i. 
" Vladimir," The China- Japanese War (London, 

1896). 



E. Boxer War : 
British Parliamentary Papers (1900), China, 

Nos. 3, 4. 

Clements, Paul H., The Boxer Rebellion: A 

J 



SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 301 

Political and Diplomatic Review in Columbia 
University Studies in History, Economics and 
Public Law, Vol. 66 (New York, 1915). 

Martin, W. A. P., The Siege in Peking (New 
York, 1900). 

Rockhill, W. W., Report on Affairs in China, 
published in Foreign Relations (1901). 

Thompson, H. C, China and the Powers (Lon- 
don, 1902). 

F. Russo-Japanese War: 

Asakawa, K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its 

Causes and Issues (New York, 1904). 
Hershey, Amos S., The International Law and 

Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New 

York, 1906). 
Kuropatkin, A. M., The Russian Army and the 

Japanese War (London, 1909). 
McCarthy, Michail J., The Coming Power (Lon- 
don, 1905). 
Ross, C, The Russo-Japanese War (London, 

1912). 
Sedgwick, F. R., The Russo-Japanese War 

(New York, 1909). 
Smith, F. E., International Law as Interpreted 

during the Russo-Japanese War (Boston, 

1907). 
War Department, U. S. Army, Epitome of the 

Russo-Japanese War (Washington). 

G. Political and Economic Questions : 
Blakeslee, G. H. (Editor), China and the Far 

East (Clark University Lectures, New York, 

1910). 
Brown, Arthur Judson, The Mastery of the Far 

East (New York, 1919). 
Colquhoun, A. C, The Mastery of the Pacific 

(New York, 1902). 



302 SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Douglas, R. K., Europe and the Far East (Lon- 
don, 1913). 
Gulick, Sidney L., The White Peril in the Far 

East (New York, 1905). 
Harding, Gardner L., Present-day China (New 
York, 1916). 
V Hombeck, Stanley K., Contemporary Politics in 
the Far East (New York. 1916). 
Hozumi, N., The New Japanese Civil Code 

(Tokyo, 1904). 
Hsu, Mongton Chih, Railway Problems in China 
(Columbia University Studies in History, 
Economics, and Public Law, Vol. 66, New 
York, 1915). 
Japan Year Book (Tokyo). 
The Japan Directory (annual), published by 

Japan Gazette (Yokohama). 
Kent, P. H., Railway Enterprise in China .(Lon- 
don, 1907). 
Knapp, A. M., Feudal and Modern Japan (Bos- 
ton, 1897). 
Lawton, Lancelot, Empires of the Far East 

(Boston, 1912). 
Lee, Homer, The Valor of Ignorance (New 
/ York, 1909). 
VLenox, Simpson Bertram, Manchu and Musco- 
vite (New York, 1904). 
^ ** The True in the East and Its Aftermath 

(New York, 1907). 
" " The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia 
(New York, 1908). 
Little, A., The Far East (London, 1905). 
%McKenzie, F. A., The Tragedy of Korea (New 
York, 1907). 
\ " The Unveiled East (New York 

1907). 
Mahan, A. T., The Problem of Asia and its 
Effect on International Policies (Boston, 
1900). 



SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 303 

Martin, W. A. P., The Awakening of China 

(New York, 1907). 
Millard, Thomas F., The New Far East (New 
York, 1906). 
" America and the Far Eastern Question 

(New York, 1909). 
" Our Eastern Question (New York, 

1916). 
" Democracy and the Eastern Question 
(New York, 1919). 
The New Atlas and Gazetteer of China, pub- 
lished by the North-China Daily News (Shang- 
hai, 1917). 
Norman, Henry, The Peoples and Politics of the 

Far East (New York, 1895). 
Okuma, Count ShigenolDU, Fifty Years of New 
Japan, English version edited by Marcus B. 
Huish, 2 Vols. (London, 1909). 
Porter, Robert P., Japan, the New World Power 

(London, 1915). 
Reinsch, Paul S., World Politics (New York, 
1900). 
" Intellectual and Political Currents in 
the Far East (New York, 1911). 
Wagel, S. R., Chinese Currency and Banking 

(Shanghai, 1915). 
China Year Book, edited by H. G. W. Wood- 
head and H. T. Montague Bell (London). 
Yen, H. L., A Survey of Constitutional Develop' 
ment in China (New York, 191 1). 



IV. Books of Travel, Description, and 

Interpretation 
Allen, Horace N., Things Korean (New York, 

1908). 
Ball, J. D., Things Chinese (Hongkong, 1903). 
Birth, J. G., Travels in North and Central China 

(London, 1902). 



304 SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Bishop, Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks of Ja- 
pan, 2 Vols, (fourth edition, London, 
1885). 
" Korea and Her Neighbors, 2 Vols. 

(London, 1897). 
" The Yangtze Valley and Beyond, 2 Vols. 
(New York, 1900). 
Chamberlain, B. H., Things Japanese (fifth edi- 
tion, London, 1905). 
Clarke, J. L C., Japan at First Hand (New 

York, 1918). 
Davidson, J. W., The Island of Formosa (Lon- 
don, 1903). 
Dickinson, G. Lowes, Letters from a Chinese 
Official (New York, 1903). 
" An Essay on the Civilization of India, 
China, and Japan (London, 1914). 
Fang, Wu Ting, America Through the Specta- 
cles of an Oriental Diplomat (New York, 
1914). 
Finck, Henry T., Lotus Time in Japan (New 

York, 1898). 
Griffis, W. E., The Religions of Japan (New 
York, 1895). 
" The Mikado — Institution and Person 
(Princeton University Press, 1915). 
Gulick, Sidney L., Evolution of the Japanese 

(New York, 1903). 
Hamilton, Angus, Korea (London, 1903). 
Hearn, Lafcadio, Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan 
(New York, 1894). 
" Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation 
(New York, 1904). 
Hulbert, H. B., The Passing of Korea (New 
York, 1906). 
«- Kemp, E. G., The Face of Manchuria, Korea, 

and Russian Turkestan (London, 1912). 
V Lowell, Percival, Chosen: the Land of Morning 
Calm (London, 1886). 



SELECTED BIBLIOGBAPHT 306 

Mabie, H. W., Japan To-day and To-morrow 

(New York, 1914). 
Martin, W. A. P., The Lore of Cathay (New- 
York, 1901). 
Nitobe, I., Bushido (New York, 1905). 

" The Japanese Nation (New York, 
1912). 
Ross, E. A., The Changing Chinese (New York, 

1911). 
Scherer, James A. B., Japan To-day (Philadel- 
phia, 1904). 
" Young Japan (Philadelphia, 1905). 
Smith, Arthur H., Village Life in China (New 
York, 1899). 
^ Starr, Frederick, Korean Buddhism (Boston, 
1918). 

V. Newspapers and Magazines Devoted to Far 
Eastern Affairs 

A. Published in the West : 

Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Associa- 
tion (monthly, New York). 

The Asiatic Review (formerly The Asiatic 
Quarterly, published every six weeks, Lon- 
don). 

The Chinese Review (monthly, London). 

Japan Society Bulletin (published by the Japan 
Society of America, New York). 

Revue d'Asiatique, published by La soceite del 
Asiatique (monthly, Paris). 

B. In China : 

(i) Periodicals: 

The Chinese Recorder (monthly, Shanghai). 
The Chinese Social and Political Science 
Review (quarterly, Peking). 
' The Far East (monthly, Shanghai). 
s^,The Far Eastern Review (weekly, Shang- 
hai). 



306 SELECTED BIBLIOGEAPHT 

Millard's Review (weekly, Shanghai). 
The National Review (monthly, Shanghai). 
North-China Herald (weekly, Shanghai). 
(2) Dailies: 

China Press (Shanghai). 
North-China Daily News (Shanghai). 
Peking Gazette (Peking). 
Peking Daily News (Peking). 
Shanghai Gazette (Shanghai). 

) C. In Japan : 

(i) Periodicals: 

The Far East (weekly, Tokyo). 

The Japan Magazine (monthly, Tokyo).- 

The New East (monthly, Tokyo). 

Oriental Economist (trimonthly, Tokyo). 

Tokyo Economist (weekly, Tokyo). 
(2) Dailies: 

Japan Advertiser (Tokyo). 

Japan Chronicle (formerly Kobe Chronicle, 
Kobe). 

Japan Gazette (Yokohama). 

Japan Mail (Tokyo). 

Japan Times (Tokyo). 

Kobe Herald (Kobe). 

Nagasaki Press (Nagasaki). 

D. In Korea : 
j The Korea Magazine (a monthly started by 
American missionaries in Korea, January, 
1917, devoted to ancient culture and civiliza- 
tion of Korea; published in Seoul). 
Seoul Press (an English daily subsidized by the 
Japanese Government; published in Seoul). 



Printed in tht United States of Ameriea 



